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•You adapt what you do to the circumstances of the 
case, the will of the parties and the necessities."
Philip Noel-Baker
-iii-
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PREFACE
This study is an attempt to determine the Security 
Council's effectivness in maintaining peace in a dispute of 
the nature anticipated by the framers of the Charter. The 
Kashmir question is peculiarly adapted to such a study.
Great power rivalry has rarely intruded and the veto power 
has not been a factor. The duration of the dispute affords 
an opportunity to observe Council adjustment to long-term 
developments. And the Council has employed various dispute- 
settling devices in seeking a solution.
Although but one element in the broader India-Pakistan 
question, the Kashmir issue initiated Council consideration 
of the greater controversy and remains by far the most im­
portant aspect. The additional issues figure in the study 
only where they are related directly to the Kashmir problem.
It is hoped that this investigation contributes to a 
clearer understanding of Council capabilities. In narrowing 
the area of disagreement and in bringing the parties within 
sight of a settlement, the Council has aided in forestalling 
open hostilities between India and Pakistan. Not the ultimate 
answer to international strife, the Council may yet contribute 
to peace, if only negatively by delaying war until martial 
passions have cooled.
D. F. G.
-iv-
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CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUNDS 
I
Each of the modern world's political phenomena is a 
visible result of myriad influences, a web of complexities 
clearly comprehended only in relation to all factors, past 
and present, which affect it. No problem in international 
politics has exclusive origin in a specific date or isolated 
incident* Yet at some one point in the development of a 
situation it may be possible to say that this event or this 
date, while not the genesis, is of such significance that it 
may serve as a logical beginning for a study of the problem. 
There exists today a complicated and prolonged dispute, al­
ready of almost five-years duration, between India and Pak­
istan over possession of a political unit called Kashmir.
Many events were of great importance in the development of 
the Kashmir dispute. One stands out as marking something of 
a critical point between the generation of a dangerous situ­
ation over long centuries and the succession of incidents in 
recent history that carried ancient sores to the point of 
eruption.
On August 15, 1947, after three centuries of dominion 
in India, Great Britain granted full powers of self-governSmg^
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to the provisional administrations of Pakistan and the Indian 
Union. Not least among the problems facing the young domin­
ions during the first weeks of independence was the status, 
present and future, of several hundred semiautonomous princi­
palities which had been morticed with British-administered 
provinces in the framework of the Indian Empire. Theoretical­
ly, liquidation of British suzerainty left the princely states 
independent nations, free to remain independent or to seek 
union with either India or Pakistan. Their official position 
had been one of alliance rather than subjugation to the Brit­
ish Crown. The practicalities of modern politics, however, 
appeared to dictate early accession to whichever dominion a 
given state was most closely associated with through geogra­
phy, economy, and religion. A majority of state governments 
immediately sought accession; a few, including several of the 
most important, did not.
Outstanding among the uncommitted states was Jammu 
and Kashmir, coveted by India and Pakistan because of its 
great size and its strategic and economic value. Kashmir’s 
maharaja. Sir Hari Singh,^ was still negotiating with both 
dominions on the question of accession when, October 22, 1947, 
an armed force entered the state from the direction of Paki­
stan. The onslaught shattered the weak state forces and
IColonel H. H. Maharaja Sir Hari Singh, 1895- , is
the fourth member of the Hindu Dogra dynasty, originally a 
princely Rajput family in the service of the Sikhs, to rule 
in Kashmir. A great grandson of the founder of the line, 
Gulab Singh, Sir Hari Singh succeeded to the throne in 1925.
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upset Kashmir's political equilibrium* Their identity was 
not yet certain before the invaders were besieging Srinagar, 
the capital* Powerless to halt the incursion with the rem­
nant of an army at his disposal, the maharaja pledged immedi­
ate union with India in return for military aid in the defense 
of his possessions.
The Indian government promptly accepted the offer and, 
over bitter Pakistani protests, rushed contingents of the 
Indian army to the aid of Srinagar's defenders. Within days 
India and Pakistan were close to open belligerency over ques­
tions of the identity and supply sources of the invaders, the 
legality of Kashmir's accession to India, and the religious 
and political preferences of the state's inhabitants. While 
hostilities continued in Kashmir, the dominion governments 
exchanged accusations, demands, and proposals, but two months 
of negotiation distinguished by absence of any inclination 
toward compromise failed to produce even a sign of agreement. 
On January 1, 1948, India referred the dispute to the United 
Nations Security Council, and Kashmir became a world problem.
II
Jammu and Kashmir is territorially the largest of the 
Indian states although its 84,000 square miles are largely a 
rugged and sparsely settled Himalayan mountain region. Situ­
ated at the northern tip of the former Indian Empire, the 
state consists of nine provincial districts— Kathua, Jammu, 
Udhampur, Mirpur, Riasi, Poonch, Kashmir South, Kashmir North,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and Muzaffarabad— in the southwest; the eastern, semi-Tibetan 
territories of Ladakh and Baltistan; and the northern tribu­
tary areas of Gilgit, Gilgit Agency, Gilgit Wazarat, Chilas, 
and the Tribal Territory. Kashmir’s heart and its richest 
district is the Vale of Kashmir which lies in the districts 
of Kashmir North and Kashmir South. Within the narrow confines 
of this famous valley are Srinagar and over one-third of Kash^ 
mir’s four million people. The Vale is the true prize at 
dispute between India and Pakistan. Kashmir’s southern and 
western boundaries touch the Punjab provinces of India and 
Pakistan and Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province, Along 
an undefined frontier in the north and east lie Afghanistan, 
the Chinese provinces of Tibet and Sinkiang, and— perhaps—  
the Soviet Union:
This is an undemarcated border of doubtful location 
in wild tribal country, much of which is above the 
clouds. The best maps show that a finger of China’s 
Sinkiang Province intervenes between Kashmir and 
Soviet territory, but the Indian Government under­
stands. • • that Russian control begins where one 
leaves Kashmir in the High Pamirs, on the Roof of the World,2
Historically, Kashmir has faced the region that has 
become Pakistan. The cities of the Indus valley are natural 
markets for the state’s timber, woodwork, woolens, and agri­
cultural produce.3 The sole rail connection with the outside
^The New York XuûSlS.» December 1, 1947, The agreement 
of Kabul between Russia and Great Britain in 1893 vaguely 
drew boundaries in this region, Afghanistan acquired a nar­
row panhandle across the top of India (Kashmir) which was 
intended to meet a shorter extension from Chinese Sinkiang. 
However, the latter was never clearly delimited.
^Government of Pakistan, Iba Story sd. Kashmir (New 
York: Pakistan Delegation to the Security Council, 1951), p. 3,
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world is a spur line from Sialkot in West Punjab to Jammu and, 
until recently, the only all-weather roads led to the West 
Punjab and the Northwest Frontier Province. Four of the great 
rivers of Pakistan, the Indus, the Jhelum, the Chenab, and the 
Ravi, whose waters are lifeblood to irrigated areas in Paki­
stan, rise in or flow through Kashmir. At a number of sites 
in the mountains of Kashmir the rivers offer possibilities 
for hydroelectric developments which could balance Pakistan's 
lack of coal. For Pakistan, these are reasons why "the gov­
ernance of all Kashmir by a potentially hostile India has been
4a prospect too fearful to be borne."
»
The modern Kashmiri is a cousin of the Punjabi to the 
south, although Ladakh, or Little Tibet, in the northeast is 
inhabited by a small Mongol-Buddhist population. Largely 
peasants, the Kashmiris are predominantly Moslem with a Hindu 
and Sikh minority, the latter a variant of Hinduism, concen­
trated in Jammu, close to the Indian border.^
Kashmir's remoteness and mountainous topography enabled 
it to enjoy a detached and solitary existence as an independent 
Hindu state prior to the Moslem invasions of India, Little 
affected by the early Islamic incursions, beginning in 
664 A.D., it at last fell under Moslem domination in the
^"Kashmir and Jammu," Round Table,XL (June, 1950), 
p. 218. Pakistan has reason to fear Indian control of the 
rivers. Partition gave India the headwaters of canal systems 
irrigating West Punjab, India began to divert the waters to 
its own Punjab regions, cutting off Pakistan's water supply.
^Government of Indian, Kashmir IsSüg. (Delhi; Min­
istry of Information and Broadcasting, n,d,j, pp« 1-2*
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fourteenth century and most of the population was forcibly 
converted to Mohammedanism. With the annexation of Kashmir 
%» the Moguls In 1586, the Vale became the summer capital of 
the Empire but by the middle of the eighteenth century a 
measure of independence had returned. As Mogul dominion wilt­
ed before the expanding power of both British and Sikhs, the 
governor of Kashmir began to exercise authority independently 
of the capital at Delhi.*
Scarcely had autonomy been achieved before warlike 
Pathans overwhelmed the Vale and established an independent 
Moslem dynasty. By 1800 the Sikhs had driven the Moguls from 
the Punjab and in 1819 they wrested Kashmir from the Pathans,
only to lose it to the British in 1846 following the first 
7Sikh war. Uninterested at the time in their acquisition,
the British, In the Treaty of Amritsar, ceded the Vale to
8Gulab Singh, a Hindu of the Dogra sect and ruler of the small 
principality of Jammu under Sikh suzerainty, v/ho offered to 
pay the 7,5 million-rupee indemnity (about $2,250,000) levied 
upon the defeated Sikhs. Already in control of the Ladakh 
and Baltistan areas bordering the Vale, Gulab Singh consoli-
FitzGerald-Lee, "Kashmir," CjBntg.mp9r.ary Review. 
CLXXIX (February, 1951), p. 93.
7sir William Barton, "Pakistan’s Claim to Kashmir," 
FOieAan A£faix.,S» XXVIII (January, 193), pp. 299-300.
®Gulab Singh, a Rajput chieftain raised to high 
office under the Sikhs, received the principality of Jammu 
from the Sikh leader Ranjit Singh. After the Battle of 
Sabraon concluded the first Sikh war, in which he was neutral, 
Gulab Singh was a spokesman for the Sikhs in arranging peace 
with the British,
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dated his territories, transferred his capital to Srinagar, 
and established the modern ruling house on the soil of Kash­
mir.
The Dogra administration followed a typically auto­
cratic pattern. The household expenses and privy purse of 
the maharaja consumed approximately one-third of the state 
revenue while public services were ignored. Dogras and royal 
favorites, almost invariably Hindu, filled government posi­
tions and exclusively controlled the militia; the Moslem 
peasant population was forbidden arms of any description.
The prime ministers, usually Hindu Punjabis, were non-Kash­
miris and a few Dogra nobles possessed most of the land in 
large feudal grants:
Against the discontent which the perpetuation of 
an antiquated land system and arbitrary rule in­
evitably aroused, the Dogra regime was explicitly 
safeguarded by its peculiar relation to the imper­
ial authorities. Together with the other princely 
states which had helped the British" put down the 
famous ^êpoy Rebellion of 1857, Kashmir came to be 
treated as an especially valuable prop of empire.?
An uprising in 1930 was the first serious attempt to 
temper the maharaja's power. Despite aid from the British in 
suppressing the rebellion, the prince was compelled to concede 
elementary civil liberties and to establish a legislature of 
limited powers. In the new atmosphere of relative freedom.
^Alice Thorner, "Issues in Kashmir," Far Eastern 
Survey. XVII (August 11, 1948), p. 174. Two Indian spokes­
men, Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Sir Senegal Narsing Rau, in 
Council discussions on the Kashmir question were at one 
time prime ministers of Kashmir.
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Sheikh Mohammed A b d u l l a h , @ young Moslem educated In India, 
founded the All-Jammu and Kashmir Moslem Conference which, 
although linked with the nonsectarian Congress party In India, 
was conceived as a defender of Moslem rights. In 1938 Jawa­
harlal Nehru,H a close personal friend, advised Sheikh 
Abdullah to open the ranks of the Conference to all Kashmiris, 
Irrespective of caste or religion. The organization, renamed 
the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, soon became an 
Important force In Kashmir’s politics. Its sole rival, save 
for the maharaja’s personalized government, was an exclusively 
Moslem party formed when a few of the original members split 
with Sheikh Abdullah. The Moslems revived the old name and 
followed the political lead of the conservative and communal- 
minded Moslem League In India. But in Kashmir, as well as 
throughout India, Sheikh Abdullah was recognized as the state’s 
outstanding popular leader.When, In a memorandum to the
lOshelkh Mohammed Abdullah, 1905- , Is the son of a
craftsman from the village of Soura near Srinagar. After 
working his way through the University of Allgarth In India, 
he returned to Kashmir to find success In a professional 
field virtually Impossible for a Moslem. His original Moslem 
Conference was Intended as a rallying point for advocators 
of Moslem rights.
llpandlt Jawaharlal Moll Ata Nehru, 1889- , Is of
Kashmiri descent himself. Educated In England, he entered 
politics in 1918 as secretary of the Home-Rule League In 
Allahabad. He joined the Congress party In 1920, gaining 
recognition as the leader of the Socialist wing. A member of 
the viceroy’s council In 1939, Nehru was vice-president and 
minister of external affairs In the interim government of 
1946. He has been prime minister and minister of foreign 
affairs of the Indian Union since 1947. In 1946 he was for­
bidden entry to Kashmir to defend Sheikh Abdullah, on trial 
for agitating against the maharaja’s government.
l^Thorner, JsiSi* £il*
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British cabinet mission of 1946, he denounced the Treaty of 
Amritsar and intitiated a "Quit Kashmir!" campaign against 
the maharaja, the prince reacted promptly by arranging the 
Sheikh's seventh imprisonment at a moment when unrest in 
Kashmir was about to erupt in violence,
Modern communications had begun to penetrate the moun­
tain principality, destroying the isolation which in the past 
had enabled it to remain somewhat aloof from the political 
currents of the Indian plains. Despite the desires of its 
ruler, Kashmir could not avoid the effects of the drive for 
independence which threw all India into turmoil,
Born with the commercial activities of the East India 
Company in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, British 
dominion in India was consolidated after steady military and 
political conquest routed all rivals— Moguls, French, and 
Sikhs, With the formal assumption of the government of India 
by the Crown in 1858, British political control of the sub­
continent was established in a pattern that was to endure 
until 1947, The Indian Empire was a conglomeration of British 
provinces, under the direct rule of the Crown, and of many 
native states, nominally independent and allied rather than 
subjugated to the imperial authority. The viceroy and his 
council were the autocratic apex of this political community. 
Desire for representation on the viceregal council and for 
eventual self-government produced the Indian nationalist
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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raovement. But with nationalism came the theory of communal- 
ism, belief in the incompatability of the Hindu and Moslem 
communities, which was encouraged by the British with the 
hope of retarding the growth of nationalism through inter- 
factional strife,14
The first of the great independence parties, the
Indian National Congress, was established in 1885.15 At
first it drew support from both major religions, but in 1906
arch-conservative Moslem landlords and princes, hostile to
the radical tendencies of Congress, withdrew to form the All-
India Moslem League, the oldest of parties based on communal- 
16ism. However, religious differences had not yet assumed 
sufficient importance to prevent Congress and League from co­
operating in the early years of the struggle for self-govern­
ment, Together they worked for provincial popular administra­
tions and for admission of Indian members to the viceroy’s 
council. Although unity frayed perceptibly during this per­
iod, a serious split did not come^until the passage of the 
Parliamentary Act of 1935,1? designed to provide the provinces 
with considerable self-government while retaining British
l^Daniel Thorner, "Hindu-Moslem Conflict in India," JEax Surxsy, xvii (April 7, 1948), p. 77.
15sir Verney Lovett, A HislQry lh& ladi# Hâlimx- allst Movement (New York; Frederick A Stokes, 1920;, p. 34,
l^Henrv Noel Brailsford, Subject India (New York:
John Day, 1943), p. 100,
1?H. G. Rawlinson, "Backgrounds: II India," Spectator. 
CLXXVIII (April 25, 1 9 4 7 ), p . 459 .
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control of the central administration. India was to be a 
federation with a relatively weak central government exer­
cising powers of foreign affairs, defense, and communications. 
The princely states would enjoy an autonomous status in the 
union. Despite its broad concessions to popular government, 
the plan was acceptable to neither the League nor Congress.
The Moslems, fearing that the central authority would be dom­
inated by the more numerous Hindus, insisted that the federal 
government be further weakened by being denied specifically 
the power of taxation. Congress saw the federal administra­
tion as already too weak and demanded that it be given greater 
powers. Nevertheless, the portions of the act relating to the 
provinces were implemented and discussion on the eventual 
form of the central government was still in process when, in 
1939, a world war introduced a new factor into the drive for 
independence.
While the British government Concentrated on the 
succession of catastrophes in Europe, unrest in India increas­
ed. The British offered first a vague "after-the-war" promise 
of greater self-government, then dispatched the Cripps mis­
sion^® with an offer of a dominion-status post-war government 
based on the act of 1935 in return for a truce on political 
activity during the war. In rejecting the Cripps proposal,
c IS fh e  Cabinet mission of 1942 was headed by Sir 
Stafford Cripps, a leading Labor party spokesman and minister 
of filtrait production in Britain’s wartime coalition min­
istry.
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Congress leader Mohandas K. Gandhi^^ termed it *a post-dated 
cheque on a tottering bank which might come back with the 
endorsement, *No effects*.The British met the subsequent 
disturbances by imprisoning the Congress leadership for the 
remainder of the war emergency, leaving the League free to 
extend its power. The Moslems gained control of a number of 
provincial governments and spoke out more clearly for an in­
dependent Moslem state, Pakistan, an aim first formulated In 
the Lahore Resolution of 1940.21
Following conclusion of European hostilities, Britain's 
new Labor government turned to implementing a campaign pledge 
of Indian independence. The Cabinet mission of 1946 offered 
Congress, the League, and the princes a complex plan for a 
federated dominion of India, based on the act of 1935 but pro­
viding for voluntary "grouping" of provinces in smaller
19Mohandas Karamchand G«ndhi, 1869-1948, was universal­
ly regarded as the living spirit of Indian independence. Soon 
after entering politics, Gandhi became the leading political 
and spiritual spokesman of the Congress party, formulating his 
anti-British policy of passive noncooperation in 1919. He 
advocated home rule, the revival of home industries, agrarian 
reform, and inter-religion harmony and was an intransigent 
foe of partition. He was assassinated in 1948 by a member of 
a fanatical Hindu group advocating violence against Moslems.
2*̂ Brailsford, p. 52.
2ijhe Lahore Resolution demanded independent status 
for provinces in which Moslems were in the majority— Sind, 
Baluchistan, Northwest Frontier Province, and the Punjab, all 
in the northwest, and Bengal in the east. The first three 
were overwhelmingly Moslem but Punjab was only 57,1 per cent 
Moslem and Bengal but 54.7 per cent. (Dr. O. H. K. Spate, 
"Partition of India and the Prospects of Pakistan." Geographic 
Review. XXXVIII, January, 1948, p. 6.)
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federations within the All-India U nion,The Moslem League 
recognized the proposal as the essence, if not the letter, of 
Pakistan and accepted. However, when Congress rejected the 
plan because of the weakness of the central government, the 
League announced that no longer would it consider compromises; 
henceforth its single goal was an independent Pakistan.
With the failure of the Cabinet mission, new disturb­
ances, this time of an ominous religious character, broke out 
in the Punjab and Bengal, On February 20, 1947, Whitehall 
aggravated an already tense atmosphere by announcing its in­
tention of withdrawing from India in the near future, despite 
the inability of Congress and League to agree upon the struc­
ture of an independent state. The complete British program, 
made public on June 3, guaranteed Pakistan's existence for 
"it is clear that any constitution. • . cannot apply to those 
parts of the country which are unwilling to accept it."23 
There was also a reference to the princes;
His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear 
that the decisions announced above relate only 
to British India and that their policy toward 
the Indian States contained in thè Cabinet Mis­
sion of May 12, 1946, remains u n c h a n g e d ,24
It appeared that the British government was underwriting the
autonomy and powers of the princes in any Indian federation
which might be constructed.
22s, Chandrasekhar, "Freedom for India?" far Eastern 
Survey^ XV (July 3, 1946), p. 198,
23»British White Paper on India," Current History, 
XIII (July, 1947), pp. 36-38.
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25Sprawled across the face of India were 562 princely
states, accounting for one-half the area and one-fourth the
population of the entire sub-continent and ranging in size
and wealth from giant Kashmir and Hyderabad to midgets with
half the acreage of Central Park:
Many of these States have roots so deeply estab­
lished in the soil that the time of their seeding 
is lost in the mist of old tradition. They were 
in India before a Muslim set foot on Indian soil 
east of the Indus, before the first European 
ship cast anchor in the water of an Indian bay, 
before Queen Elizabeth signed a charter for trade 
in the East Indies, and centuries before the 
first political party in India was born,26
The exact political status of the states was, to some 
extent, a mystery even to the British, Prior to the Crown's 
assumption of the Indian government, relations between the 
princes and the East India Company had been governed by a web 
of treaties which recognized, in varying degrees, the "sover­
eignty" of each potentate. In the proclamation of 1858, Queen 
Victoria promised scrupulously to maintain the engagements,27 
In return, the princes ceded to the Crown control of their 
foreign affairs, communications, and defense and recognized 
the paramountcy of the Crown:
2^The exact number of states was uncertain, varying 
from under four hundred to nearly seven hundred according to 
the definition of "sovereign" since some states were feuda­
tories of others. The compromise figure adopted by the 
Political Office of the Government of India was 562. Many of 
the "states" were such by courtesy only for most of the smallei 
units were nonviable economically and politically,
2^Sir Geoffrey F. de Montmorency, The Indian States any 
Indian Federation (Cambridge University Press, 194^, p. 17.
p. 47.
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The doctrine of paramountcy. . . in very general 
terms may be said to be the taking of action by 
the British authority for the common weal in a 
direction not specifically covered by treaty or 
engagement. • .28
The resultant legal position of the princes was compli­
cated and often contradictory. Their states were not British 
territory nor were their subjects British subjects, although 
they were British-protected persons. The authority of the 
rulers in state internal affairs was wide but in all cases 
limited by relationship to the paramount power:
The States are equally entitled to British pro­
tection and defence from aggression and to an 
effective guarantee of survival and integrity.
In the territories of the States British-lndian 
law does not apply. The British-lndian Central 
and Provincial legislatures have no power to 
legislate in regard to the affairs or subjects of 
the States: and the High Courts and chief courts 
of British India have no jurisdiction in theirterritories.29
This "Indian India" considered itself in direct alliance with 
the occupant of the British throne and was held together by 
the common headship of the viceroy, vAxo "as Governor-General 
• • , presided over the Government of India and as Crown 
Representative# • . exercised paramountcy over the States.
The Office of Political Affairs in New Delhi administered of­
ficial relations between the viceroy and the states.
Both parties viewed the arrangement with satisfaction. 
Buttressed by British power, the princes rested secure in
p. 55, 
p. 15.
Percivai Griffiths, "Struggle for Stability," 
i2til CÊûtUXÏ, CXLIV (July, 1948), p. 11.
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their autocratic privileges and became Britain*s most loyal 
supporters; "they look like Indians, but are in fact the body­
guard of the British Viceroy."31 To Whitehall, the states 
were island fortresses, the strongest props of the empire, 
as their loyalty during the Sepoy Mutiny and two world wars
proved. Canning thought them the surest guarantee of British
powerÏ
It was long ago said. . . that if we made all 
India into zillahs (or British Districts) it was 
not in the nature of things that our Empire
should last fifty years; but that if we could
keep up a number of native states without politi­
cal power but as royal instruments, we should 
exist in India as long as our naval supremacy 
was maintained. Of the substantial truth of 
this opinion I have no doubt. • ,32
The system was all too effective. While the nation­
alist movement forced concessions in British India, the states 
remained autocratic, frozen in the nineteenth century. As 
late as 1940 only twenty-three boasted some type of consulta­
tive assembly, and in only one^3 did responsible self-govern­
ment exist:
The depth of the loyal feeling of the Princes is 
now an Immutable fact, which has to be reckoned 
with. . . This sentiment in the case of the Princes 
has had a tangible result in the fact that the cry 
for an independent India, so often voiced by the 
Congress extremist, falls on deaf ears in the 
States and makes no appeal whatever to their 
rulers.3̂
S^Brailsford, p. 130,
32%bid.. pp. 14-15.
33Aundh, in the Deccan area of south-central India. 
34ue Montmorencyt p. 76.
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The official British view of paramountcy was that it 
would lapse upon withdrawal, not devolve upon successor gov­
ernments, The principalities would become completely inde­
pendent with the choice of acceding to either dominion or of 
remaining independent. The rulers themselves held this view;
The States demand that without their own agree­
ment the rights and obligations of the Paramount 
Power should not be assigned to persons who are 
not under its control, for instance an Indian 
Government in British India responsible to an Indian legislature,35
The Moslem League leader, Mohammed All Jinnah,^^ indirectly
supported this interpretation when he stated that a state's
ruler possessed full power of accession to whichever dominion
he preferred with no obligation as a result of geography or
devolution of sovereignty,3? Nehru, speaking for Congress,
rejected the theory of lapsed paramountcy and insisted that
the people of the states, through plebiscites, should possess
the ultimate power of accession;
And here let me make it clear that it has been our 
policy all along that where there is a dispute 
about the accession of a state to either Dominion, 
the decision must be made by the people of that
p. 96.
36Mohammed All Jinnah, 1876-1948, the Quaid-E-Aram 
(Great Leader) of India's Moslems and a lawyer by profession, 
joined the Moslem League after differing with the policies of 
the Indian National Congress, He participated in the London 
conferences of 1930-32 which led to the Act of 1935, In 1940 
Jinnah announced the Moslem goal of an independent state. In 
1947 he became the first governor-general Of Pakistan,
3*7Alice Thorner, "The Kashmir Conflict," Middle 
£.a.st Jg u m al»  m  (January, 1 9 4 9 ), p . 18 .
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state.38
The controversy remained somewhat academic until, in 
June, 1947, the British cabinet announced that the June, 1949 
withdrawal deadline would be anticipated by ten months. Prob­
lems of partition, paramountcy, and accession became immedi­
ate. Religious riots broke out in the Punjab and Bengal, two 
provinces scheduled to be split in the partition. The bound­
aries of the new dominions were traced according to a hastily 
drafted partition plan and, while native Indian administra­
tions began to exercise governmental functions, the princes 
were presented with an Instrument of Accession which provided 
for union with the appropriate dominion on defense, external 
affairs, and communications only. The majority of states soon 
ratified accession treaties but the two largest, Kashmir and 
Hyderabad, asked more time in which to reach a decision.
Following August 15, Independence Day for the new 
dominions of Pakistan and the Indian Union, Kashmir’s Hindu
maharaja played and failed at statecraft. Lord Louis Mount-
39batten, while still viceroy of a united India, had journeyed 
to Srinagar but had been unable to persuade Sir Hari Singh to 
accept union with either dominion. In August Kashmir conclud­
ed a standstill agreement with Pakistan, providing for
Jawaharlal Nehru, Independence a M  (New York:
John Day, 1950), p. 57.
39Louis Mountbatten of Burma, 1st Viscount, 1900- ,
a grandson of Queen Victoria, was educated at Cambridge and 
soon thereafter began a military and naval career. He was 
supreme allied commander in southeast Asia, 1943-46; viceroy 
of India in 1947; and first governor-general of India in 1947 
and *48,
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continuation of economic and administrative relations on a 
pre-independence basis, and began to negotiate a similar pact 
with India, But the time for expedients was running out. 
Moslem peasants in the districts of Poonch and Muzaffarabad 
were restive. Refugees from the horrors of the Punjab 
massacres fled across the border into Jammu, carrying with 
them the hates and fears of communal bloodshed. Despite the 
standstill agreement, the necessary supplies were not forth­
coming from Pakistan. The Kashmiri government took vigorous 
measures to counteract outside pressure;
In quick succession all voices in Kashmir pleading 
for accession to Pakistan were silenced; newspapers 
Y/ere censored or shut down, journalists were in­
terned, and finally the Kashmir State Assembly was 
prorogued to prevent further criticism of the 
State Government
When open revolt erupted among the Moslem peasants 
of Poonch and Muzaffarabad, the maharaja, in a final attempt 
to prevent the toppling of his throne, released Sheikh Ab­
dullah and empowered him to negotiate with Karachi and New 
Delhi. Jinnah inflexibly demanded that Moslem Kashmir join 
Moslem P a k i s t a n . 4 1  Nehru's reaction was confused, handicapped 
as he was by his previous assertion that the people, not the 
ruler, should decide the accession of a state.
In October the Pakistani press reported the establish­
ment of an Azad (Free) Kashmir provisional government at
40AlicG Thorner, "Conflict," p. 21.
41loc. cit. At Lahore in September an agent of Sheikh 
Abdullah was informed that Pakistan would not support an accès* 
sion plebiscite unless the conference voted solidly for Paki­
stan.
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Rawalpindi In West Punjab and various Moslem organizations be­
gan warning the maharaja not to accede to India. The Kashmiri 
government countered by speeding work on a new road connecting 
Jammu with India's East Punjab. Pakistan protested the 
"brutal" suppression of the uprising among the Moslems of 
Poonch and Kashmir replied with a detailed list of charges 
against Pakistan, including econpmic blockade and infiltration 
of armed raiders.On October 21, the Pakistani prime minis­
ter, Liaquat All Khan,^^ rejected the accusations and again 
warned against accession to India.
The following morning large armed bands crossed the 
Pakistani border into Kashmir and seized the frontier town of 
Muzaffarabad on the road to Srinagar. The Azad Kashmir gov­
ernment staged a dramatic reappearance. It identified the 
raiders as Azad troops and began issuing communiques from 
Pulandri in western Kashmir:
The united will of the people has overcome
the organized violence of the ruler's armies and
he and his so-called Prime Minister have fled 
from Kashmir and will perhaps soon flee from 
Jammu as well.
The Provisional Government entertains sentiments 
of the utmost friendliness and good will toward
^^The New York Times. October 21, 1947. The note
further declared: "If unfortunately this request is not heed­
ed, the Government fully hopes. • • Pakistan would agree that 
it would be justified in asking for friendly assistance to 
oppose trespass on its fundamental rights."
^^Liaquat Ali Khan, 1895-1951, was a member of a Pun­
jabi family of Persian descent. Educated in law in India and 
England, he devoted most of his time to politics, joining the 
Moslem league in 1923, The first Indian finance minister in 
the interim government of 1946, in 1947 Liaquat Ali Khan be­
came Pakistan's first prime minister, serving as such until 
his assassination in 1951.
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the neighboring dominions of India and Pakistan»
The question of the accession of Jammu and 
Kashmir to either dominion can be decided only 
by a free vote of the people in the foimi of areferendum.44
As the raiders, later identified as Pathan tribesmen
from the Northwest Frontier Province, neared Srinagar, the
maharaja sought aid from New Delhi. Negotiations resulted in
the accession of Kashmir to India on October 27, although the
agreement specifically stated that the union was to be regard-
45ed as conditional until settled by a referendum. Within 
hours Indian troops were on the way to Srinagar by air to pre­
vent the fall of the city. In accordance with a commitment 
reluctantly made by the maharaja. Sheikh Abdullah was asked 
to head an emergency administration.
Accession transformed Kashmir's difficulty into an 
open clash between India and Pakistan, Moslem spokesmen termed 
the maharaja's action "treachery" while the Pakistani govern­
ment refused to recognize the union:
In the opinion of the Government of Pakistan, the 
accession of Kashmir is based on fraud and violence.
The sending of Indian troops to Kashmir under cover 
of its accession further intensified and inflamed 
the feelings of the tribes,4®
The prime minister of the Northwest Frontier Province declared
that Kashmir rightfully belonged to Pakistan and appealed to
"every Moslem in Pakistan to prepare to face the situation
44%tia York liffiâi» October 25, 1947,
4^SC Official Recordsf 3rd Year, 227th Meeting, 
pp. 18-19,
ÜÊU üat Times. October 31, 1947.
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created by India’s invasion of K a s h m ir ."4?
Mew Delhi’s view was equally uncompromising. Al­
though final settlement was conditional upon a plebiscite, 
accession was valid, Kashmir thus had become an integral 
part of Inula defended by Indian troops and the invasion of 
the state was a violation of Indian territory. In mid-Novem­
ber Nehru announced that India possessed evidence proving 
that the entire affair had bean organized by the Pakistani 
government;
They helped the tribesmen, • , to collect, 
they supplied thèla with lorries, with petrol and 
with officers. They are continuing to do so, • •
It is obvious that no large body of men and armed 
groups cculd cros« Pakistan territory without the 
good will, connivance and active help of author­
ities there. It is impossible to escape the con­
clusion that the raids on Kashmir were carefully 
planned and well-organized by Pakistan authorities 
with the deliberate object of seizing the state by 
force and then declaring accession to Pakistan,
This was an act of hostility not only to Kashmir but to the Indian U n i o n . 4 8
Before the advent of winter severed land communication 
between Kashmir and India, Indian troops had clëared the Vale 
but the Azad government and its adherents retained control of 
areas near the Pakistani border. They continued to receive 
supplies and it was reported^^ that in addition to tribesmen
47jj|2idl., November 26, 1947,
^^Ibid,, November 26, 1947,
49ibid.̂  January 29, 1948, The source of this report 
was Russell K, Haight, a 25-year-old ex-GI from New York who 
served two months as a brigadier general in the Azad forces, 
Indian representatives repeatedly referred to Haight’s testi­
mony during the Security Council debates on Kashmir,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-23-
and Kashmiris» the forces consisted of Pakistani nationals 
and some regular Pakistani troops— on leave, Karachi said.
New Delhi charged that the raiders retired to bases in Paki­
stan following large-scale sorties. Indian forces could not 
drive the invaders from Kashmir without attacking these bases. 
To do so would create an international incident.
Both India and Pakistan professed a desire to reach a 
settlement but negotiations failed to produce an agreement, 
partially as a result of the fanatic and emotional political 
climates in both nations which precluded any compromise. 
Karachi, while admitting that the tribesmen had crossed Paki­
stan to reach Kashmir, denied that official Pakistani sources 
had or were aiding them. And Pakistan would be bound fay the 
result of a plebiscite only after all forces, Indian as well 
as tribal, had been withdrawn from Kashmir. India had taken
the position that a referendum was not possible until "order
had been restored"— that is, not until Indian troops garrisoned 
the entire state:
We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ulti­
mately to be decided by the people. That pledge 
we have given. • . not only to the people of Kash­
mir but to the world. We will not and cannot back
out of it. We are prepared when peace and law and 
order have been established to have a referendum 
held under international auspices liketthe United 
Nations. We want it to be a fair and just refer­
ence to the people and we shall accept thei» ver­
dict. I can imagine no fairer or juster offer.50
Pakistan's delicate internal balance made any move 
toward compromise extremely hazardous since the government's
50Nehru, p. 59.
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control over the wild tribes of the Northwest Frontier, the 
provocateurs of the Kashmir incident, was tenuous to say the 
least. The tribesmen never had acknowledged an overlord—  
Mogul, Afghan, or British— and they were even less likely to 
surrender meekly to the demands of the new-born Pakistani 
government. The British had exerted what control, through 
subsidies and punitive expeditions, as was necessary to pre­
vent the tribes from raiding the cities of the Indus valley 
but otherwise had left the tribes much to themselves.Paki­
stan could not maintain the high British subsidies, neither 
did it possess sufficient military strength to administer 
the tribes forcibly. Karachi hoped that a common religion
would bind the Pathans to the new Moslem state. Kashmir, pre­
sented as a Hindu conspiracy to oppress Moslems with the 
additional prospect of loot for the "liberators," could be of 
use in such a program. And there was always the possibility 
that if Pakistan curbed the tribes in Kashmir, they would 
turn on the rich cities of the Punjab;
If Pakistan is to prevent the tribes by force of
arms from infiltrating Into Kashmir, the area
of conflict will extend, not diminish. Pakistan 
will have a major war on her hands in her own 
territory. Is Pakistan, then, to fight against 
the tribesmen on her own territory in order to 
help India’s conquest of Kashmir and to prevent her people from joining Pakistan?52
51"Pakistan and the Tribes," Round Table. XXXIX (Septem­
ber, 1949), p. 332.
52The New York Times,. February 6, 1948, The quotation 
is an excerpt from a letter written by Col, Majeed Malik, a 
member of the Pakistani delegation to the Security Council.
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The Indian case, saturated with the theory and the practice 
of international law, would not admit the applicability of 
such an argument,
Fanatically clinging to their contradictory views, 
the dominions moved toward war in the weeks immediately fol­
lowing invasion and accession. But the voice of Great Britain, 
rapidly fading to a whisper in Indian political life, proved 
yet sufficiently audible to forestall an open clash. With 
Pakistani and Indian armies still officered largely by Britons, 
the supreme command of United Kingdom personnel in both forces 
rested with British Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck,53 
who informed Karachi and New Delhi that British officers 
would resign rather than be involved in "a fratricidal Indian 
conflict," Simultaneously British officers were ordered not 
to participate in Indian operations in Kashmir. But war, 
averted in October, threatened in December. The quarreling 
dominions, discouraged by the futility of bilateral negotia­
tion, began to look for another jnethod through which to 
achieve a settlement,
III
Neither Karachi nor New Delhi overlooked the possibil­
ity of a third party contributing its good offices. That 
this party might be the Commonwealth of Nations was, however,
^̂ Fielci Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, 1884- , has
devoted hi« military career to the East, serving in the 
Punjab, Egypt, Aden, and Mesopotamia. He was commander of 
British Middle Eastern forces, 1941-42; in India, 1943-47; 
and of Indian and Pakistani forces in 1947,
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unacceptable to Nehru:
The Commonwealth might have been considered as 
some kind of a superior body which sometimes 
acts as a tribunal, or judges, or in a sense 
supervises the activities of its member nations, 
that certainly would have meant a diminution in 
our independence and sovereignty, if we had once 
accepted that principle. Therefore, we were not 
prepared and we are not prepared to treat the 
Commonwealth as such or even to bring disputes 
between member nations of the Commonwealth before 
the Commonwealth b o d y . 54
But on November 3, Nehru suggested that the promised plebiscite 
might be conducted "under international auspices like the 
United Nations,"55 week later, the Azad government pro­
posed that the United States or the United Nations send ob­
servers to Kashmir to "testify to the justification" of the 
struggle against the Hindu maharaja.5& (ki November 17,
Liaquat Ali Khan publicly favored asking the United Nations 
to send representatives.5? Yet despite apparent agreement on 
the acceptability of the United Nations, India's unilateral 
communication to the Security Council roused Pakistan to 
expressions of violent chagrin.
On January 1, 1948 the Indian government informed
58Council President Fernand van Langenhove of Belgium of the
5^Nehru, p. 274,
55%h& New York Times. November 3, 1947,
56ibid.. November 9, 1947.
57lbld., November 17, 1947.
5®Pernand van Langenhove, 1889- , has been Belgium's
permanent representative to the United Nations since 1946, A 
former delegate to the League of Nations, he represented 
Belgium at the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization in 1945,
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existence of a dispute covered by Article 3559 of the United
Nations Charter:
A situation now exists* • . owing to the aid 
which invaders, consisting of nationals of 
Pakistan* • are drawing from Pakistan for 
operations against Jammu and Kashmir, a State 
which had acceded to the Dominion of India and 
is a part of India. • * The Government of India 
request the Security Council to call upon Paki­
stan to put an end immediately to the giving df 
such assistance, which is an act of aggression 
against India* If Pakistan does not do so, the 
Government of India may be compelled, in self 
defence, to enter Pakistan territory, in order 
to take military action against the invaders*®0
Van Langenhove immediately urged both governments "to 
refrain from any step incompatible with the Charter and liable 
to result in an aggravation 6f the situation* . *"&! On Janu­
ary 3, Pakistan replied that its case would be presented to 
the Council by Foreign Minister Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan*^^ 
The initial presentation of arguments was scheduled for 
January 6*
Two approaches to the dispute were open to the
59section 1 of Article 35 states that: "Any member
of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation 
of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of 
the Security Council or of the General Assembly." Article 34: 
"The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any sit­
uation which might lead to international friction or give 
rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continu­
ance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security."
Official figfiarsi&t 3rd Year, Supp* for Nov.,
1948, S/628, p. 139.
Gljbld.. 226th Meeting, p. 4.
62$ir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, 1893- , has been
Pakistani minister of foreign affairs since 1947. He served 
as president of the Moslem League in 1931 and on the viceroy's 
council, 1935-41,
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Councll* It might accept the Indian point of view that the 
issue was purely one of international law and that consequent- 
ly the Council should function as a judicial tribunal. An 
affirmative decision on the validity of the Indian charges 
would probably result in branding Pakistan as an aggressor.
Or the Council might ignore the technicalities of formal re­
lations among nations and recognize that, no matter which 
side the rules favored, there existed a situation in which 
both parties held an understandable interest; a satisfactory 
solution would have to be one that was acceptable to both.
Solution of the Kashmir question, of great importance
to the parties immediately concerned, would be of scarcely
less significance to the Security Council itself. An answer
would indicate that the Council might yet be able to function
successfully in a situation relatively uncomplicated by great
power rivalry, that, if given the opportunity, it might be
able to function as had been intended when the outline of an
international security agency had been traced. The New York
Times noted this aspect of the dispute:
If the Big Five can agree on a proper procedure, 
perhaps for the holding of a supervised plebiscite, 
the Council's prestige, badly damaged by the veto 
controversy, may be repaired. For the Council's 
purpose, as outlined in the Charter, is not to 
quarrel but to settle quarrels,63
63fhe New York Times. January 4, 1948,
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CHAPTER II 
COMPLAINT, COUNTER-COMPLAINT 
I
The Kashmir question made its initial appearance on 
the Security Council agenda on January 6, 1948. Five meetings 
and seemingly endless debates later, on January 20, the Coun­
cil had sketched a pattern for future action. The shaping of 
an approach to the problem could be discerned in procedures 
adopted for consideration of the question, the votes on and 
significance of two resolutions, and the attitudes of the 
Council members themselves. States represented on the Council 
were Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, 
Syria, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. The first indication of alignments, or lack of such, 
followed Pakistan's request, on January 6, for a two-week 
postponement to permit better preparation of its case. Only 
Paris el-Khouri^ of Syria gave Pakistan full support. The 
remaining Council members were either noncommittal or dis­
played marked uniformity in opposing a delay in excess of one
Iparis el-Khouri, 1879- , entered the Syrian govern­
ment in 1918. Prime minister during 1944-45, he attended the 
San Francisco conference in 1945 and has participated in 
several Arab League congresses.
-29-
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week. Succeeding meetings bore out this first impression of 
a Council attitude relatively uncomplicated by great-power 
rivalry.
When the Council turned to consideration of the Indian 
complaint, it found a case rigidly bound to the theory and 
practice of international law, India called attention to the 
existence of a dispute endangering international peace and 
security, a dispute engendered by Pakistan's alleged aid to 
the invaders of Kashmir. The "facts" of the situation led to 
certain "indisputable* conclusions:
(a) That the invaders are allowed transit 
across Pakistan;
(b) That they are allowed to use Pakistan 
territory as a base of operations;
(c) That they include Pakistan nationals;
(d) That they draw much of their military 
equipment, transportation and supplies (includ­
ing petrol) from Pakistan; and
(e) That Pakistan officers are training, 
guiding, and otherwise actively helping them,2
Pakistan's attitude in refusing to negotiate on these points
not only was unneutral, "but constitutes active aggression
against India, of which the State of Jammu and Kashmir forms
a part."3 International law sanctioned entry of Pakistan by
4an Indian aimed force in order to deal with the invaders,
United Kallona Seanxlty Cgun^il Qffldal B&caxcLs.,Third Year, Supplement for November, 1948, S/628, p, 142,
^Theorists in international law support India on this 
point, Oppenheim states that self-defense, coupled with an 
element of necessity, has long been considered adequate justi­
fication for a violation of the rights of another state,
"When, • • a State is informed that a body of armed men is 
being organized on neighbouring territory for the purpose of
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However» the possibility that such action might result in 
open hostilities with Pakistan caused India to turn to the 
United Nations, In such a situation, the Security Council 
would be justified in calling upon Pakistan:
(1) To prevent Pakistan Government person­
nel, military and civil, from participating or 
assisting in the invasion of the Jammu and 
Kashmir State;
(2) To call upon other Pakistani nationals 
to desist from taking any part in the fighting 
in the Jammu and Kashmir State;
(3) To deny to the invaders: ( a )  access to 
and use of its territory for operations against 
Kashmir, (b) military and other supplies, (c) 
all other kinds of aid that might tend to pro­
long the present struggle.5
The Pakistani reply, submitted to the Council on 
January 15, relied more upon emotion than upon law in construct­
ing a case. Rather than aiding the invaders, Pakistan had 
done and was doing everything within its power "to discourage
6 raid into its territory, and when the danger can be removed 
through an appeal to the authorities of the neighbouring coun­
try, no case of necessity has arisen. But if such an appeal 
is fruitless or not possible, or if there is danger in delay, 
a case of necessity arises, and the threatened State is justi­
fied in invading the neighbouring country and disarming the 
intending raiders," L. Oppenheim, International Law, A 
Treatise, ed. H, Lauterpacht, Vol. I, Peace (7th ed., London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1948), pp. 265-66.
Brierly concurs. "A state, like an individual, may 
protect itself against an attack, actual or threatened."
J. L. Brierly, Jhs. Lam fli. Natjpna, Aa latroduclion ia iha la- ternational Lam fil jEaaaa (4th ed., Oxford; Clarendon Press, 
1949), p. 291.
Jessup states that in such a situation, "the inciden­
tal or consequent infringement of the rights of another state 
is excused, although the other state may be legally privileged 
to resist." Each state is entitled to judge in its own cause 
the "necessary degree of immediacy and urgency" without refer­
ence to an international authority. Philip C. Jessup, A Mod­
ern Law jgf Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 163-64,
Officiai BjB,CPr.da<. 34d year, Supp, for Nov., 1948 S/628, p, 143
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the tribal movement by all means short of war."^ While it 
might be possible that "a certain number* of tribesmen and 
persons from Pakistan were aiding the Azad Kashmir government 
as volunteers»^ it was certainly not true that Pakistan was si 
active party. Granted that a situation prejudicial to peace 
did exist, Kashmir, however, has but a portion of this dispute, 
an important element but one that could not be isolated. In 
this greater dispute, India was guilty on all counts— genocide 
for complicity in a Sikh plan to exterminate the Moslem popu­
lation of East Punjab following partition; aggression for 
forcibly occupying Junagadh and several smaller states which, 
although Hindu-populated, had acceded to Pakistan; and hostil­
ity toward Pakistan for failure to implement agreements on 
division of the military, financial, and industrial assets of
Qthe former Indian government. Kashmir was but the culmina­
tion of an Indian policy aimed at the destruction of Pakistan. 
Accession had been obtained through "fraud and violence* after 
the maharaja failed in his attempt to suppress a legitimate 
uprising against his autocratic governmentî
On 15 August 1947, Jammu and Kashmir State like
Oüiglj.1 3rd Year, Supp. for Nov., 1948,
S/646, p. 68.
^Westerners in the sub-continent reported that Paki­
stani authorities "continued to countenance the recruitment, 
training, transport, and equipping of tens of thousands of 
tribesmen for service in Kashmir," Alice Thorner, "Issues," 
p. 177.
^Agreement had been reached in December, 1947, but 
India withheld delivery of certain supplies, claiming that 
they might be used against it in Kashmir.
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other States was free to accede or not to accede 
to either Dominion. It entered a standstill 
agreement with Pakistan. • • This was, however, 
only a device on the part of the Maharajah to 
gain enough time within which to create condi­
tions which would furnish him with:a plausible 
excuse to call in the forces of the Indian Union 
so that, after trampling down all popular opposi­
tion with their help, he might be able to ac­
complish his desire of acceding to the Union of 
India; thus putting upon the latter the responsi­
bility of dealing with his rebellious people.
Pakistan requested the Council to, first, call upon 
India to cease its aggressive tactics and to implement the 
partition agreements, and second, to appoint a commission 
which would investigate the charge of genocide, arrange evacu­
ation of Junagadh and Other states, and bring about a cease­
fire in Kashmir. The latter would entail:
. . .  the withdrawal of all outsiders, whether 
belonging to Pakistan or the Indian Union. • .; 
steps for the establishment of an impartial and 
independent administration, . .; and a plebiscite 
to ascertain the free and unfettered will of the 
people. . • as to whether the State shall accede 
to Pakistan or to India.10
Although the Security Council noted receipt of the Pakistani 
document— and there were numerous references to it during the 
ensuring debates— the counter-complaint did not become immedi­
ately a part of the agenda, a fact which was to create some 
confusion during a later stage in the discussions.
The Council began its consideration of the dispute in 
a routine fashion by seating the representatives of India and
Official Records, 3rd Year, Supp, for Nov., 1948, S/646, pp. 80-81.
p. 68.
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Pakistan— -neither state was a member of the Council— according 
to the provisions of Article 31^^ of the Charter. With its 
second procedural step, the Council adopted an approach to 
the problem which it maintained through four-and-a-half years. 
Actual negotiations were to be carried on in informal meetings 
between the parties with the Council president as rapporteur. 
The Council would act only when the results of these confer­
ences were reported to it in official session.
As two documents, the Indian and Pakistani complaints, 
had opened consideration of the dispute, so two official 
papers marked the conclusion of this initial period. The first 
Belgian resolution, adopted January 17, was scarcely more
than a rewording of Van Langenhove*s wires to the governments 
12in December. However, the final paragraph, although initi­
ating no action on the part of the Council, was to be of un­
foreseen significance some months later, for India and 
Pakistan were requested:
. . .  to Inform the Council immediately of any 
material change in the situation which occurs 
or appears to either of them to be about to 
occur while the matter is under consideration 
by the Council, and to consult with the Council 
thereon,13
^^Article 31: "Any Membqr of Jthe United Nations
which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, 
without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before 
the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the 
interests of that Member are specially affected."
12see page 27.
Official Basfiris., 3rd Year, 229th Meeting,S/651, p. 121.
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The resolution was approved with nine votes in favor—  
Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States— none opposed, and 
two abstentions— the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
With adoption of the second Belgian resolution, on 
January 20, the Council established a definite basis for 
further action:
A. A commission of the Security Council 
is hereby established, composed of three members 
of the United Nations, one to be selected by 
India, one to be selected by Pakistan, and the 
third to be designated by the two so select­
ed . . .
B« The Commission . . . shall act under 
the authority of the Security Council, , , It 
shall keep the Security Council currently in­
formed of its activities and of the development 
of the situation. . •
C. The Commission is invested with a dual 
function:
(1) To investigate the facts pursuant to 
Article 34 of the Charter;
(2) To exercise. • , any mediatory influ­
ence likely to smooth away difficulties, to 
carry out the directions given to it by the 
Security Council; and to report hbw far the 
advice and directions, if any, of the Security 
Council have been carried out.14
The commission was to base its activities on India’s 
complaint and on Pakistan's counter-complaint, which had ex­
tended the scope of the dispute beyond the question of Kashmir 
alone. However, consideration of the additional controversies 
introduced by Pakistan was to take place only "v;hen the Secur­
ity Council so directs." The vote on this resolution dupli-
145c Official Records, 3rd Year, 230th Meeting, S/654, 
pp. 130-31,
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cated that on the first Belgian draft while a Soviet-sponsored 
motion to postpone final consideration pending further argu­
ments was defeated with two votes in favor— the Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist R-public and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics— against nine opposed— Argentina, Belgium, Canada, 
China, Colombia, France, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States.
II
The second Belgian resolution culminated a series of
impassioned debates in which the Indian and Pakistani spokes-
ismen, Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan,
found themselves in violent disagreement on five basic points.
First was the general approach to the problem. Ayyangar saw
the issue as primarily one of international law, a question
of whether or not Pakistan had violated its international
obligations as a result of its activities on behalf of the
insurgents in Kashmir. Since India regarded the validity of
accession as unshakable, Indian activity in the state waa
clothed in an impeccable legality:
We desire only to see peace restored. . , and 
to ensure that the people of Kashmir are left 
free to decide in an orderly and peaceful 
manner the future of their state. We have no 
further interest. . . Everything that we have 
done has been in discharge of our legal,
Gopalaswami Ayyangar, 1882- , has been India's
minister of transport and railways since 1948, His career
of legislative and executive service began in 1905.when he 
entered the Madras civil service. Ayyangar was Prime Minis­
ter of Jammu and Kashmir from 1937 to 1943.
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constitutional, and moral responsibilities 
and obligations,16
Pakistan, on the contrary, was guilty of the most flagrant 
violations of obligations among nations Inot only in not pre­
venting but in actually abetting the tribal invasion of Kash­
mir, which constituted a hostile act against India. Tenta­
tively assuming the martyr's role, Ayyangar promised that 
India, whose motives were above reproach, would do its utmost 
to avoid a conflagration although war might be forced any day 
by the "compelling necessities" of the military situation.
Zafrullah Khan fully agreed on the danger of war but 
suggested that it hinged less upon compelling military neces­
sities than upon the threat of "direct military attack" upon 
Pakistan by India, The Pakistani representative looked more 
to an uncertain international equity than to the'letter of 
the law of nations in establishing a cace for Pakistan. While 
in no sense responsible for any transgression of the rights of 
either India or Kashmir, Pakistan refused to countenance the 
trampling of the desires of the Kashmiris beneath so-called 
international obligations, Pakistan also desired only an 
opportunity for the people of Kashmir to make a free choice;
We do not differ over theoobjective as stated.
We desire that peace be restored; we have re­
peatedly said that fighting must stop at once 
and that means must be taken to stop it. How­
ever, we differ over the definition of what you 
call peace and what we call peace, what you call 
order and what we call,order, what to you is law 
and what to us is law,!'
Official Records, 3rd Year, 227th Meeting p. 28, 
^^£2 Official £££J2riS.i 3rd Year, 229th Meeting, p. 113,
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The matter at Issue concerned illegal Indian suppression of 
a legitimate rebellion, suppression supposedly justified by 
a fraudulently achieved suzerainty, rather than Pakistani or 
tribal disregard of law.
The second major controversy arose as a result of 
divergent views on the facts of accession; specifically, which 
nation had attempted to pressure Kashmir into submission.
The picture was quite clear and uncomplicated for Ayyangar at 
least, Œi August 15, 1947 Kashmir, which had been an indepen­
dent state in treaty relations with the British Crown but 
enjoying no international existence, became free to decide 
whether to accede to one or the other dominion or to remain 
independent. The Kashmiri government immediately began 
negotiating with both India and Pakistan, Admittedly, India 
was interested in Kashmir, both strategically and economically; 
"nevertheless, we have at no time put the slightest pressure 
on the State to accede to the Indian Dominion, because we 
realized that Kashmir was in a very difficult position."18 
Not until the eve of accession did India assume an active 
role. Then, after reports of disturbances had been followed 
by the news of a full-scale invasion, India felt compelled to 
respond to the state government's appeal fore aid. In order 
to give a legal basis to Indian operations in Kashmir, it had 
been necessary for the state to accede to India but the 
accession agreement clearly stipulated that this union was
Official BfiSflXdÂ, 3rd Year, 227th Meeting,
p, 13,
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condltlonal until "order had been restored" and the people of 
Kashmir had been given an opportunity to ratify the maharaja's 
action:
I would invite* . . attention* . • to the high- 
principled statesmanship characteristic of the 
Government of India* • * The acceptance of the 
accession was urged upon the Government of India 
by the leader of the most influential popular 
organization In Kashmir* It was clear to my Gov­
ernment. • . that peace in Kashmir could never be 
restored or maintained without the support of the 
people. Sheikh Abdullah. • • pressed for acces­
sion as earnestly as the Ruler. • . himself. • .
On the question of accession the Government of 
India has always enunciated the policy that in 
all cases of dispute ithe people of the State con­
cerned should make Ithe decision.i?
Ayyangar launched a frontal attack, challenging 
Zafrullah Khan to produce an equally noble Pakistani record.
He doubted that this could sincerely be done for Pakistan's 
maneuvers had been all too obvious. Economic blockade and 
repeated threats had constituted Pakistan's consideration of 
Kashmir's delicate situation:
The events. • . cannot be explained away 
as a fortuitous combination of circumstances.
A closer examination would reveal to any im­
partial body of men that there was a definite 
method, a calculated plan, which was beingfollowed.20
Zafrullah Khan ignored Ayyangar's challenge, retreat­
ing into a bitter denunciation of India's "considerate" atti­
tude toward Kashmir. He wondered how it could be believed 
that India, admittedly aware of Kashmir's strategic and 
economic possibilities, had not been aware of what was
p. 20.
ZOiUd.. p. 14.
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contemplated with regard to accession» "that they did not try 
to influence it,"^^ The known fact that following his re­
lease from prison. Sheikh Abdullah had journeyed to New Delhi, 
presumably for conferences on accession terms, would seem to 
indicate that India had been urging accession to itself for 
some time prior to October 26* But "it has unfortunately 
become a habit with the Government of India simply to deny 
whatever they find is inconvenient either to deal with or to 
answer,
The true picture of the "economic blockade" was of a
slightly different hue than the version presented by Ayyangar,
continued Zafrullah Khan. Supplies failed to reach Kashmir
as a result of the general Punjab disorders, for as far as
Delhi, transportation was at a standstill:
Consequently, there was a.shortage of supplies 
everywhere. It was not that the Pakistan Gov­
ernment was unwilling to fulfill its part of 
the standstill agreement, but they were unable 
to do so owing mainly to these Idisturbances* . .
And if anyone were guilty of non-cooperation, it was the
maharaja* Geography, economics, and the wishes of his people
pointed toward accession to Pakistan, yet he favored India and
sought to solve the problem by killing, jailing, or expelling
"a million or so" of his Moslem subjects. Pakistan had agreed
to discuss supply difficulties but heard nothing more on the
matter from Kashmir* Since the preliminary demand for a
p. 1G5.
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conference had been met, "there was no reason to ask for any
24outside assistance.”
Ayyangar side-stepped further wrangling on the issue 
of pre-accession pressure, basing a fresh attack on Pakistan's 
activities once large-scale strife broke out in Kashmir. The 
Indian approach on this point was uncompromising. Only with 
Pakistani aid could the tribesmen have achieved such consid­
erable success; only by crossing Pakistani territory could 
they have reached Kashmir.Ayyangar offered the Council 
several selections from India's dossier on Pakistan— evidence 
that the tribesmen possessed modern weapons which "could only 
have come from Pakistan military depots""reliable" infor­
mation that the prime minister of the Northwest Frontier 
Province functioned as the chief organizer of the rebel forces 
at Peshawar and that a number of major Pakistani cities were 
used as tribal bases; and the obvious military fact that 
tactics employed by the raiders indicated that they were being 
trained and led by professional soldiers. It was, said 
Ayyangar, a damning picture.
Anyone familiar with the Northwest Frontier would
sit*
nf\During the first months of the dispute, even the 
most heated Indian protests held to the semi-fiction that the 
tribes had come Ithrouoh but not from Pakistan. Not until 
repeated representations had failed to bring from Pakistan 
the slightest concession to the view that tribal activities 
were illegal did India directly accuse Pakistan of complicity. 
Alice Thorner, "Conflict," p. 29.
3rd Year, 227th Meeting, p. 22.
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know that the tribes, in addition to manufacturing weapons,
had always been in the habit of accumulating large stores of
arms by means "legitimate as well as illegitimate," countered
Zafrullah Khan2
, , • One of the matters to which attention has 
been invited by the Pakistan Government. . , is 
the failure of. . . India to hand over to, « .
Pakistan. , • its due share of military stores.
Pakistan is woefully short of its quota, much 
less could it supply anybody out of it. . • To? retend that the Pakistan Government is supply- ng them when the Government of India knows it 
has withheld. . .military stores is to add insult to injury.27
Any British officer who had served on the frontier
could testify that the tribesmen were in no need of training
in Jmilitary tactics or in the use of small arms. Lastly, if
Pakistani military personnel were operating in Kashmir, they
were Poonchis on leave and therefore on their own time:
If, when they go home on leave, these officers 
or men find that their people are being massa­
cred or persecuted, and if some of them take a 
hand in whatever is going on,lit is nevertheless 
not a case of allowing them to go on leave in 
order to take part in the fighting. . . They 
are expected to say, "My brother may have been 
killed, my father may have been killed, my wife 
may have been raped and my children butchered, 
but I am not a member of the Pakistan forces 
and must not retaliate," That kind of thing 
might be expected of angels but it cannot be 
expected of human beings,28
The question of which government bore the blame for 
failure to resolve the dispute through bilateral negotiations 
was the third major clash between the Indian and Pakistani
OiiXçiâl Records. 3rd Year, 229th Meeting, pp.
107-08.
p. 109.
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interpretations of the situation. Ayyangar again cast India 
in a role of altruistic nobility, for India, seeking only a 
reasonable settlement in a friendly spirit of "give and take," 
had made repeated attempts to reach agreement, only to be re­
buffed by Pakistan. Not until the military situation had so
degenerated that India's own peace and security were threaten­
ed had New Delhi chosen another course:
Negotiations finally broke down as a result of 
the attitude adopted by the Pakistan Government 
in declining to do what, under any view of right 
international conduct, it Is its obligation to 
do. , . Settlement would have been reached but
for the intransigeance and the lack of adequate
confidence and courage, in dealing with their 
own people, which the Government of Pakistan 
have unfortunately exhibited in this connec­tion. 29
Quite the contrary interpretation was presented by 
Zafrullah Khan. Each time the Pakistani government advanced 
proposals, the Indian government insisted that anything relat­
ing to Kashmir must be approved by Sheikh Abdullah's admin­
istration, a position wholly unacceptable to Pakistan since 
it "prejudges the whole question of the plebiscite."30 And 
each time Pakistan had suggested that the question be re­
ferred to the United Nations, India had argued that, since 
Pakistan was not a legitimate party to the dispute and the 
raiders were not a state, the United Nations could do nothing 
apart from sending observers. Zafrullah Khan concluded with 
a well-aimed thrust at the Indian charge of non-cooperation
Official Records. 3rd Year, 227th Meeting, p. 11.
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by asking, why, if India was so interested in joint action,
it had hot informed Pakistan in advance that Indian troops
were to be moved into Kashmir rather than waiting until the
■occupation* was a faJLl apigmplA»
Were they not willing at the very least to noti­
fy the Government of Pakistan that the landing 
of troops in Kashmir was intended? There was 
no opportunity for discussion and no opportunity 
to partake of joint action in order to arrive at 
a settlement.
Unable to agree on an interpretation of the dispute, 
Zafrullah Khan and Ayyangar were similarly at odds on a fourth 
point— the action to be taken by the Security Council. Still 
steeped in the maxims of the cult of Grotius, Ayyangar ex­
pounded the Indian view of right and law. Pakistan had violât" 
ed its international obligations and the Council should "use 
its undoubted influence and power" to correct this situation 
by calling upon Pakistan to cease forthwith all aid and enoour- 
agement of the anti-government forces in Kashmir. The dispute 
had arisen as a result of such Pakistani activity; once it 
had ceased, there would be no further disagreement.
This was neither the source of nor Ithe solution to 
the difficulties as Zafrullah Khan viewed them. Kashmir wa4 
the result of years of oppression of the Moslem population by 
the maharaja's government. The spark for this long-stored 
fuel had been the maharaja's desire to accede to India. The 
result had been an understandable uprising of the people, in 
sympathy for whom the tribesmen and some Pakistani nationals
Records. 3rd Year, 228th Meetin, p. 84.
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had offered aid, A bad situation had been made infinitely 
worse by the maharaja's "treacherous* accession to India and
the "occupation" of Kashmir by Indian troops. The only solu­
tion was to order all outsiders to withdraw from the state so 
as to permit the people to decide their own fate:
, , , The condition to be brought about is this;
Whether by joint administration under the two 
Governors-General, by joint occupation of pre­
dominantly Muslim areas by Muslim troops from 
Pakistan and predominantly non-Muslim areas, • •
by Indian troops, by joint occupation in each
place, by inviting Commonwealth forces. ♦ or 
whether through the United Nations— Kashmir must 
be cleared. . . Normal administration must be 
restored. There should be no kind of pressure, 
either from the Muslim Conference. . . or the 
National Conference, , , The people should then 
be invited to express the way in which they want 
to go, , ,32
The fifth and, at this stags of the discussions on
Kashmir, the most important agreement between the two advocates
concerned the significance and scope of the dispute, Pakistan
saw it as one facet of a much broader problem, a facet that
could not be dealt with apart from the whole. India’s view
was that "the subject-matter of reference is limited to the
33dispute in Kashmir, • ," Kashmir was a problem by itself, 
but vaguely related to the extraneous.matters introduced by 
Pakistan, Discussion of additional issues at this point would 
only further impede progress toward a settlement while if 
Kashmir were considered by Itself and a settlement achieved.
Official Records. 3rd Year, 229th Meeting, p. 120. 
The question of Commonwealth troops, which passed unnoticed at 
this point, was to assume some significance at a later stage.
Official ils&a&Ma, 3rd Year, 227th Meeting, p. 6 0,
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tension between the two states would be eased and the other
questions could be more readily resolved:
We hope to be able to convince the Security Council 
that once we have dealt with the Kashmir question, 
there will probably not be anything of substance 
which will divide India and Pakistan to the extent 
of endangering international peace and security.34
Introduction of the second Belgian resolution, estab­
lishing the commission, provoked controversy on this point, 
Zafrullah Khan argued that reference to Kashmir should be 
omitted from the resolution's title to permit the conunission 
full latitude in considering all points raised by the Indian 
complaint and the Pakistani counter-complaint. At this point, 
Ayyangar seized upon the fact that the Pakistani representa­
tion had never officially appeared on the agenda, thus the 
resolution and Council consideration at the moment were limit­
ed to Kashmir alone:
• • • The Security Council can pass this resolu­
tion only with regard to the item entered on the 
agenda, • • The main contention is whether we 
are investing this commission today with juris­
diction to deal not only with matters connected 
with the 0ammu and Kashmir situation, but also 
with matters outside that situation, • .35
Zafrullah Khan agreed that the language of the 
resolution referred directly only to Kashmir but insisted that 
the commission's powers should be broad enough to embrace all 
matters disturbing relations between the dominions and of 
which the Council was seized, "irrespective of the fact that
Qfiiglal Recordsf 3rd Year, 230th Meeting, p. 136,
35xbid., p. 132.
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discussion was proceeding at the moment only with regard to 
one of them."36 Council compromise, omission of direct
reference to Kashmir with the understanding that it would 
nevertheless be considered before any attention was given to 
other items, was accepted althoggh not applauded by both 
parties.
Although the statements of the Indian and Pakistani 
representatives consumed the major portion 6f these meetings 
and discussion among the Council members was consequently 
brief, some indication of the members* approach to the prob­
lem was evident. The prevailing attitude was neutrality with 
certain individuals openly voicing this view while others 
remained largely noncommittal, their sentiments appearing 
only during the three votes. As previously mentioned, only 
Paris el-Khouri of Syria appeared openly to favor one party.
The Council member placed in the most difficult 
position in this dispute between two members of the Common­
wealth of Nations was Philip Noel-Baker,United Kingdom 
secretary of state for Commonwealth relations, v^o had been 
accredited as the United Kingdom’s special representative to 
the Council during consideration of the Kashmir question. As
p, 134.
37philip John Noel-Baker, 1889- , a Member of Parlia­
ment since 1936, served in the Labor government from 1946 to 
1951. Noel-Baker*s background in international affairs in­
cludes membership in the British delegation at Versailles in 
1919, service with the League of Nations Secretariat and 
Assembly, and participation on the Executive Commission of 
the United Nations Preparatory Committee in 1945.
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was to be expected, Noel-Baker maintained a scrupulously 
neutral attitude. Repeatedly he suggested compromise on 
major disagreements and urged the parties to seek agreement 
themselves in the out-of-Council conversations.
The most outspoken delegate was Dr. Jose Arce^S of 
Argentina Wio voted with the majority and pursued a neutral 
policy but displayed an attitude all his own. Where the 
British attitude had been conciliatory, almost appeasing, Arce 
reprimanded both India and Pakistan. Nothing that the United 
Nations Charter contained no definition of aggression, he 
reminded Ayyangar and Zafrullah Khan that a definition, con­
tained in theURio pact,^^ existed among the American states, 
Argentina would hold as the aggressor whichever dominion com­
mitted actions failing under this definition. Although ap­
proving the second Belgian resolution, Arce Was disappointed 
at its weakness for he understood that the Council had been 
established "for the purpose of finding a speedy solution for
S®Dr, Jose Arce, 1881- , surgeon, medical educator,
and writer, was appointed permanent Argentine delegate to the 
United Nations in 1946, Arce's government career began in 
1903 and in 1945 hb represented Argentina at the United Na­
tions Conference on International Organization, taking a 
leading part in the attack upon the great-power veto.
S^Article 9 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance states: "In addition to other acts which the Organ
of Consultation may characterize as aggression, the following 
shall be considered as such: (a) Unprovoked armed attack by a 
State against the territory, the people, or the land, sea or 
air forces of another State; (b) Invasion, by the armed forces 
of a State, of the territory of an American State, through 
the trespassing of boundaries demarcated in accordance with a 
treaty, judicial decision, or arbitral award, or, in the ab­
sence of frontiers thus demarcated, invasion affecting a 
region Wiich is under the effective jurisdiction of another 
State."
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any situation liable to compromise world peace and secur­
ity."40 Yet after lengthy debates and several meetings, the 
Council did little but "appeal to these two governments to 
be calm and sensible." Arce did not suggest another approach.
In only one instance, dicussion on the second Belgian 
resolution, did sharp controversy arise among the Council 
members themselves. Andrei Gromyko*^ of the Soviet Union did 
not care for the structure of the commission. Theoretically 
a Council creature, it would really be quite independent of 
the Council and "would act without any reference to the 
latter, as the connexion between it and the Security Council 
would exist only on paper,"42 This would be the result of 
establishing a body whose members were not necessarily repre­
sented on the Security Council. If a commission was to be 
created, let it be composed of states on the Council so that 
it would be obvious that it was the Council and not an out­
side agency investigating the dispute.
Alfonso Lopez of Colombia took exception in curtly 
reminding Gromyko that the Council’s goal was to settle the 
dispute, not to ientangle it in technicalities. All legal
4°SC Official Records. 3rd Year, 229th Meeting, p. 124.
4lAndrei A. Gromyko, 1908- , chief deputy foreign
minister of the Soviet Union since 1949, entered the commis­
sariat of foreign affairs in 1939. He has served as Soviet 
Counselor at Washington, D.C.; minister to Cuba; and ambas­
sador to the United States. Gromyko was in the Soviet delega­
tion at San Francisco in 1945 and was permanent representative 
to the United Nations from 1946 to 1948.
42^ Oiiiclai Records. 3rd Year, 230th Meeting, p. 140.
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means of achieving this goal should be considered;
It seems. . , it is only too clear that, as 
they themselves have begun to establish the 
basis for an agreement in the appointment of 
the proposed commission, we should in turn 
be only too glad to accept the principle of 
this initial step.43
Although Gromyko reiterated his view that the commission was
not an agent of the Council "either in form or in fact," the
remaining members unanimously endorsed Lopez’s view,
III
All too soon it was to become evident that the 
significant results of initial Council consideration of the 
Kashmir question merely delimited the arena for future battles. 
But despite the brief duration of the optimism engendered by 
the accomplishments of this period, the five meetings were 
far from wasted time. A relatively firm basis for future 
action had been established. The broad principle of a 
plebiscite as the ultimate determinant of Kashmir’s allegiance 
was never at issue between the parties and with Council ac­
ceptance, it became, for the greater part of four-and-a-half 
years, the factor upon which hinged all attempts to achieve a 
settlement. A first step, based upon this principle, had been 
taken with the creation of a commission charged with bringing 
about conditions favorable to a plebiscite and with supervis­
ing the eventual vote itself. And a Council approach toward 
the entire problem had been tacitly adopted,
43sc Official 3rd Year, 229th Meeting, p.124.
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The parties themselves had clearly outlined their 
positions. India underlined each Item In Its Indictment of 
Pakistan with the maxims of International law, taking Its 
stand on a case based upon three presumptions: (l) the ac­
cession of Kashmir to India was valid; (2) Pakistan, In 
abetting Insurgents against the legitimate authority of a 
friendly state was violating certain rights and duties of 
members of the International community; and (3) Kashmir was 
a problem by Itself and should be considered onilts own merits, 
not In relation to other situations. In these circumstances, 
the Council's course was clear. Pakistan should be ordered 
to cease Its activities In Kashmir, thus allowing India to 
restore order In the state and to remove the threat to peace. 
That the Indian case was handicapped by Immersion In legal 
theory was obvious. India's alms might be legitimate and un­
derstandable but they were scarcely furthered by Insisting 
that an Issue Involving the fear, pride, and lives of men must 
be treated as a textbook problem In law. Practicalities, no 
matter what theory might say, demanded that Pakistan be re­
garded as a legitimate and vitally Interested party. Practi­
calities, In an International community where Judgments could 
be enforced only through cooperation or superior force, ruled 
out a satisfactory solution on the basis of Council "orders". 
But India's devotion to theory was fanatic and was to obstruct, 
for long months to come, the concessions and compromises 
necessary to bring peace to Kashmir.
The Pakistani case adroitly side-stepped the legal
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Issues raised by India and, beneath a flimsy interpretation 
of the facts in the case, rested upon emotion and moral right. 
For the record, Pakistan offered a legal position based upon 
four points; (1) the disturbance in Kashmir was a legitimate 
revolt against an autocratic government; (2) foreign elements 
in the state were neither aided nor officially sanctioned by 
Pakistan; (3} accession was fraudulent and therefore Indian 
troops were operating illegally in Kashmir; and (4) )the situa­
tion was compounded of many factors and could not be resolved 
without practical action on all issues of the broader contro­
versy. The interpretation of accession was shaky. The 
replies to the Indian charges and evidence of aid were not 
quite convincing. The justification for raising additional 
matters in dispute to the importance of Kashmir was weak.
But Pakistan's practical approach to Kashmir itself— that it 
was of legitimate and vital interest to both India and Paki­
stan and both must participate in the settlement— found a 
favorable reception among the Council members.
The resolutions, voting record, and comments indicated 
that, for all practical purposes, the Council was united in 
seeking a solution acceptable to both India and Pakistan with 
no particular favoritism shown to either party. Soviet devia­
tions, although difficult to analyze at this early stage, 
hinted at lack of interest or opinion rather than an obstruc­
tionist policy. It appeared that the Council had chosen a 
mediatory, not a judicial, approach.
Pakistan was the greater beneficiary of this <
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development for it achieved recognition of equal status with 
India and could begin to shed its defendant's role. India, 
originally on the diplomatic offensive, found its carefully 
documented legal case all but ignored and its own actions 
about to be investigated.
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CHAPTER III 
A QUESTION OF PRIORITY 
I
The opening meetings of the second period of Council 
consideration, during which the agenda entry became the India-* 
Pakistan Question, seemed to presage steady, if not swift, 
progress toward a solution of the dispute. On January 22,
Van Langenhove was able to report that Ayyangar and Zafrullah 
Khan were agreed in principle on the prerequisites of a 
settlement. But development of details with which to flesh 
the principles proved beyond the Council's capabilities. As 
discussion degenerated into deadlock, Ayyangar, dissatisfied 
with the "unfavorable trend" of the debates, requested ad­
journment in order to return to New Delhi for consultation.
The request was granted on February 12.
The meeting of February 5 was noteworthy for Sheikh 
Mohammed Abdullah's appearance before the Council, In a 
bitter denunciation of Pakistan, he outlined the latest chap­
ter, dating from the partition of India, in the history of 
Kashmir. The state had been so maladministered that the first 
task was construction of a democratic regime, not accession. 
India had granted time for the reorganization of internal
-54-
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affairs but Pakistan had applied pressure:
Pakistan wanted to force us to a position of
slavery* . . I had thought that Hitler and
Goebbels were dead. Dut what has happened 
in my poor country convinces me that they .
have transmigrated their souls into Pakistan.^
The change in agenda, which Van Langenhove had made on 
his own authority, symbolized the basic disagreement at this 
point, Ayyangar protested that only through a formal vote 
could an item on the agenda be altered once adopted. In 
effect. Council jurisdiction should be limited to Kashmir 
alone. Zafrullah Khan reiterated Pakistan's thesis; Kashmir 
was but one facet of a complex situation, all of which must
be considered in order to achieve a solution. Although the
Council eventually approved the change, India was appeased 
with a promise that only after Kashmir had been dealt with 
would the Pakistani charges be considered. Thus, on January 
22, the Jammu and Kashmir Question became the India-Pakistan 
Question.
A distinct note of optimism was introduced when Van 
Langenhove reported the parties agreed on three points; (1) 
accession was to be decided by a plebiscite; (2} conditions 
must ensure complete impartiality; and (3) therefore, the 
referendum must be conducted under the aegis of the United 
Nations, If details to effect these principles could be 
agreed upon, Kashmir would cease to be a problem.
Although no resolutions reached a vote during these
tell ïfixk HfflSi» February 6, 1948.
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meetings, six were introduced and remained before the Council 
at adjournment, A Belgian draft^ recognized that Kashmir's 
future must be decided through a referendum sponsored by the 
United Nations. After India and Pakistan had submitted qual­
ifications, the resolution was amended to provide that the 
commission should work toward "promoting the ceswation of 
acts of hostility and violence" and should report to the Coun­
cil on the fulfilment of essential plebiscite conditions:
Such proposals shall include measures designed 
to ensure cooperation between the military forces 
of India and Pakistan with a view. . , to main­
taining order and security in the f u t u r e .3
On January 29, Van Langenhove introduced additional 
resolutions calling for a plebiscite and a cease-fire. The 
plebiscite draft^ was primarily repetitious verbiage, again 
recognizing that a vote must be organized and supervised under 
the authority of the Security Council. The cease-fire pro­
posal stated that:
1. In the accomplishment of its functions, 
the Commission of the Security Council shall 
take into consideration that, among the duties 
incumbent upon it, are included those which 
would tend towards promoting the cessation of 
acts of hostility and violence, and which are 
of a particularly urgent character;
2. In the pursuit of this aim, the Com­
mission shall use every diligence to ensure 
that its mediatory action be exercised without
^52 Official 3rd Year, 236th Meeting, p. 265.
Official 3rd Year, 236th Meeting, p. 269.
Official R$£PrdS» 3rd Year, 237th Meeting, S/661,
p. 285.
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delay.5
In the fourth document, the Council received the
first indication that India was not presslngly interested in
an immediate plebiscite, an impression more than borne out in
the ensuing months* On February 3, Ayyangar suggested a
resolution in which the Security Council would concentrate on
getting Pakistani-aided forces out of Kashmir and
. . . that the Commission of the Council shall, 
among its duties, regard as particularly urgent 
the promotion of measures intended to bring 
about as expeditiously as possible the cessa­
tion of fighting and other acts of hostil­
ity. . .G
Plainly, India was interested in discussion Of a plebiscite 
only after a cease-fire had been arranged.
A resolution submitted on February 6 by General 
McNaughton? of Canada, then Council president, urged coopera­
tion among India, Pakistan, and the Council and listed seven 
principles of a just settlement: (l) cessation of hostilities;
(2) withdrawal of all non-Kashmiri irregular armed forces;
(3) maintenance of order by the forces of both India and Paki­
stan until accession was determined; (4) withdrawal of all
Qffisial Records. 3rd Year, 237th Meeting, S/662,
p. 286.
Official Records. 3rd Year, 239th Meeting, p. 326,
"̂ Andrew George Latta McNaughton, 1887- , has served
Canada in military and civil capacities since 1909. Commander 
of the 1st Army Overseas, 1940-44, he was minister of defense, 
1944-45, and at present is chairman of the Canadian section 
of the Canada-U.S, Permanent Joint Board on Defense. General 
McNaughton has been a delegate to the League of Nations and 
Commonwealth conferences and was permanent Canadian repre­
sentative to the United Nations, 1948-50.
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forces when such was accomplished; (5) return of refugees and 
release of political prisoners; (6) establishment of conditions 
necessary to a fair plebiscite, including an interim adminis­
tration; and (7) a plebiscite under authority of the Council 
at the earliest possible date.
The final document, a Colombian resolution introduced 
on February 11, followed McNaughton*s proposals in calling 
for withdrawal of tribal forces and an interim administra­
tion and in addition;
The Commission of the Security Council shall be 
composed of representatives of five Members of 
the United Nations, designated as follows: one 
to be selected by India, one by Pakistan, as 
already provided, . . and three by the Security 
Council. . .8
II
The alteration of the agenda entry was the first of 
four points to provoke prolonged controversy between the 
Indian and Pakistan representatives, Ayyangar again displayed 
his devotion to technicalities by noting that the previous 
meeting had adjourned with the understanding that the Council 
would meet again to consider "this question," obviously re­
ferring to the existing entry, the Jammu and Kashmir Question. 
Since that was the matter to be discussed, the change was un­
authorized and invalid, India was not unwilling to discuss 
other issues but it was important that there be no change in 
agenda at the present times
Qgg Oülcial B££.QXd5i 3rd Year, Supp, for Feb., 1948, 
S/671, p. 27.
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What I have been trying to persuade the Security 
Council to accept is the point that we are now 
engaged in debating only the Jammu and Kashmir 
question, with all the background that anyone 
may bring into it. . , I am now concerned with 
being satisfied that the debate in which we are 
now engaged will confine itself to the Jammu 
and Kashmir question.?
Kashmir alone would be like "a sentence torn out of
its context," countered Zafrullah Khan. No matter what might
be the fine points of Council procedure, consideration of all
the questions could not be avoided:
I am not concerned with the technicalities 
of the question. So long as it is deemed that 
all these questions are before the Security 
Council and on its agenda, I do not insist 
that a particular hfeading be applied, , . The 
point which I desire to have stablished clearly 
is that the Security Council is now seized of 
a situation between India and Pakistan and that 
that situation has many facets, of which Kashmir 
and Jammu is only one.10
Although the Council compromise appeared to meet the demands 
of both Ayyangar and Zafrullah Khan, it was clear in later 
debates that neither party had abandoned or intended to aban­
don its position on this question.
The second clash ranged over all previous charges and 
counter-charges, M. C. Setalvad,^^ who spoke for India on 
January 23, attacked Zafrullah Khan's accusations as estab-
Official RecorOs, 3rd Year, 231st Meeting, p. 161. 
lOUaid.. pp. 159-160.
11m . C. Setalvad, 1884- , has been with the Indian
United Nations delegation since 1947. Advocate General of 
Bombay in 1942, he resigned in protest against British policy 
in India. Setalvad represented India on the partition com­
mission which traced the boundaries of India and Pakistan.
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lishing a record for "calculated venom. . , irrelevancy. . ,
12deliberate omission. . , and clever distortion of facts." 
Complaints of Indian treatment of Moslems came from a govern­
ment which had failed "woefully" to discharge its own obliga­
tions toward minorities. Nor would India countenance the 
charge of noncooperation:
It has been suggested. . . that the Government 
of Pakistan was not informed of the intended 
dispatch of troops. My answer is that there 
was no need nor obligation to inform the Gov­
ernment of Pakistan of this dispatch of troops 
to the Kashmir State. The accession had made 
it a part of the Indian U n i o n , 13
Hastily deserting this vwekk defense, Setalvad attempt­
ed to guide the debate back to the issue as India saw it.
That issue remained whether or not, in reference to the inva­
sion of Kashmir, Pakistan had disregarded its obligations to 
a friendly neighboring state. Pakistan protested that it was 
anxious to discharge its international duties tüt was unable 
to prevent the tribes from entering Kashmir:
That is, I am sure the members of the Security
Council are well aware, no answer. A State 
cannot say that it is unable to restrain war­
like passage through its territory to others, 
and permit an invasion of a neighbouring State,14
Qffl&iai Becorda. 3rd Year. 232nd Meeting, p. 171,
pfilgial BiJEflJzdS., 3rd Year, 233rd Meeting, p. 223.
14£C Official Records. 3rd Year, 232nd Meeting, p. 186, 
Oppenheim supports Setalvad: "States ere under a duty to pre­
vent and suppress. . . subversive activity against foreign 
Governments as assumes the form of armed hostile expeditions
or attempts to commit common crimes against life or property."
C^penheim, pp. 260-61.
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Zafrullah Khan, again denying that Pakistan had aided 
the invaders, sought to minimize the importance of foreign 
forces in the Kashmir disturbances. He quoted figures listing 
60 per cent of the insurgents as native Poonchis, 35 per cent 
as tribesmen, and only 5 per cent as Punjabi Moslems, sup­
posedly proving that strife in Kashmir was a legitimate revolt 
against the maharaja,
Still clinging fanatically to the legal approach, 
Setalvad prompted the third controversy by raising the question 
of the place of precedent in Security Council procedures. He 
called to the support of his contentions as to Pakistan’s 
liability the findings of the commission in the Greek question;
The existence of disturbed conditions. . . in 
no way relieves. . . neighbours of their duty 
under international law to prevent and suppress 
subversive activity in their territory aimed at 
another Government, nor does it relieve them of 
direct responsibility for their support of. . . 
guerrillas.16
Setalvad slipped in a graceful bid for Soviet support by not­
ing that although the USSR had not concurred in the report, 
he was sure it was not because the principle was faulty under 
international law but because the USSR Was not convinced of 
the correctness of the commission findings. Evidence and
^^An Indian White Paper of March 5, 1948 estimated, on 
the basis of bodies recovered, that the composition of insur­
gent forces opposing the Indian army in Kashmir was "70 per 
cent Pathans and Moslems from Dir and Swat states, 20 per 
cent deserters from the Maharajah’s state forces, 5 per cent 
from Poonch, , , and 5 per cent Sundas." The New York Jimea, 
March 6, 1948.
162̂ ; Official 3rd Year, 237th Meeting, p. 298.
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precedent combined in a clear case for the Judicial-minded 
Indian. "If measures short of war fall to prevent the in­
filtration" of the tribesmen, it was the duty of Pakistan "to 
resort to measures of war against these tribesmen."1?
Admittedly "no authority" on international law, 
Zafrullah Khan was disinclined to carry on a lengthy discus­
sion on the relation between the Kashmir and Greek situations. 
But he thought the comparison poor. Kashmir, unlike Greece, 
was a case of an alien oppressor ruling over a people "with
whom he has nothing in common," With this brief appeal to
the principles of humanitarianism over the maxims of law, he 
stepped around the concept of precedent and moved on to the 
"absurd" suggestion that Pakistan go to war with the tribes:
That is strange advice. . . when the object 
. . .  is to bring about an immediate stoppage 
of the fighting. In order to bring about an 
inunediate stoppage of fighting. . . not only
should this war in Kashmir continue betweeen
the people. . . and the Maharaja, but Pakistan 
should start a new war on the frontier with 
the tribes in the tribal area.18
Such ridiculous references to unrealistic theory 
merely obstructed consideration of more important issues, some 
of which had more practical legal aspects. One was the legal­
ity of Kashmir's "purported accession" to India, a question 
raised by Pakistan at the outset:
All . . . allegations, even if they could be 
made out in fact— which is disputed— are based 
upon the assumption of the validity and legality
l?Ibld. ■ p, 301.
Official Records. 3rd Year, 239th Meeting, p. 347.
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of the accession of the State of Kashmir to 
India, which raises. . . questions of fact and 
questions of law.19
To question the validity of the accession was incom­
prehensible to Setalvad, for India had been approached on 
behalf of both the people and the government of Kashmir and 
had then agreed only on the condition that the union be rati­
fied by a plebiscite. If accession were a product of fraud 
and violence, to Pakistan fell the blame. And even if the 
accession should be invalid, "which we do not for a moment 
admit," Pakistan would remain under certain international 
obligations:
The position would be that Kashmir has not 
validly acceded to India; but it has not ac­
ceded to Pakistan at all. , , By all the 
principles that govern international relations,
India has the right to go to the aid of a 
legitimate Government, even if the opposition 
to that Government is from its own insurgent 
nationals.::. . A neighbouring country. . , 
has not the right to go. « .to the help of 
insurgents against the constituted authority 
in a . . . State. That. . . is a well under­
stood principle in international law,20
An issue that was to remain an obstacle to a peaceful 
settlement for four years was the fourth point which engaged 
the advocates in full-scale verbal battle during this series
Official Records. 3rd Year, 236th Meeting p. 274.
2Qibid.. pp. 275-76. Oppenheim is not fully in accord, 
holding that a state may recognize as belligerents;,and thus 
lawfully aid, insurgents if they succeed in controlling a 
part of a country, maintain a government, and conduct their 
own military operations. This corresponds to thePakistani 
interpretation of the Azad government. But the question of 
exactly when such conditions legalize recognition, and aid, 
is dangerous and difficult to answer. "For an untimely and 
precipitate recognition. . . Is an unlawful act, and it is 
frequently maintained that such amount to intervention," 
Oppenheim, p. 124.
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of meetings. From thé outset India and Pakistan had agreed 
on the necessity of a plebiscite but it now developed that 
they differed radically on the conditions under which that 
plebiscite should be conducted. The Indian plan called for 
pacification of Kashmir» then a referendum under the auspices 
of the United Nations, However, Sheikh Abdullah’s administra­
tion was to remain as the state’s civil authority.
We have to take the verdict of the people of a 
State which is now being governed by machinery 
which it has had for years. Kashmir. . . con­
ducts its own administration. . , The question 
is whether, , • one can oust that machinery 
completely and put something which comes from 
outside in its place. I think that would mean 
an amount of encroachment on the ordinary 
sovereign powers of any State, to which no 
State would be willing to agree.21
Thus despite accession, India appeared to attribute 
many aspects of sovereignty to Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah him­
self attacked the concept of an interim government. Conceding 
that he was no longer impartial, he maintained that this fact 
would not affect his administration of Kashmir. In any event, 
the United Nations had no authority with which to displace a 
legal governments
Where are you going to get this neutral admin­
istration? I say to you frankly that if you 
ask Almighty God to administer the State of 
Kashmir, I do not feel He will act impartially.^^
A neutral administration was prerequisite to Pakistani 
agreement on a plebiscite, retorted Zafrullah Khan. Judging
Records. 3rd Year, 239th Meeting, p. 329.
22uj^ tot Yfixk limea^ February 6, 1948.
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from certain remarks in which he had implied that referendum 
plans might be dropped» Sheikh Abdullah's competence to con­
duct a fair vote was questionable. The Indian plan would not 
bring peace, although "it might bring suppression and a good 
deal of o p p r e s s i o n ."24 Zafrullah Khan saw legal technical­
ities again obstructing progress:
It is entirely irrelevant today to inquire 
whether, juristically, the holding of a pleb­
iscite for this specific purpose falls within . 
the domestic jurisdiction of the Maharaja or 
within international jurisdiction. . .1 beg 
to submit. . « that, in order for the pleb­
iscite to be free and unfettered, . the ad­
ministration. , . must be impartial and 
neutral.25
This was to be the basis of Pakistan's interpretation of 
plebiscite conditions through four years of negotiations.
A question of priority shattered what hope remained 
that the disputants might early reach preliminary agreement. 
India stubbornly insisted that consideration of detailed pleb­
iscite procedures should come only af%er hostilities had 
ceased:
It would be putting the cart before the horse 
if the Security Council. . . proceeded, . . to 
deal with the question of a plebiscite which, 
if it is in fact a matter for discussion and
23«iThere may not be a referendum after the disasters 
at Baramula, Uri, Pattan, and Muzaffarabad, The people may 
not bother about it any more." The New XÊXk Times. Novem­
ber 12, 1947.
Official Records» 3rd Year, 239th Meeting, p. 348.
Official Records. 3rd Year, 240th Meeting, p. 354,
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decision by this body, should come at the veryend,20
For this reason, Ayyangar opposed simultaneous consideration 
of the Belgian plebiscite and cease-fire drafts. India's 
•concrete" cease-fire proposals had apparently been brushed 
aside; "instead, there is a draft resolution before the Secur-
ity Council which is. , , innocuous in the extreme." Acts
of violence and hostility were being perpetrated every day; 
yet the commission, which was not yet in existence, was ad­
vised to do something which would "tend" to "promote" the 
cessation of those acts. Certain amendments might make the 
drafts acceptable but no matter what action the Council might 
take, the Indian goal would remain the same:
After fighting is stopped, normal conditions 
are restored and everybody belonging to the 
State has returned to his home and land, we
want conditions to be established with a two
fold objective; first, the establishment of\{ 
a system of self-government acceptable to the 
people of the State and secondly, a final set­
tlement of the question of a c c e s s i o n ,23
Far from agreeing with the dogmatic Indian attitude, 
Zafrullah Khan believed that an immediate plebiscite agreement 
would automatically halt hostilities without tiresome investi­
gation of questions of fact and of law;
Pakistan was and is willing to forego all these
investigations if the one point on which the 
parties are agreed. . , the question of the ac­
cession of the Kashmir State. . . shall be
2ÔSC Official Records. 3rd Year, 236th Meeting, p. 272.
27^ Qfiicial Records. 3rd Year, 237th Meeting, p. 294.
23^ Official Recordsf 3rd Year, 239th Meeting, p. 327.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-67-
decided by means of a plebiscite, and if, in 
order to secure its fairness and impartiality, 
the plebiscite is carried out under the aegis 
of the Security C o u n c i l ,29
Despite continued discussion, the deadlock remained 
unbroken. On February 10, Ayyangar summarily requested ad­
journment, assuring the Council that India was not withdrawing 
the question from consideration. But as "the trend of opin­
ion, . , seemed to ignore the urgency and immediacy of a 
solution and to consider problems which could walt,"̂ '̂ the 
Indian delegation had concluded that the less immediate prob­
lems should be considered at leisure, in full appreciation of 
all factors Involved, The request pleased no one, Zafrullah 
Khan considered the situation too urgent to warrant postpone­
ment, particularly as Pakistan had other matters to take up. 
"We do not know where we s t a n d , B u t  on February 12, the 
Council acceded to the request with the understanding that 
the delegation would return as soon as possible.
Shifts in sympathy among the Council members had 
become evident as this series of debates drew to a close. 
the question of the agenda, there were varying views,
Gromyko’s thesis was that "only the Council can delete any 
item from the Council’s a g e n d a . " 3 2  Therefore, the Kashmir
Official 3rd Year, 236th Meeting,pp. 274-75,
SOynltM NôUfiüiS. IV (March l, 1948), p. 193,
3^The New York Times, February 12, 1948.
32S£ CtfflcAal BÊÈfiüsbi, 3rd Year, 231st Meeting, p.
150,
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question was still the legal entry and would remain so until 
the Council decided otherwise, although he had no objection 
to including the Pakistani counter-complaint as a separate 
item.
Fast footwork on both sides of the issue characterized 
Noel-Baker on this point. At first he agreed "broadly" with 
the Indian contention that the question of Kashmir had prece­
dence, although "we cannot deny to the representative of 
Pakistan the right to raise a matter which he thinks u r g e n t . "33
But Arce was of a different persuasion, for if the
Council attempted to deal with Kashmir apart from the other
questions, the dispute might never be settled and the Council
would be committing a "flagrant injustice" against the two
dominions. All factors must be considered regardless of the
fact that only one was officially before the Council:
We must remember. . . that this is not a court 
of justice but a political body, which must be 
governed by fixed rules but cannot pay too much 
attention to trifling details of form, partic­
ularly when they do not involve major questions of principle,34
El-Khouri reached the same conclusion after following 
a legal route. His judicial experience convinced him that, 
once a principal claim had been submitted to "any court of 
justice," the defending part was free "at any time" to sub­
mit a counter-claim relative to the original issue:
The representative of the United Kingdom did
p. 148. 
p. 150.
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not speak about the relationship between the 
claims. If he considered them not related to 
each other, his suggestion would be correct; 
but if he considered that they were linked to 
each other, then his proposal to have the 
claims discussed and decided separately would not be correct.33
Apparently always willing to oblige, Noel-Baker re­
versed his field when he found Council consensus opposed to 
his suggestion. After all, "the substance is what matters" 
and the members appeared to be agreed on the substance, which 
was that all the matters were on the agenda, directly or by 
implication.
Opinions on the question of priority of plebiscite or 
cease-fire followed a similar pattern. Again Noel-Baker, not 
inclined to take a "dogmatic" view of the importance of either, 
attempted to place a kindly hand on the shoulder of each 
party. He saw merit in iimediate consideration of referendum 
procedures but "not at all because I am against the view ex­
pressed by the representative of India that stopping the 
fighting is our most urgent task. I agree with him fully. . 
Noel-Baker now believed that the entire issue, from measures 
to halt strife to the staging of a plebiscite, was one prob­
lem. If confidence in a plebiscite could be created, a cease 
fire might automatically follow. As was to be expected, the 
Indian representative took violent exception to this position. 
Coincidentally, one meeting later Noel-Baker announced that 
he had changed his mind; he no longer felt it necessary to
33lbid.. p. 149.
Official Recordsf 3rd Year, 236th Meeting, p. 282.
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to consider the plebiscite first.
El-Khouri and Arc© again favored the Pakistani side 
of the issue. No question of priority arose for cease-fire 
and plebiscite were interdependent* said El-Khouri, Further, 
he agreed with Pakistan that the tribesmen were no one’s 
agents:
The tribesmen and the inhabitants of Kashmir 
are not responsible to anybody, and I do not 
believe that anyone would have sufficient con­
trol over them to issue a cease-fire order, , ,̂ 7
And Arc© joined Zafrullah Khan on two points. He questioned 
the ability of Sheikh Abdullah’s administration to conduct an 
impartial referendum and, in line with the Pakistani argument, 
regarded misrule by the maharaja as the basic cause of Kash­
mir’s difficulties in arguing for the priority of a plebiscite;
It is worth while to remember the Latin proverb,
which says ÆUfeiala toliituz sifsfiius., or,in other words remove the cause and the effects 
will disappear, , . If. . , we assure these 
human beings that they themselves will be able 
to decide their own fate freely, , . I am sure _ 
that they will lay down their arms, I am sure 
that the tribes will withdraw to their own territories.38
Warren Austin^? of the United States followed Noel- 
Baker in avoiding commitment to either India or Pakistan,
Official Records. 3rd Year, 237th Meeting, p. 290.
Official EsÈSœdâ, 3rd Year, 240th Meeting, p, 367.
39warren Robinson Austin, 1877- , former United
States senator, was named United States special ambassador to 
the United Nations in 1947. His record in International af­
fairs includes membership on the Senate Foreign Relations 
committee and service as an adviser to American delegations 
at various inter-American conferences. He is credited with 
devising the Act of Chapultepec.
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although he did favor an interim government for Kashmir. 
Elaborating upon this point,hhe gave indirect support to 
India’s position on the validity of accession. With acces­
sion the external sovereignty of Kashmir had been transferred 
to India. Therefore, India need not worry that the foisting 
of an interim administration upon the state would be a viola­
tion of international law:
Now here we see the external sovereignty of 
Kashmir and Jammu possessed, and exercised 
before us in this petition by India. A 
plebiscite is one of the conditions attend­
ing the accession and the grant of this part 
of the exercise of sovereignty from Kashmir 
and Jamu to India. . . If this solution in­
volves an Interim government, India has fullauthority.40
At one point Austin became extremely critical of the tone of 
the Indian case, which seemed to be requesting the Council 
to "pull-off Pakistan" and let India "finish the job" in Kash­
mir, He informed Ayyangar that the Council was opposed to
Officiai 3rd Year, 240th Meeting, p. 376,
Austin is not quite in line with Oppenhelm. If the relation 
of states, such as Kashmir, to the central government is con­
sidered to be in the nature of vassalship or Indian suzerain­
ty, India possesses international guardianship but the state 
is independent internally. This is India’s own interpreta­
tion, The institution of a new government, even if in pursuit 
of international obligations over which India possesses author­
ity, would amount to a violation of the internal "sovereignty* 
of the state. "Suzerainty is by no means sovereignty. It is 
a kind of international guardianship, . , In ever case in 
other States, since the suzerain absorbs these relations en­
tirely, such vassal nevertheless remains a half sovereign 
State on account of its Internal independence, . Oppen- 
heim specifically cites the states of the Indian Empire as 
examples. The Instrument of Accession supposedly placed the 
states in the same position toward India or Pakistan that 
they had enjoyed with respect to Great Britain. Oppenhelm, 
pp. 170-71
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all fighting and definitely would not act as an ally of one 
party to the dispute. This was a further indication that, in 
the eyes of the Council, Pakistan had achieved equal status 
and rights with India in Kashmir.
Although T. F, T s i a n g ^ l  of China believed that the 
obvious key to the problem lay in the plebiscite, he neverthe­
less managed to stay on the fence by noting ithat "on the other 
hand, unless we restore peace in Kashmir, such a plebiscite 
would not be possible."42 The best method of halting strife, 
said Tsiang, required Pakistan to use its Influence to keep 
the tribesmen from entering Kashmir and India to withdraw Its 
troops progressively if the Pakistani appeal were effective. 
This suggestion was to be echoed in later, more detailed, 
cease-fire proposals.
Ill
The debates which had opened on January 22 in an 
atmosphere of optimism closed on February 12 under a cloud of 
bitterness and despair. Far from fulfilling the high hopes 
of progress seemingly promised by acceptance of the second 
Belgian resolution, the discussions had only revealed appar­
ently irreconcileable differences on details in the imple­
mentation of principles relatively easily agreed upon. Yet
4^Tingfu Fuller Tsiang, 1895- , at present permanent
representative of China to the United Nations, was educated 
in the United States, A former professor of history, he 
entered the Chinese diplomatic service in 1936, serving as 
ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1936 to 1938.
^"52 Official 3rd Year, 237th Meeting, p. 289.
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the period was of considerable significance to later develop­
ments. It indicated that achievement of a settlement would 
be an arduous and prolonged task and it witnessed emergence 
of a number of issues which were to increase in importance 
during the months to come. Disagreement concerning an interim 
administration and the priority of plebiscite or cease-fire 
was not easily to be reconciled. The genesis of future cease­
fire proposals lay in Tsiang*s suggestions and, in the Colom­
bian draft resolution, there lay a modification of the com­
mission’s structure v4iich was later to be acted upon.
The six resolutions, which expired unenacted with 
adjournment, clearly demonstrated that the Council, despite 
India's attitude, planned to make the eventual plebiscite 
even more its own concern than the question of Jwho was legally 
at fault in Kashmir. Ayyangar may have been somewhat Justified 
in his criticism of the circuitous route by which the Belgian 
resolution arrived at a cease-fire proposal but eventually 
he, like the Council members themselves, would have to face 
the fact that the Council was not an international tribunal 
empowered to issue injunctions but must achieve its goals 
through mediation and the cooperation of the parties to a 
dispute.
The Indian case remained embedded in law, stressing 
the legal aspect of all major issues, the validity of ac­
cession, an interim administration, and priority of plebiscite 
or cease-fire. There was as yet no indication that New Delhi 
was prepared to compromise on any poSnt:
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The Council is not concerned with whether or 
not the Maharajaw lawfully became the rule 
(sic) of the State, whether or not there is 
a moral administration in the State, whether 
or not the Maharajah is sovereign, and whether 
or not Kashmir.has, legally acceded to India.
The only issue is that Pakistan must observe 
its international obligations«and must not 
support any outside raiders. ^
The suggestions that Pakistan go to war, if necessary, to
fulfil its obligations and that the Council restrain Pakistan
in order to permit India to accomplish its aims in Kashmir
were ill-advised in the extreme for they could only irritate
those members of the Council sincerely working toward an end
to hostilities.
The Pakistani stand, although still less legal-based 
than the Indian, called upon law in entering a stronger chal­
lenge to the validity of accession. This but indicated that 
Pakistan would do better to avoid judicial intricacies for 
the reasoning in this instance was weak. On the remaining 
issues, an interim government and precedence of plebiscite or 
cease-fire, Pakistan continued to stress the practical aspects 
of the situation. The position that a cease-fire would be 
a relatively unimportant matter if only a plebiscite were 
immediately guaranteed was somevdiat extreme but not so annoy­
ing to the Council as India’s seeming dismissal of the pleb­
iscite from immediate consideration.
Council opinion, as a result of a number of rash 
Indian statements, the abrupt adjournment request, and Indian
Nations Bulletin. IV (March 1, 1948), p. 194.
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Intransigeance on the interim administration and plebiscite
issues, had become more critical of New Delhi. Yet there
was only a slight deviation from the neutral attitude adopted
in previous meetings. Pakistan had apparently added Arce to
El-Khouri in its list of potential champions, but Austin,
Noel-Baker, and Tsiang remained resolutely in the middle.
Other members were largely noncommital. And the Council, in
decisions on the agenda and on the plebiscite-cease-fire
controversy, had more clearly defined its approach to the
entire problem. It was, as Arce had stated, "not a court of
justice but a political body" and it would seek a solution
not through legal but through political means. Noel-Baker
attested to the Council's belief that its role was mediatory:
Having heard the parties, I want, with equal 
understanding, with equal friendship. . . for 
both, as a member of the Security Council, 
sharing our collective responsibility to man­
kind, to ask the question: What ought the
Security Council now to do?44
Granted that officially the Council remained neutral, 
Pakistan could yet claim an advance at the conclusion of the 
second series of meetings. The alteration of the agenda v̂ as 
a major victory, although it remained to be seen whether the 
Pakistani counter-complaints would assume much importance in 
the discussions, and, as a result of the uncompromising 
Indian attitude on an interim administration and a plebiscite 
and the impolitic request for adjournment, the Council was 
growing increasingly annoyed with the Indian position,
Qiiicial Records. 3rd Year, 235th Meeting, p. 256.
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CHAPTER IV 
PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH 
I
Kashmir again became a problem for the Council on 
March 8, 1948, A recess of almost a month duration had pro­
vided time for an alteration of the situation in Kashmir 
itself and for considerable diplomatic activity in London and 
Washington, the two capitals now beginning to show the most 
concern over the dispute. On March 5, Sheikh Abdullah had 
been appointed "state Premier at the head on an interim popu­
lar government."^ Previously he had merely headed an emer­
gency administration while the pre-invasion prime minister 
continued as titular chief of the government. In addition, 
the maharaja had guaranteed a democratic constitution and a 
representative government for the state. And rumors that the 
United States and the United Kingdom had been seeking a new 
approach to the problem, perhaps a broadening of Sheikh 
Abdullah’s regime sufficient to win Pakistani approval, flood* 
ed Lake Success.
Hopes for progress during the third phase of Council 
debates were not entirely misplaced for when discussion
ĴhSi U m  ïfixJi March 6, 1943.
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concluded on June 3, a program for commission activity in 
Kashmir had been adopted by the Council, and grudgingly ac­
cepted by Mew Delhi and Karachi, and the United Nations Com­
mission for India and Pakistan had been constituted. On 
April 23, Belgium and Colombia joined Czechoslovakia and 
Argentina, previously selected by India and Pakistan respec­
tively, on the commission. The United States became the 
fifth member on May 7,
Of three resolutions introduced during the meetings,
two, a six-power draft and a Syrian-sponsored document, were
approved. The former afforded the commission its final 
structure and was essentially a modification of a Chinese 
resolution which did not reach a vote. The draft^ submitted 
by Tsiang provided for the withdrawal and denial of all aid 
to the tribesmen, then the progressive withdrawal from Kash­
mir of Indian troops not essential to the security of the 
state; the remainder should be stationed so as not to "afford 
any intimidation or appearance of intimidation." India was 
to establish a plebiscite administration "with the sole and 
full authority to administer the plebiscite on the question 
of accession of the State." Further;
10, The Government of India undertakes to
use its best endeavours to ensure that in the
composition of the Interim Government of Jairanu 
and Kashmir provision is made for adequate 
representation of all major political groups In 
the State,
11. The Government of India agrees to
 ̂ OffiSiai Records. 3rd Year, Supp. for March, 1948,S/699 $ pp. 3G-40.
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appoint an official of high standing to be 
stationed in the State during the interim 
period, who shall have the power to cause 
to be fulfilled by the State Government all 
international obligations arising out of the 
present Articles of Settlement.3
The commission, after observing the plebiscite, would certify
to the Council whether it had been "really free and impartial."
The six-power (Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia,
United Kingdom, United States) resolution, later adhered to 
by France, imitated the Colombian draft of February 11 in the 
increase of the size of the commission to five members. Paki­
stan was to persuade insurgent elements in Kashmir to cooper­
ate in cease-fire attempts and to secure the withdrawal of 
the tribesmen from the state. India was to withdraw its 
troops in stages when arrangements for a cease-fire became 
effective and to inform the commission of the completion of 
each stage. Again, the presence of the remaining troops 
should not afford "any intimidation or appearance of intimida­
tion." The plebiscite administration was to control state 
police forcesi
If these local forces should be found to be 
inadequate, the Commission, subject to the 
agreement of both the Government of India and 
the Government of Pakistan, should arrange for 
the use of such forces of either Dominion as 
it deems effective for the purpose of pacifica­tion.4
The Kashmiri government was to be broadened to include 
representatives of all major political groups and the
p. 340.
flifjjsiaX. B&fariia, 3rd Year, 286th Meeting, 8/726,
p. 21.
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plebiscite administration was to be granted all powers neces­
sary for an impartial referendum, Indian forces would be 
made available to assist the administration and a plebiscite 
administrator, nominated by the secretary-general of the 
United Nations, would be appointed by and serve as an official 
of the government of Kashmir. Furthers
The Government of India should undertake to 
prevent, and to give full support to the 
Administrator. , . in preventing any threat, 
coercion or intimidation, bribery or other 
undue influence on the voters in the pleb­
iscite. . .5
India was to ensure that the Kashmiri government 
would guarantee civil liberties, release political prisoners, 
and permit the return of refugees. Lastly, the commission 
was to certify, at the conclusion of the plebiscite, that the 
vote had been "really free and impartial." The Council voted 
upon each paragraph of the resolution. Belgium, Canada,
China, Colombia, France, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States favored every provision while the Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
abstained on all. Argentina and Syria abstained on those 
paragraphs which appeared to give India a greater voice in 
the pre-plebiscite administration than was accorded Pakistan.
Final Council action occurred on June 3 following re­
ceipt of a commission request for forther instructions, par­
ticularly as to whether the group was to consider the items 
in the Pakistani complaint in addition to the situation in
Sibid.. p. 34.
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Kashmir. The resultant Syrian resolution directed the com­
mission to proceed "without delay" to the scene of the dispute 
"with a view to accomplishing in priority the duties assigned 
to it"6 by the six-power resolution. Regarding Pakistan's 
counter charges, the commission was instructed:
. , . further to study and report to the Security 
Council when it considers it appropriate on the 
matters raised in the letter of the Foreign Min­
ister of Pakistan, dated 15 January 1948, in the 
order outlined in Paragraph D of the resolution 
of the Council dated 20 January 1948.7
This order was: (1) the situation in Kashmir as set forth in
the Indian complaint and in the Pakistani reply and (2) the 
additional matters contained in the Pakistani counter-com­
plaint. The resolution was approved with eight in favor 
(Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, France, Syria, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States) and three abstentions 
(China, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics).
II
Initial arguments in the new series of debates reveal­
ed no relaxation in the rigid Indian and Pakistani positions 
after a month in which to reconsider attitudes. Ayyangar 
proclaimed hopes for an early settlement but repeated India's 
refusal to withdraw troops before the plebiscite, emphasizing 
that in no fashion would Indian forces be permitted to inter-
Official RecordsT 3rd Year, 312th Meeting, S/819,p. 21.
£ll«
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fere with a "free and unfettered" referendum. Yet a neutral 
regime remained "unthinkable"; "it is not possible for India 
to yield on this point.
Zafrullah Khan used indignation over India’s failure 
to modify its position to mask the absence of compromise in 
the Pakistani approach. A further protest was entered on the 
appointment of Sheikh Abdullah as premier of Kashmir, a fait 
accompli which would further impede a settlement for "no one" 
would accept as fair and just a referendum carried out by 
the "hand-picked" premier of the maharaja with the aid of
•J
Indian troops. For the record, Pakistan continued to demand 
immediate consideration of plebiscite procedures.
But the chill was relieved somewhat with the intro­
duction of the Chinese resolution. Although this measure 
called for changes in the government of Kashmir and a reduc­
tion in the strength of Indian forces, Ayyangar was able to 
modify his previous position and to express guarded approval 
of the draft as "an honest, bona fide and fair attempt to 
settle the question.Still, as a first step, the Council 
should order Pakistan to halt aid to the insurgents,
Zafrullah Khan was "bewildered" that anyone should 
expect the government of Pakistan to accept the Chinese pro­
posal. The plan might reduce the more obvious forms of 
pressure on the voters but it could not prevent more subtle
®lhs. USM Xsxk liCLSS, March 11, 1948.
9lbid.. March 19, 1948.
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methods of coercion as long as Sheikh Abdullah remained at 
the head of Kashmir's government. The Sheikh had stated that 
he was willing to broaden his ministry by the Inclusion of 
representatives of other political groups as long as all mem­
bers of the government were loyal to the National Conference.10 
The premier would not tolerate "disloyal and traitorous" ele­
ments. The Idea was obviously to establish one-party govern­
ment and to rule out participation by both the Moslem Confer­
ence and the Azad Kashmir government.
The Chinese resolution had at least found Ayyangar 
not totally unsympathetic but the six-power draft drew his 
fire as well as Zafrullah Khan’s. Ayyangar was not at all 
pleased to see that this draft, although based on Tsiang*s, 
had been so twisted out of shape by compromise that practically 
every amendment of substance was "a definite worsening of our 
position, and constitutes a breach— In some cases, a violent 
one— in our fundamentals."^^ Resolutely pecking at techni­
calities, he noted that although the Chinese version was not 
above criticism, It had possessed some happy features:
It avoided any unnecessary or Improper encroach­
ment by outside authorities on the sovereign 
powers exercisable In the State by the Jammu 
and Kashmir Government and by the Government 
of India within their respective constitutional 
spheres. It respected constitutional propri­
eties In the relations which. In a federal
lOAccordlng to the Indian government, Abdullah’s 
first ministry Included a member of the Moslem Conference, 
one of five Moslems In a seven-member cabinet. The Kashmir 
p. 15.
PiiJLulul üj££û£liÂ, 3rd Year, 285th Meeting, p. 6.
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structure, should subsist between the Govern­
ment of India and the Government of a State 
which had acceded to India,12
This was not so in the case of the six-power measure
which appeared to provide for the complete displacement of
the legitimate state government. And a most unsatisfactory
feature was the scant consideration given the issue on which
India had invoked Security Council Jurisdiction:
Short of obtaining an official declaration of 
war by the Pakistan Government and the use of 
their regular army openly for conducting mili­
tary operations in Jammu and Kashmir, the 
fighters have been and are obtaining all other 
help and assistance on Pakistan territory.13
It was not clear to Ayyangar whether the provision calling 
upon Pakistan "to prevent" the entrance of tribesmen and Pak­
istani nationals into Kashmir carried a clear commitment on 
the use of Pakistani armed force if peaceful methods failed 
to halt this movement. "Unless this committment is unequiv­
ocal, the undertaking *to prevent* is not of any practical
value."14
Zafrullah Khan was even less impressed by the resolu­
tion. The fundamental problem was to determine the conditions 
essential to a successful plebiscite. Yet the draft concerned 
to a great extent the character of the insurgents. Deserting 
Kashmir altogether, Zafrullah Khan threw himself into an
p. 4.
13Uiisi.. p. 6.
p. 11.
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hysterical and impolitic attack upon the Council. He saw in 
these "vague provisions" the result of much whispering 
diplomacy:
If that is so, it would appear that at least 
some of the members of the Security Council 
seemed to have realized. « , with a sense of 
sharp surprise, that the Security Council had 
for once let itself slip into a position of 
fairness and impartiality between two contend­
ing parties which might help to restore the 
United Nations a fraction of the prestige that 
it was so rapidly losing in the eyes of the 
world. They therefore beat a hasty retreat 
from a position so unfamiliar and embarrassing 
and fraught with the possibility of such unde­sired consequences,15
If Pakistan were to persuade the tribesmen to with­
draw, Pakistani troops must be permitted to operate in the 
battle areas in Kashmir to supervise withdrawal. Yet the 
only troops provided for were Indian, which would encourage 
non-Moslem elements in Kashmir, knowing that forces charged 
with maintaining order were drawn from their own side, to 
grow aggressive and repeat the horrors of the Punjab, In 
short, all pre-plebiscite provisions seemed to be weighted 
heavily in favor of India.
Ayyangar, unfortunately, had not reached the same con­
clusion, although it was only right that arrangements should 
favor India. The union of Kashmir and India was legal; it 
existed at that moment ahd it would exist at the conclusion 
of hostilities. It would exist until and if a plebiscite 
went against India:
» p. 26.
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Until then, Pakistan has no constitutional posi­
tion in Jammu and Kashmir; and we therefore put 
it forward as one of our fundamental contentions 
that, in regard to the arrangements which we make 
for the plebiscite under international auspices, 
there is no case for allowing the intervention of 
Pakistan at any stage,
Ayyangar resented the tendency of the Council to regard Indian
forces in Kashmir as an army of occupation. India would not
abdicate its "paramount duty" of defending Kashmir as long
as accession lasted. Standing rock-solid on the legality of
the union, he attacked the resolution for failing to grant
India a privilege he must have known could never be accepted
by Pakistan:
When the whole of the State, , , comes under one 
administration— and that, the administration of 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir— India's garrisons 
will need to be planted at her outer frontiers on 
the west of the Jammu and Kashmir State.1?
Wrath consumed Zafrullah Khan with India's open 
espousal of such an extreme position, a position wholly un­
acceptable to Pakistan. India not only desired to be the 
sole judge of the validity of accession and of the constitu­
tion of the government of Kashmir but insisted on Council aid 
in imposing a military regime upon the entire state to achieve 
v/hat its own Illegal efforts had been unable to accomplish.
No matter how, India might confuse the issue, the essence of 
the matter remained that accession was a question equally 
vital to both dominions, "and they are equally vitally
p. 13.
, p. 14.
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interested in its result.
Apparently no matter what its structure, India would 
consider no interim government which was not totally an Indian 
creature. The resolution provisions on this point may have 
been mild in the eyes of the Council but they were too much 
for Ayyangar. India did not oppose the inclusion of certain 
outside elements in the present government. Yet the proposal 
to supplant that government with a special, coalition admin­
istration was out of the question, for such administrations 
were actually dangerous if brought into existence "at a time 
when the major political issue before the country is one on 
which those groups differ violently,
Zafrullah Khan was equally uncompromising on the other 
side of the issue for he saw the continuance of the existing 
government, coupled with the presence of Indian troops in 
Kashmir, as unavoidably prejudicial to Pakistan. On these 
"two central crucial matters" Pakistan asked only an impartial 
field from which all suspicion of favoritism toward one party 
or the other had been removed. But, as the Pakistani spokes­
man correctly pointed out, the arrangements upon which India 
insisted would "influence the plebiscite in only one direc­
tion; there is no possibility of their influencing it in the 
other,"'.20
p. 29. 
. p. 14. 
20lfcii., p. 30.
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Ayyangar*s ultimate view was that the modifications
of the Chinese resolution embodied in the six-power draft so
attenuated the former that India found acceptance impossible.
India and Pakistan appeared to be "tarred with the same brush"
in the interests of building a Council reputation for holding
the scales even between the parties, an attitude Zafrullah
Khan had Just as vehemently criticized the Council for
abandoning with the six-power measure:
India brought before the Security Council a 
plain, élmple, straightforward, factually fool 
proof issue, and the action that we suggested 
the Security Council should take was inescap­
able. . . instead of taking that action earlier,
India's complaint was placed in cold storage for 
nearly four months. . ► And at the end of it 
if all we are exhorted in appealing language, 
to agree to a resolution niggardly in its recog­
nition of the merits of the matter, vague and 
indefinite in the wording of the action to be 
taken by Pakistan. And in the interpretation 
of that language the Security Council has gone 
even further and been apologetic to Pakistan 
for reminding it of its duty. India cannot, 
in honour, agree to this treatment of its c a s e .21
At last the Indian and Pakistani representatives found 
themselves in agreement, albeit of a negative variety, for 
Zafrullah Khan similarly opposed the resolution. However, 
certain amendments, which would actually amount to a drastic 
reversal of the intentions of the proposal, might make it 
acceptable to Pakistan, Such alterations as granting Paki­
stan the right to employ troops in Kashmir and reorganization 
of the government on the basis of equal representation of all 
major political groups would, in effect, transfer control of
p. 12.
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the state to the insurgent forces if the wording of the Pak­
istani amendment were adopted:
The Government of the State shall forthwith be 
reconstituted so as to give equal representa­
tion to each major political group in the State 
— viz.. the National Conference, the Muslim 
Conference and the Azad Kashmir— which will 
each be invited to designate an equal number 
of responsible representatives to constitute 
a Council of Ministers. This Council of 
Ministers may choose one of its members to 
act as President, but in the allocation of 
portfolios it will be guided by the advice of the Commission. 22
The unusual spectacle of Indian-Pakistani agreement, 
even though in opposition to the resolution, evidently con­
vinced the Council that at last a fair formula had been dis­
covered, for each paragraph received the approval of a major­
ity of the members. And a rereading apparently convinced 
Karachi and New Delhi that the measure was not Jquite so ob­
jectionable as first supposed for although neither government 
unreservedly accepted the resolution, both announced that 
they were willing to consult with the commission once it 
reached the sub-continent, 3̂
22jbid., p. 47.
23According to reports from New Delhi, the reception 
India would accord the commission might be less than heart­
felt: "The Indian press has begun to lay the ground work for
the rejection of any recommendations that the commission may 
make unless they favor India. Dispatches from Kashmir make 
it plain that the pro-India Government of Sheikh Abdullah is 
now unwilling to accept even an impartial plebiscite. . . It 
may be borne in mind that India and Sheikh Abdullah, with 
Kashmir already in their hands, have nothing to gain and every­
thing to lose so far as the United Nations Commission’s work 
is concerned. . . In a. . . dispatch from Srinagar, Sheikh 
Abdullah is quoted as having said in a speech to, . , his Na­
tional Conference party: ’Kashmir is our homeland and no for­
eigner has any right to interfere in our internal affairs’"
Ihfi. New York Tic:s. * e 16, 1948.
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Neither Ayyangar nor Zafrullah Khan commented ex­
tensively on the Syrian resolution for by that time, June 3, 
the commission had been constituted and had departed for 
India, However, Ayyangar remained opposed to any broadening 
of commission powers:
All I need say is that my Government wishes me 
to bring to the notice of the Security Council 
the fact that it is opposed to any extension of 
the powers of the Commission to cover Ithese three 
additional charges, because it considers, first, 
that these ancillary charges have not been proved; 
and, secondly, that these charges do not consti­
tute any alement of international importance 
which merits consideration by the Security Coun­cil,24
The Pakistani opinion was even more briefly express­
ed, ̂ returning to the theme that it' was the "totality of rela­
tions between the two Dominions which constitutes a threat to 
international peace. . . Consequently, it was but natural 
that the commission be instructed to investigate all facets 
of the; dispute.
Neutrality remained the Council*s byword. Austin of
the United States again stepped forward as the champion of an
interim administration, provision for which was contained in
both resolutions. However, he v;as not in sympathy with the
Pakistani suggestion that all political groups in Kashmir
should share equally in the government:
The draft resolution does not mean. . . that 
each of the three political groups. . . should
24sc Official S££fl££Ls., 3rd Year, 312th Meeting, p. 19.
SSltli., p, 8.
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be given the right to designate an equal number 
of responsible representatives to constitute a 
Council of Ministers. It is not our thought 
that the predominantly Muslim character of the 
population. . . should be a criterion. . . It 
is likewise not our thought that any undue ad­
vantage should be given to one group merely 
because they hold the power at the present moment.
The principle involved is that of neutralization 
of the Government in so as the issue of ac­cession is c o n c e r n e d .26
Considered in its entirety, the six-power resolution was not 
a final solution, "not a determination of issues," said 
Austin. It was simply a method of aiding the parties to 
achieve a solution other than through a military decision.
Noel-Baker similarly stressed the absence of any
indictment in the resolution:
To my Government it is in no sense an award, a 
verdict, a judgment between the parties; it is 
a plan, a body of measures. . . designed to 
stop the present fighting in Kashmir and to pro­
vide machinery for the fair and impartial pleb­
iscite on Kashmir’s future. . .27
In Tsiang, India found a faintly sympathetic voice 
during debates on the six-power measure. Although criticizing 
Ayyangar for his opposition, when the draft actually offered 
much that India asked, Tsiang agreed that the plebiscite, the 
"arch of the resolution," was impossible without prior restora­
tion of order. The proposal called for a reduction of Indian 
forces in Kashmir but he could not see that it denied India
the right to enter the state again in self-defense if raids
should reoccur:
26^C Official Records. 3rd Year, 236th Meeting, p. 25.
Qi£l&iàX, Records, 3rd Year, 284th Meeting, p. 12.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
* 91"
I maintain that if the provisions of the draft 
resolution were each executed in turn, the prob­
lem of defence would be a minor one, if it did 
not disappear altogether. . . But if our calcu­
lations should be wrong and if, suddenly, there 
should be a large invasion, then what? , • Noth­
ing in this draft resolution impairs the inherentright of self-defence.28
Arce continued to display a predilection for Zafrullah 
Khan*8 case, opposing all portions of the resolution which 
appeared to give India an undue advantage in the deployment 
of armed forces in Kashmir, And, with Zafrullah Khan, he 
argued that "speeches and proclamations" alone would not be 
sufficient to persuade the tribesmen to withdraw; Pakistan 
should be allowed "to make use of all the means at its dis­
posal. . , and among those means, the most frequently employ­
ed is the use of police, of force,"29 Pakistani troops 
should be permitted to operate in Kashmir,
El-Khouri opposed the draft on two counts: (1) it
unduly favored India and (2) since it did not meet the wishes 
of either party, the Council was making a futile gesture in 
approving a program which could not be implemented without 
the cooperation of India and Pakistan. He then struck at 
India with New Delhi’s own weapon of law for he charged that 
although the resolution treated the political aspect of the 
problem satisfactorily, it ignored the legal aspect, acces­
sion:
It would not be legally and judicially correct 
p. 9.
29sc Official Record^. 3rd Year, 2C6th Meeting, p. 13,
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If we considered the accession as already hav­
ing taken place, and that it cannot be modified 
except by a plebiscite. I consider that, up to 
the present time, there is no accession of Kash­
mir to either Dominion, because that accession 
which was proposed was not in conformity with 
the arrangements and agreement made between the 
two parties, and it is not an arrangement with 
the people of Kashmir themselves whereby they 
have been given a chance for self-determination, 
an opportunity to decide their own fate.30
He considered it "fair and just" that, in drafting the reso­
lution, the Council should give both parties equal privileges 
in the plebiscite arrangements and thus abstained from voting 
on provisions which called for the use of Indian or Kashmiri 
state forces or officials and did not provide similar benefits 
for Pakistan or Azad Kashmir.
Discussion on the Syrian resolution added Guy de la
Tournelle of France, for the moment, to Tsiang as an Indian
advocate. De la Tournelle thought the measure unnecessary
and implied that the Pakistani counter-charges did not merit
investigation. Yet he would vote for the resolution since it
would have an inconsequential effect on the commission’s
activities, neither hindering nor aiding them;
The fact that the Commission is given complete 
freedom to consider these questions does not 
at all mean that it will deal with them. On 
the contrary it will be free to disregard them 
without referring back to the Security Council, 
if it thinks that these questions do not con­
stitute a threat to p e a c e ,31
30lbid.. p. 4. El-Khouri was referring to the Indo- 
Pakistani understanding that disputed accessions would not 
be regarded as final until settled by a referendum.
Official Records. 3rd Year, 312th Meeting p. 19.
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Tsiang stepped forward openly in India's defense in 
this instance, abstaining in the vote on the resolution. He 
feared that further instructions to the commission would ob­
scure the most important issue, Kashmir, and attempted to 
persuade the Pakistani delegation to drop the charges in its 
counter-complaint. The implementation of partition agreements 
was a matter of administrative detail; no real injustice would 
be done to either party if the charge were dropped. The 
validity of the genocide issue was doubtful:
It would be wise if the representative of Pakistan 
would drop the question of genocide, . , Bringing 
up that question here casts a certain slur on the 
Government of India, I do not think that the 
slur is deserved, • . add I do not think that the 
handling of that question by the Security Council 
would really help to restore better relations 
between the two Governments,32
Advice so close to the Indian case was understandably rejected
by Zafrullah Khan.
Ill
The Council record from March 8 to June 3, 1948 was 
perhaps more encouraging than that of any other single per­
iod during the dispute. The United Nations Commission for 
India and Pakistan, long promised and discussed, had at last 
been created and given a fairly detailed plan of operations. 
And despite Indian and Pakistani protests during the meetings, 
the home government had expressed qualified willingness to 
cooperate with the Council's agent once it began its task.
t p* 4.
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If an international investigatory body were the answèr to the 
problem of Kashmir, the Council had taken a long step toward 
a settlement. Yet already there were indications that the 
commission's future was not to be untroubled. India's uni* 
lateral action in the appointment of Sheikh Abdullah as Kash­
mir's premier foreshadowed a tendency to act in Kashmir with­
out previous consultation with either the Security Council or 
Pakistan. The practical value of United Kingdom-United States 
mediatory activity was evident in the provisions of the 
Chinese and six-power resolutions covering an interim adminis-
itration, the principle of which India reluctantly accepted.
But such action had aroused Pakistan's resentment and even 
though diligent negotiations might persuade India to move 
toward compromise, results would continue to be nullified if 
Sheikh Abdullah could not similarly be persuaded to abstain 
from inflammatory statements.
The three resolutions, particularly the Chinese and 
six power drafts, bore out the Council's determination to 
achieve a compromise political settlement rather than to hand 
down a judicial decision. Both resolutions appeared to be 
based on a practical analysis of the situation, recognizing 
Pakistan's right to a voice in any settlement but similarly 
noting that, until accession was definitely invalidated,
India enjoyed a legal status that could not be claimed in pll 
honesty and sincerity by Pakistan. The Syrian resolution, in 
providing for the priority of Kashmir, effectively shunted 
the Pakistani counter-charges to the sidelines and can be
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viewed only as a valueless sop to Pakistani pride and honor, 
as De la Tournelle so obviously implied.
On the surface, the Pakistani and Indian positions 
appeared to have remained firm but in reactions to the pro­
posals of an interim administration and to the six-power 
resolution, passed over their protests, the two governments 
began to display a grudging willingness to compromise. But 
India refused to abandon its basic premises that accession 
was valid and that the issue was a question of legal rights. 
In addition, the contentions that Pakistan should play no 
role in a plebiscite and that Indian troops should be author­
ized to garrison the entire state were advanced more firmly, 
and foolishly, for Pakistan could never accept them,
Zafrullah Khan continued to refuse recognition of the 
validity of accession and so was unable to give unreserved 
support to any measure that accepted the legality of the 
Indian position in Kashmir. But in proposing an amendment to 
the six-power resolution, he indicated that Pakistanis con­
ception of an ioterim government was no less weighted in 
favor of Pakistan than was the Indian in favor of India.
The sole deviation in Council alignment came in 
Tsiang's reinforcement of the Indian forces. Yet even this 
development made no appreciable change in the over-all Coun­
cil attitude of neutrality. The voting pattern, aside from 
Tsiang’s abstention on the Syrian resolution, remained the 
same. After six months of debate and negotiation, slight 
departures from a generally impartial approach appeared to
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place Argentina and Syria in support of Pakistan, China as 
India*s advocate, and the United Kingdom and the United States 
in the forefront of a resolutely neutral bloc, a bloc that 
set the Council line in all resolutions*
India and Pakistan emerged from this latest series 
of meetings with equal portions of success and setback. India, 
the loser in two previous bouts, had indicated sufficient will­
ingness to compromise to escape the criticism that had fallen 
on its previous totally intransigent attitude. The six-power 
resolution, while not granting all it asked, nevertheless gave 
to New Delhi the larger role in plebiscite arrangements. And 
although opposed to the Syrian resolution, India could yet 
claim satisfaction from it for it definitely gave Kashmir 
precedence over all other issues with the likelihood that it 
would be the sole question seriously considered by the Council.
Pakistan*s legal position as a party in the dispute 
was more clearly established than had previously been the 
case. The six-power resolution recognized this and contained 
provisions which might lead to the legal employment of Paki­
stani troops in Kashmir. And the Syrian resolution, although 
of slight practical value, demonstrated that the Council had 
not, officially at least, dismissed from consideration the 
Pakistani charges against India.
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CHAPTER V 
A MATTER OF SUBSTANCE 
I
With the establishment of the commission, the Secur­
ity Council temporarily relinquished direct consideration of 
Kashmir. Areas of serious disagreement remained, and neither 
the Indian nor the Pakistani government had accepted uncondi­
tionally the six-power resolution defining the commission’s 
competence. Yet prospects were far from inauspicious, for 
six months of wrangling and compromise in the meeting rooms 
at Lake Success had resulted in broad principles— a cease­
fire and a plebiscite under United Nations auspices— upon 
which a settlement might be constructed. And both New Delhi 
and Karachi had expressed willingness to confer with the 
commission.
For eighteen months, from June 16, 1948^ to December 
17, 1949, the five-member "creature of the Council" sought 
an answer to the question of Kashmir’s future. Its search
&The commission’s first eleven meetings, to July 3, 
took place at Geneva and were devoted to organization. Mem­
bership changed several times during the commission’s life. 
The original roster consisted of Santos Gomez, Colombian 
diplomat; Jerome Klahr Huddle, United States ambassador to 
Burma; Egbert Graeffe, Belgian diplomat; Dr. Josef Korbel, 
Czechoslovak ambassador to Yugoslavia; and Dr. Ricardo Sirl, 
Argentine minister to Denmark. The New York Times. June 17, 
1943.
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was blessed with partial success for in Kashmir a cease-fire 
was arranged and a cease-fire line agreed upon. But certain 
questions, at first mere details, had become so magnified as 
to present almost insurmountable obstacles to a final truce 
and plebiscite agreement. The military situation in Kashmir 
had changed drastically, for Pakistan, contrary to its profes­
sions before the Council, had employed regular army units in 
the state after May 8, 1948 and had assumed direct military 
control of the tribesmen and of the Azad Kashmir f o r c e s ,% As 
a result, demilitarization of Kashmir through withdrawal of 
armed forces, at first thought a technical question to be 
settled by military experts, had become *a matter of substance," 
The new impasse brought from the commission majority a recom­
mendation that further mediatory activities be conducted by 
a single representative of the Council.
Council discussions following receipt of the final 
commission report resulted in a set of demilitarization pro­
posals, based upon the commission’s findings and recommenda­
tions drafted by General McNaughton, Although both India and 
Pakistan found the suggestions unacceptable without extensive 
amendment, the Council viewed them as "fair and just" and on 
March 14, 1950 adopted a four-power resolution embodying the 
essence of the McNaughton proposals. An Australian jurist.
Îbid.. July 18, 1948, The New Delhi report contained 
a further indication of change in the situation in Kashmir:
•An Indian news agency reported today that the tribesmen in 
, . , Kashmir, once Innmbering 80,000, have now dwindled to an 
insignificant force, leaving most of the fighting to local 
insurgents and to Pakistanis. ,
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Sir Owen Dixon,3 was named, on April 12, 1950, to the newly 
created post of United Nations Representative for India and 
Pakistan,
The Security Council experienced a change in member­
ship twice during the commission’s existence. January 1,
1949, Cuba, Norway,\ and.Egypt replaced Colombia, Belgium, and 
Syria, One year later, Ecuador, India, and Yugoslavia were 
elected to positions vacated by Argentina, Canada, and the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Thus, when the final 
commission report was debated, from February through April,
1950, represented on the Council were Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, 
India, Norway, and Yugoslavia in addition to the five perma­
nent members. However, the Soviet delegate, boycotting 
Council meetings as a result of the dispute over Chinese 
representation, did not participate in the discussions.
The first commission report covered activities during 
the three months from June 16 through September 22, 1943,
The original premier problems of an interim government for 
Kashmir and arrangement of troop-withdrawal details had faded 
before the immediate necessity of a cease-fire with the dis­
covery, on July 7, that Itbree brigades of regular Pakistani 
troops had been operating in Kashmir since May 8. Pakistan’s 
reasons for this action were necessity to forestall an Indian
3$ir Owen Dixon, 1886- , educated in Australia, was
appointed acting judge on the Victoria state supreme court in 
1926, Since 1929 he has served as a justice of the Australian 
high court, apart from the years 1940-44 when he sat on var­
ious government war boards, 1940-42, and was Australian am­
bassador to the United States, 1942-44,
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offensive supposedly designed to crush Moslem opposition in
the state, protection of Pakistani territory from possible
aggression by Indian forces, and prevention of an influx of
refugees into Pakistan:
Pakistan had not informed the Security Council 
of the presence of its troops in Kashmir be­
cause, by the time they had been sent into the 
State, the question had been entrusted to the 
Commission whose early departure for the sub­
continent was expected, . . In view of the 
Foreign Minister, the presence of Pakistani 
troops in Kashmir did not raise the question 
of international obligations since Pakistan 
had never accepted any with regard to non-inter­
ference in Kashmir.4
Further legal justification was sought in the invalidity of 
Kashmir’s accession to India, according to the Pakistani in­
terpretation of that union.
To meet a dangerous situation, the commission asked 
the governments to accept a resolution, drafted on August 13, 
which consisted of three parts; (1) a cease-fire proposal; 
(2) a truce agreement; and (3) a vague reaffirmation of the
desire of both parties to settle the dispute by means of a
plebiscite. The first part called upon the Indian and Paki­
stani military commands, at the earliest practicable date, to 
issue a cease-fire order applicable to all forces under their 
control. Military commanders were then to agree upon a 
permanent cease-fire line. Further;
The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistani 
forces agree to refrain from taking any measures 
that might augment the military potential of the
forces under their control in the State of Jammu
Record3, 3rd Year, Supp. for Nov., 1943,
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and Kashmir. {For the purpose of these pro­
posals forces ujadsz Ih&lt control shall be 
considered to include all forces, organized 
and unorganized, fighting or participating in 
hostilities on their respective s i d e s . ) 5
The truce section of the resolution recognized the 
presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir as a material change 
in the situation.& Consequently, Pakistan was to withdraw 
its forces and to secure the withdrawal of the tribesmen. 
Pending a final settlement, evacuated territory would be ad­
ministered by local authorities supervised by the commission:
When the Commission shall have notified the 
Government of India that the tribesmen and Paki­
stani nationals. . . have withdrawn, thereby 
terminating the situation which was represented 
by the Government of India to the Security Coun­
cil as having occasioned the presence of Indian 
forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and 
further, that the Pakistani forces are being 
withdrawn. , , the Government of India agrees 
to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces. . . 
in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.'
Following withdrawal, and until the dispute had been settled,
India would maintain, in agreement with the commission, the
minimum force necessary to ensure law and order in Kashmir.
The Indian government accepted the proposals on the 
understanding that a cease-fire would accord no legality to
p. 32.
^The first resolution concerning Kashmir adopted by 
the Security Council (S/651) requested India and Pakistan "to 
inform the Council immediately of any material change in the 
situation which occurs or appears to either of them to be 
about to occur while the matter is under consideration by the 
Council, and consult with the Council thereon."
Officiai Escsisiâ, 3rd Year, Supp. for Nov., 1948, 
S/1100, p. 33.
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the presence of Pakistani troops, that Kashmir’s sovereignty 
would not be affected, that Indian troops would occupy 
strategic evacuated points, that India would retain sufficient 
forces in Kashmir to guarantee security, and that Pakistan 
would not participate in the organization 6f the plebiscite.
Pakistan weakened its acceptance with the conditions 
that India accede to plebiscite arrangements placing the tv/o 
governments on an equal footing, that all Kashmir be placed 
under the surveillance of the commission, that evacuated ter­
ritories be administered by local authorities in ̂  facto con­
trol at the time of the cease-fire, and that Azad Kashmir be 
a party to any settlement. Pakistan could not speak for Azad 
Kashmir nor would it employ coercion:
Political control over the Azad Kashmir forces 
vests in the Azad Kashmir Government, and it is 
the latter Government alone that has authority 
to issue a cease-fire order to those forces, and 
to conclude terms and conditions of a truce which 
would be binding upon those forces.8
In addition, Karachi rejected the portion of the resolution
labeling the entry of Pakistani troops into Kashmir a material
change in the situation.
The commission assented to the Indian qualifications 
but found that Pakistan’s "clarifications" amounted to ser­
ious reservations. Discussion of plebiscite arrangements was 
not yet pertinent and the commission had been informed 
previously by Karachi that Azad forces were controlled by the 
Pakistani high command:
®Xi2ià» • pp. 41-42.
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The commission observes with regret that. . .
Pakistan has been unable to accept. , . without 
attaching certain conditions beyond the compass 
of this resolution, thereby making Impossible''an 
Immediate cease-fire and the beginning of fruit­
ful negotiations between the two Governments and 
the Commission to bring about a peaceful and 
final settlement of the situation In the State 
of Jammu and Kashmir,9
In analyzing the situation, the commission found two
new factors primarily responsible for failure to achieve a
cease-fire; (1) the existence of the Azad Kashmir movement
as an organized political and military entity, assisted by
Pakistan and In control of large areas of Kashmir, and (2)
the presence of Pakistani troops In the state:
The Security Council never contemplated during 
Its debates that the Commission, , . should 
deal with a situation involving military action 
between two regular armies.10
The positions of the governments on the question of the Pak­
istani forces had become unyielding, India insisted that they 
be withdrawn before the initiation of negotiations for a final 
settlement. Yet Pakistan refused to consider withdrawal 
unless Indian troops left the state simultaneously. Pakistan, 
"in Its desire to anticipate certain specific conditions which 
might provide the bases for a plebiscite,"11 had destroyed 
all possibility of affecting an Immediate cease-fire.
Following receipt of the first report, the Council
p. 49. 
p. 52.
11^ Official Records. 3rd Year, 382nd Meeting, p. 5.
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requested that yet another attempt be made to achieve agree­
ment on a cease-fire. The commission began negotiations with 
the Indian and Pakistani representatives to the United Nations 
and was able to report on January 10, 1949 that, as a result 
of acceptance by both governments of plebiscite provisions 
supplementary to the commission’s cease-fire resolution, 
neither Karachi nor New Delhi saw any reason for the continu­
ation of hostilities:
Both Governments announced their agreement to 
order a cease-fire effective one minute before 
midnight, 1 January 1949, publicly expressing 
the hope that this decision may bring to the 
peoples of Pakistan and India a sense of closer friendship.12
The new provisions called for a plebiscite immediately
upon implementation of the cease-fire and truce measures of
the original resolution. The secretary-general of the United
Nations was to nominate a plebiscite administrator who would
be appointed officially by the government of Kashmir and
derive all necessary powers from the state:
After implementation of parts I and II of the 
Commission’s resolution of 13 August 1948, , . 
the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator 
will determine, in consultation with the Govern­
ment of India, the final disposal of Indian and 
State armed forces, such disposal to be with 
due regard to the security of the State and the freedoms of the plebiscite.13
Disposal of armed forces in the evacuated territories would be
determined by the commission and the administrator in consul-
i2sc Official Records. 4th Year, Supp. for Jan., 1949, 
S/1196, p. 23.
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tation with local authorities. The United Nations agents 
would also organize the referendum and attest to its impar­
tiality. Details of the vote would be settled following 
signature of a truce agreement. The second report concluded 
with a request that the plebiscite administrator be appointed 
as soon as possible.
But the commission’s third report, forwarded to the 
Council on December 17, 1949, demonstrated all too clearly 
that agreement on principle does not ensure a common approach 
to detail. Upon the commission’s return to the sub-continent, 
the most urgent problems had been implementation of the cease­
fire and arrangement of truce provisions. Hostilities in 
Kashmir had ceased, and Karachi reported considerable progress 
in withdrawing tribesmen and other irregular forces from 
Kashmir. It was expected that by the middle of February,
1949 "the obligation of the Pakistan Government in this re­
spect would have been fulfilled."14
Comprehensive truce proposals were completed on April 
28, and the governments were requested to accept them without 
reservations. The commission would demarcate a formal cease­
fire line. Since the military situation in Kashmir’s northern 
areas was confused, disposition of the region would not be 
determined immediately:
Should the Commission and/ or the Plebiscite 
Administrator conclude upon advice from the 
Observers, or upon reports from the Government
Pffi-Cial RegarsUt 4th Year, Special Supp. No. 7, 
5/1430, p. 29,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
"1 0 6"
of India, that it is necessary for the defence 
of the area, the Commission and/ orlthe Pleb­
iscite Administrator may request the.Government.- 
of India to post garrisons at specified points.
Pakistan was to have seven weeks in which to withdraw its
troops in successive contingents. India also was to withdraw
the bulk of its forces;
The withdrawal will begin as soon as the Com­
mission shall have notified the Government of 
India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals 
. . . have withdrawn, and that the Pakistan 
troops are being withdrawn, , .16
Territory evacuated by Pakistan would be administered 
by local authorities under commission surveillance. Upon 
acceptance of the proposals, the commission would consult with 
India on the disposal of Indian and state forces and with 
"local authorities regarding the disposal of the armed forces 
in the territory to be evacuated by Pakistan troops, , ."I?
The truce terms were not to be considered prejudicial to the 
territorial integrity or sovereignty of Kashmir,
Neither India nor Pakistan was able to accept the 
proposals without reservations, Pakistan, under no condition, 
would agree to Indian occupation of evacuated areas north of 
the cease-fire line and insisted on interpreting the "declared 
objective" of the truce terms to be a synchronization oflthe 
withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani forces so as to create a 
"military balance" between the opposing forces. In order to
p. 111.
lÊJM d.. p. 112.
l^ itis t., p, 113.
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maintain order in the evacuated areas, it would be necessary 
to reorganize the Azad forces, which were to be considered 
"local authorities* and not subject to withdrawal or disband­
ment. Further, the guarantee of Kashmir’s integrity and 
sovereignty introduced a controversial matter and so should 
be omitted from the truce terms.
India found the proposals, further qualified by the 
Pakistani reservations, fundamentally opposed to the Indian 
position. The claim of Pakistan, much less that of Azad 
Kashmir, to equality of rights in Kashmir in any sphere had 
never been acknowledged. India could never accept "synchro­
nization" or "military balance" which would mean that Paki­
stani action would be contingent on Indian withdrawal and 
that Azad forces would remain in control of state territory. 
Pakistani withdrawal and Azad disarmament would have to pre­
cede any move to diminish Indian strength:
The Government of India are prepared to discuss 
with the Commission the, , , formation of a Civil 
Armed Force for the maintenance of, . , order in 
Azad. . . territory, but both the composition and 
the character of -such a force must be adjusted to 
this primary purpose and not to the creation of 
"a military balance between the forces on each side,"IS,
Lastly, since Indian forces were not specifically authorized 
to garrison the northern areas, Kashmir’s security would be 
dangerously weakened.
Unable to agree upon political provisions of a truce, 
the governments nevertheless achieved a formal demarcation of
p. 93,
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the cease-fire line on July 27. The agreement specified the 
positions of opposing forces and provided that "there shall 
be no increase of forces or strengthening 6f defences in 
areas where no major adjustments are involved in, , . the 
cease-fire line,"^^ ,
Heartened, the commission suggested further confer­
ences on a truce. In case no common ground could be found, 
the governments were asked to submit their differences to 
arbitration. Pakistan assented, but India, explaining that 
although it was not opposed to the principle of arbitration, 
it thought that the commission proposal was too vague, refused. 
Withdrawal and Azad disarmament were not questions for arbitra­
tion but for immediate decision.
In analyzing developments during the year and a half 
of its existence, the commission found that three principal 
issues impeding a solution had emerged in clear focus: (1)
disposition of Azad forces, (2) withdrawal of regular troops, 
and (3) the question of the northern areas:
The implementation of a truce which appeared to 
be a question mainly of procedure and of short 
duration— approximately three months— became in 
fact a matter of substance.20
Augmentation of Azad forces, officered by and working in close 
cooperation with the Pakistani military, had seriously com­
plicated the basic problem of withdrawal. On that issue, the 
commission sided with India regarding a "military balance"
p. 126. 
p. 36.
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and "synchronization" of withdrawal, which could not be in­
terpreted without reference to the distinction drawn by the 
resolution between India and Pakistani forces:
The Commission's reference to synchronization 
should be interpreted to mean that discussion 
with. • . India concerning the withdrawal of 
the bulk of its forces would hnsue without de­
lay and lead to the establishment of a time 
sequence for the two withdrawals, . . after 
the acceptance of truce terns by both Govern­
ments, The Commission was not able to share 
the view of. . . Pakistan that the only method 
of assuring this form of synchronization was 
by the full and free exchange of information 
between the Indian and Pakistan Governments 
regarding withdrawal plans.21
But the commission disagreed with India on the northern 
areas. A cease-fire throughout Kashmir was necessary during 
the plebiscite, and the entry of Indian troops into these 
regions might be opposed bitterly and forcibly by the solidly 
Moslem population. While it was doubtful whether the north 
was effectively in Pakistani control during the autumn of 
1948, by January 1, 1949 state authority had been eliminated 
from the area and Pakistan "undeniably held military con­
trol."2%
The commission doubted that a five-member body was 
sufficiently flexible Jand suggested a single representative 
with broad authority as a more effective means of finding 
"the balance and compromise necessary to, , , settlement of 
the dispute,"23 %he representative's powers should include
, p. 51.
p. 59.
, p. 62.
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"authority to settle eventually, by arbitration, such issues 
involved in the demilitarization, . . which impede the pleb­
iscite."̂ 4 as yet unnamed representative was advised to
commence his work with a modification of the original demil­
itarization plan:
Such a modification must treat the problem of 
demilitarization as a whole, eliminating all 
distinctions and comprising all questions con- 
-, cerning the final disposal of all armed forces 
in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.25
And the commission's successor would be aided in his task, 
for on March 22 Admiral Chester W, Nimitz26 of the United 
States had been appointed plebiscite administrator, fulfilling 
the request in the commission's second report. Once demili­
tarization and a truce had been achieved, Nimitz could under­
take arrangements for the referendum.
A minority report was submitted on December 16, 1949, 
by Oldrich Chyle, Czechoslovak commission member. He stated 
bluntly that the commission had failed, failed because the 
resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 were not 
based on the actual political situation. No compromise on 
the basis of the resolutions was acceptable to both parties.
p. 63. 
p. 52.
^^Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz, 1885- , a
1905 graduate of Annapolis, has served the United States in 
two world wars. Commander of the Atlantic submarine force 
in the first war, he was commander in chief of the Pacific 
fleet from 1941 to 1945. Admiral Nimitz was awarded the 
newly created rank of fleet admiral of ithe navy in 1944.
From 1945 he was chief of naval operations.
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The majority had shown •insufficient sagacity* by underrating
the significance of the Azad forces and by failing to take
into account the situation in the north when drafting its
truce proposals. The United States and the United Kingdom
were largely responsible for the failure by pressing for
arbitration, a step the commission had not been authorized to
take. The American and British governments had continually
interfered with the work of the commission:
If peaceful solution of the dispute is to be 
attained it has to be assured that the Commis­
sion does not become an instrument of policy 
of certain Great Powers.2?
Not lack of flexibility but too much flexibility had under­
mined the commission’s "vain attempt" to please both parties. 
Chyle recommended a new commission, consisting of representa­
tives of all Council members, with complete freedom from 
interference guaranteed.
Following the consideration of the third report, the 
Council authorized General McNaughton, Council president dur­
ing January, 1949, to initiate further negotiations. McNaughton 
forwarded his report on February 3, 1950. Pakistan would ac­
cept the demilitarization proposals subject to slight changes 
in wording, India proposed several amendments, the most 
important being the withdrawal of all regular and irregular 
forces from Kashmir, the disarmament of Azad forces, and Indian 
military control of the northern areas with civil administra­
tion by the state government,
Q£Ii£iâl 4th Year, Special Supp. No. 7,
S/1430, p. 203,
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McNaughton prefaced his formal proposals with a
suggestion that future action be based upon existing points
of agreement and that judgment on past issues be avoided. He
reaffirmed the necessity of a plebiscite and called for a
program of progressive demilitarization designed:
. . .  to reduce the armed personnel in the State 
. . .  on each side of the cease-fire line to the 
minimum compatible with the maintenance of secur­
ity and of. . . order, and to a level sufficiently 
low and with the forces so disposed that they will 
not constitute a restriction on the free expression 
of opinion. , .28
This meant withdrawal of regular Pakistani and Indian forces 
not essential to state security as well as disbandment of 
local forces, the state army and Azad Kashmir. The demili­
tarized northern area would be administered by local authori­
ties under United Nations supervision.
Agreement between the governments should be reached 
upon a number of points:
(a) The Government of Pakistan should give 
unconditional assurance to the Government of 
India that it will deal effectively within its 
own borders with any possibility of tribal in­
cursion into Janrniu and Kashmir. . .
(b) The Governments of India and Pakistan 
should confirm the continued and unconditional 
inviolability of the cease-fire line.
(c) Agreement should be reached on the basic 
principles of demilitarization. • .
(d) Agreement should be reached on the min­
imum forces required for the maintenance of 
security and of. , , order, and on their general 
disposition.
(e) Agreement should be reached on a date by 
which the reduction of forces. . . is to be 
accomplished.
(f) Agreement should be reached on the pro-
OfiiclsI EææqxAs.» £>th Year, Supp. for Feb.,1950, S/1453, p. 14.
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gresslve steps to be taken in reducing and re­
distributing the forces to the level envisaged 
, , , above.
A United Nations representative would supervise the progres­
sive stages of demilitarization and would have authority to 
"interpret" agreements on these points. When demilitarization 
had not been accomplished, the plebiscite administrator would 
take up his duties.
Although unconditional acceptance of the McNaughton 
proposals was not offered by either India or Pakistan, the 
Council nevertheless acted upon them in the four-power (Cuba, 
Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States) resolution 
adopted on March 14, 1950. The draft asked for the "resolu­
tion of the outstanding difficulties" based upon the "sub­
stantial measure of agreement on fundamental principles 
already reached," Demilitarization steps should be taken 
immediately:
Ihâ gflungil#1* Calla upon the Governments of India and 
Pakistan to make immediate arrangements without 
prejudice to their rights or claims. . . to pre­
pare and execute within a period of five months 
. . .  a programme of demilitarization on the 
basis of the principles. . . of General McNaugh­
ton* s proposals or of such modifications of 
those principles as may be mutually agreed, .
A United Nations representative would "assist in the 
preparation and, , , supervise the implementation" of demili­
tarization and would "Interpret" agreements reached between
p. 15.
Ŷearbook al i______ ,Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 308-09.SOyg L aO OL lh& Uaiims, 12SQ (New York:
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India and Pakistan. He would exercise all powers formerly 
devolving upon the commission, which was officially dissolved. 
At the "appropriate stage" he was to arrange for assumption 
by the plebiscite administrator of functions assigned to the 
latter through agreements between the parties. The resolution 
was approved with eight votes in favor (China, Cuba, Ecuador, 
Egypt, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States); none opposed; two abstentions (India and Yugoslavia); 
and one member, the Soviet Union, absent.
II
Six primary issues— Pakistani troops in Kashmir, the 
Azad Kashmir forces, troop withdrawal, disposition of Kash­
mir’s northern districts, interpretation of plebiscite con­
ditions, and the McNaughton proposals reoccurred in Council 
debates during the eighteen months of commission activity. 
India’s Sir Senegal Narsing Rau^^ belabored the facts of law 
and the perfidy of Pakistan with passion on the first issue 
to arise, Pakistani military operations in Kashmir. Eau had 
a telling point and he let neither the Council nor Pakistan 
forget it. Within a fortnight after Pakistan had righteously 
sworn to the Council that it was not an active party in the 
Kashmiri disturbances, Pakistani troops had moved into the
^Sir Senegal Narsing Rau, 1887- , educated in India
and in England, joined the Indian Civil Service in 1910. He 
served on several provincial high courts and from 1944 to 
1945 he was prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir, In 1946 Rau 
was a constitutional adviser to the constituent assemblies of 
both India and Burma, Since 1949 he has been permanent 
Indian representative to the United Nations.
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state, a development that could be viewed only as a material 
change in the situation. Yet Pakistan had not seen fit to 
inform an agency of the United Nations luntil several months 
later:
Thus, India’s original complaint alleging aid 
by Pakistan, , , was now proved to be true or 
at least, to have become true in an aggravated 
form; not only was there aid, but the Pakistan 
Army was actually inside the State giving aid 
and direction hnd, indeed, engaging in actual fighting,32
Self-defense was no Mystification, for under Article 
5l33 of the Charter there were two limitations on that right—  
there must be an armed attack upon a United Nations member, 
and measures taken in self-defense must be reported immedi­
ately to the Security Council, Rau belittled the Indian 
actions complained of as merely tactical maneuvers designed 
to relieve military pressure in Ladakh and Poonch,
Zafrullah Khan, trapped by an obvious violation of 
obligations accepted in several Council resolutions, flayed 
wildly at the Indian charges in spasmodic tirddes of question­
able legal right and unrestrained emotion. Ignoring the
^̂ 20. Official Records, 5th Year, 463rd Meeting, p. 6,
Article 51: "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self- 
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member oflthe 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and secur­
ity. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right 
of self defense shall be immediately reported to the Security 
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary 
in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security."
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technical and legal aspects of the situation, he reiterated 
the defense that an all-out offensive by India had necessitat­
ed an all-out reaction by Pakistan. The most pressing reason 
for Pakistani action had been the need to forestall capture 
of certain vital irrigation headworks on the Jhelum, the 
Chenab, and the Indus which irrigated nineteen million acres 
in West Pakistan, If Kashmir were to accede to India, the 
headworks would be lost and the supply of water cut off al­
together.34
Turning from economics to strategy, Zafrullah Khan
departed from the immediate situation to plead that, no matter
what the legal points were, Kashmir was essential to Pakistani
security and must be prevented from falling into the hands of
India, India, in possession of the state, would outflank
Pakistan’s entire northwest defense system:
If Kashmir should accede to India, Pakistan 
might as well, from both the economic and the 
strategic points of view, become a feudatory 
of India or cease to exist as an independent 
sovereign State. That is the state of the two 
sides; these are the considerations.35
Rau, eager to keep his opponent in full retreat,
34a1 though a situation much like this occurred in the 
case of headworks falling to India as a result of partition 
(see page 5, note 4), Oppenheim frowns on the practice: "A
State, in spite of its territorial supremacy, is not allowed 
to alter the natural conditions of its own territory to the 
disadvantage of the natural conditions of. . . a neighbouring 
State— for instance, to stop or divert the flow of a river 
which runs from its own into neighbouring territory." Oppen­
heim, p. 259.
35^£ Official Records. 5th Year, 464th Meeting,
p. 8.
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selzed on this Jremark as indicating that Pakistan was no
longer content with a democratically decided accession but
desired outright possession of Kashmir:
At this point of the argument he seems to have 
forgotten that the matter is to be decided not 
by the comparative needs of Pakistan and of 
India, but by Jthe wishes of the people of Kash­
mir. , , If I may say so without any offence, 
the wolf may need the lamb desperately, but the 
lamb may hava different wishes in the matter.36
Rau found the Pakistani record on the issue of the 
augmentation of Azad forces equally damaging, for again, 
obligations had been violated. He relied upon the testimony 
of the commission on this point; both the third report and 
its accompanying minority report had found the increased 
strength of Azad Kashmir a material change in the situation, 
a development "contrary to the understanding that Pakistan 
would not use the period for consolidating its position or 
increasing its military potential."37 %ndia's real point on 
the issue was not whether disarmament of the Azad forces 
should occur during a certain period but that it should take
place before the bulk of the Indian army was withdrawn from
Kashmir,
Zafrullah Khan relied upon a novel interpretation of 
the commission truce proposals, an interpretation at odds 
with the commission’s own version as contained in the third 
report, to argue that disarmament and disbandment of Azad
36s2 Records. 5th Year. 466th Meeting, p. 9,
37£2 fiffixAjj RecoiÙ3. 5th Year, 463rd Meeting, p. 7.
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troops had never been intended to take place during the truce 
period. The commission was aware of Azad strength when it 
formulated the truce terms, yet the provisions did not mention 
Azad Kashmir— "conclusive evidence" that Azad forces were not 
intended to be Included.38
On the third ̂ question, the Indian position had not 
changed since dispute first arose as to the correct inter­
pretation of the truce proposal withdrawal provisions. India 
would not consider moving the bulk of its troops from Kashmir 
until plans for the disbandment of Azad forces as well as the 
withdrawal of regular Pakistani forces were underway. If any 
Azad contingents were to assist in maintaining order, they 
must be small and matched by non-Azad groups. Only when the 
tribesmen and Azad and Pakistani troops could no longer main­
tain large-scale military operations in Kashmir would India 
consent to gradual removal of its forces and partial demobili­
zation of state troops.
Zafrullah Khan would Jnot desert his highly individual­
istic interpretation of the truce terms. Azad troops were 
legitimate local forces, were not covered by the proposals, 
and withdrawal should not be contingent upon their disband­
ment. In reality, he charged, the principal obstacle to a 
truce was India's refusal to communicate withdrawal plans to 
Pakistan in order to effect a synchronized retirement. The 
opinions of India and of the commission to the contrary.
Official Bfig.gxdfi» 5th Year, 465th Meeting, p. 9.
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Zafrullah Khan refused to abandon the principal of "synchro­
nization."
Sovereignty was the theme of the Indian case on the
fourth issue, control of the northern districts during the
pre-plebiscite period. Accession to India, said Rau, had not
meant dissolution of the government of Kashmir; it retained
Internal powers. If a plebiscite were to be held for all of
Kashmir, the authority of the state government must not be
disrupted beforehand. The Council, in providing that the
plebiscite administrator should receive his powers from the
state, had recognized this, but he could not do so if the
northern areas were detached from the state. Rau refused to
compromise further on this issue:
India cannot possibly go on making these con­
cessions and frittering away its position. It 
is urged that. . . India should acquiesce in them 
because, it is said, they are. . . temporary and 
only a step towards. , , the plebiscite. But it 
is incomprehensible to us why pressure should 
always be brought to bear on India to acquiesce 
in wrong, and ^y, for a change, some pressure 
should not be brought to bear on the other side 
to acquiesce in the right on the same g r o u n d s . 39
Zafrullah Khan probed the flaw in Rau's argument. If 
Indian reasoning on "authority derived from the state" were 
pressed to its logical conclusion, it would necessitate res­
toration of state authority and Indian military control 
throughout the region bccupied by Azad or Pakistani forces:^® 
All that was contemplated was that the Plebiscite
Qfii.fijgl Records. 5th Year, 463rd Meeting, p. 13.
40india expounded exactly this proposal before the 
Council on Aoril 19. 1943 (see page 65),
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Administrator should be deemed to have derived 
his powers, as a matter of legal technicality, 
from the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Not even 
the Government was mentioned; it was the State 
of Jammu and Kashmir, as a legal d o c t r i n e .41
The fifth clash arose on the issue of the plebiscite 
itself. In a thrust which appeared designed to topple every­
thing the Council and the commission had constructed since 
January, 1948, Rau questioned the soundness of repeated 
references to Indo-Pakistani "agreement" on a plebiscite.
The meaning of "plebiscite? was still very much in disagree­
ment:
India offered a plebiscite upon certain. . , 
conditions which amount briefly to this, that 
the State must be restored to its normal condi­
tions before the plebiscite is held. India stands 
by that offer, supject to those conditions.
Pakistan, on the other hand, appears to desire 
a plebiscite with the State in its present dis­
rupted and abnormal condition. . . Where there 
has been no meeting of minds, it is not pos­sible to spell out in a g r e e m e n t .42
A plebiscite for the entire state and unquestioned sovereignty 
of the state over its entire territory were inseparably con­
nected, Rau maintained.
Zafrullah Khan held fast to a plebiscite as the 
ultimate determinator of Kashmir's disposition. And he point­
edly charged that the prime obstacle to arrangement of a 
referendum was not a matter of acceptable conditions but of 
India's insistence that it alone should determine those 
conditions:
Gffisial Recordsf 5th Year, 465th Meeting, pp.
25-26.
Offiglai Records, 5th Year, 463rd Meeting, p. 23.
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Indla*s insistence is that, although that settle­
ment should be with the United Nations and the 
United Nations should take the responsibility 
for it, that settlement must be what India s a y s .43
The McNaughton proposals provoked the final contro­
versy, India was in agreement on certainpprovisions but 
could not approve the jentire plan, India had accepted the 
commission's truce proposals on assurances that Kashmir's 
sovereignty would not be questioned, that Azad Kashmir's 
legitimacy would not be recognized, that Azad forces would be 
disarmed, and that the northern areas would be considered in 
implementation of the terms. The net effect of McNaughton's 
plan was to neutralize every assurance relied upon by India,
To avoid consideration of past issues would be to ignore the 
dispute's origin and development. Security in the north 
rested entirely upon Pakistani good will:
May I ask v/hat arrangements Pakistan made to 
prevent the tribal incursions of October 1947?
What is to happen if the situation recurs?
India can t a k e  no risks in t h i s  m a t t e r . 4 4
But most serious of all, although India's original 
complaint had been substantiated, although the Pakistani army 
should have been withdrawn from Kashmir long ago, the pro­
posals contemplated no effective action on this matter:
Indeed, the very reverse is the case. By sanc­
tioning the administration of the northern areas 
by the existing local authorities, these pro­
posals, in effect, recognize and help to perpet­
uate the unlawful occupation of these areas by-
^^20. Official Records. 5th Year, 466th Meeting, p. 27.
44S0 Official Records. 5th Year, 463rd Meeting, p. 16,
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Pakistan.45
Although not quite convinced that they guaranteed a 
thoroughly impartial plebiscite, Zafrullah Khan was willing 
to accept McNaughton*s suggestions. Pakistan would reconcile 
Itself to the risk, trusting in the integrity of the pleb­
iscite administrator to see that the feferendum was “as free 
and impartial as human effort can make it.**46 Zafrullah Khan 
grew somewhat sarcastically critical of Rau*s attitude toward 
the proposals;
His only prejudice is that his p&int of view, 
which was unacceptable to the Commission, has 
by and large been egually unacceptable to General McNaughton.47
The Council members, greatly exercised over the 
Pakistani incursion into Kashmir following receipt of the 
first commission report, largely ignored this issue in suc­
ceeding discussions and drew together in a practically unani­
mous neutral attitude on "the matters of bubstance" and in 
urging acceptance of the McNaughton proposals. Pakistan*s 
entry into Kashmir could only be viewed, said Tsiang, as a 
material change in the situation, and Pakistan was at fault in 
not having reported immediately to the Council, But when 
discussion reached the commission reports, Tsiang assumed an 
attitude critical of both parties, for he thought the three 
principal differences were causing difficulties out of all
p. 10.
Official Bcccida, 5th Year, 469th Meeting, p. 12,
47g^ Qffi.S,.ial Records, 5th Year, 465th Meeting, p. 12.
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proportion to their importance;
The importance of this disagreement has been 
magnified, because each side puts upon the 
manner of troop withdrawals a political inter­
pretation, as if the settlement of the question 
of accession of, . , Kashmir to India or Paki­
stan depended upon the method and timing of 
the withdrawal of their respective f o r c e s .48
Pakistan*s action was also criticized by Arne Sunde^^ 
of Norway, who nevertheless favored acceptance of the situa­
tion and a fresh start toward a solution;
I frankly doubt the utility of threshing out 
again in the Security Council the manifold and 
complex issues which are at stake in this case.
Tentative suggestions swiftly become unalterable 
opinions when they are expressed in this Council, 
and arguments advanced in the heat of discussion 
have a tendency to become vested with the habile- ments of national p r e s t i g e ,50
It would be tragic should differences on such essentially
procedural problems as withdrawal and demilitarization block
a final settlement. He had followed the arguments carefully,
avoiding premature persuasion, but "there is no longer any
doubt in my mind as to whose reasoning has the b st foundation
of fairness and justice, . , General McNaughton*s,
4SSC Official Records. 5th Year, 467th Meeting, p, 31.
49Arne Sunde, 1883- , has represented Norway in
numerous posts abroad and in several international arbitra­
tion cases. He was a member oflthe government in exile in
London during the war years, Sunde has been Norway’s
permanent representative to the United Nations since 1948.
50^2 Ofilsiai Records. 5th Year, 459th Meeting,
p. 5, Official Records. 5th Year, 467th Meeting, p. 2.
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A new voice, that of Sir Alexander Cadogan,^^ gpoke 
for Britain during this period, but Whitehall’s accent was 
unchanged. Slipping off the fence momentarily to join his 
confreres in criticizing Pakistan’s action in entering Kash­
mir, Cadoganssoon regained his perch, resigning himself to 
the situation as it existed* In favoring the McNaughton 
proposals, he echoed Noel-Baker’s position on the six-power 
resolution;the proposals were not a final solution but 
rather another step toward a plebiscite. The Council should 
avoid dredging up past issues in seeking a solution, for what 
had to be discussed was a question of mechanics:
How, then, can either side feel justified in 
pursuing points. . . which can do no good and 
which, unintentionally I know, merely serve 
to frustrate the early expression of the will 
of the people? . . Can it be anyone’s wish to 
allow legal points of doubtful relevance to 
stand in the way of progress?^
Ernest Gross^^ of the United States resolutely
52sir Alexander Cadogan, 1884- , has served the
British foreign office in Constantinople, Vienna, Peking, and 
at home. Permanent under-secretary of state for the foreign 
office from 1938 to 1946, Cadogan attended the Roosevelt- 
Churchill Atlantic meeting, was chairman of the Dumbarton Oaks 
conference in 1944, and attended the United Nations Conference 
on International Organization in 1945. He is a former United 
Kingdom permanent representative to the United Nations, 1947-49.
53See page 90,
Official Records. 5th Year, 467th Meeting p. 7,
S^Ernest A. Gross, 1906- , has been in United States
government service since 1931, with the state department, 
1931-33. He has served as legal advisor to a number of feder­
al agencies and to American delegations to international con­
ferences, Gross was deputy assistant under-secretary of state 
for occupied areas, 1946-47, and has been a deputy representa­
tive to the United Nations since 1949.
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championed the McNaughton proposals and attention upon the
problems of the present and future rather than the past;
Demilitarization does not prejudge the rights or 
claims of the parties. It need not, therefore, 
rest upon those rights or claims. It is however, 
an essential prerequisite for a solution of the dispute.56
Demilitarization in a single period was consistent with what 
should be the controlling consideration— minimizing the pos­
sibility of a resumption of hostilities. Thus the process 
should be timed so that at the conclusion of the demilitari­
zation period there would remain no force with an aggressive 
potential. Gross thought it unfortunate that India had re­
jected the McNaughton plan, which had been designed to remove 
the threat of renewed hostilities.
Ill
The commission phase of the Kashmir dispute was not 
altogether devoid of success. Hostilities in Kashmir had 
ceased; a plebiscite administrator had been appointed; the 
commission's August 13, 1948 truce proposals provided a basis 
for further demilitarization formulas; and, with the appoint­
ment of the United Nations representative, the Council had 
adopted a new approach to the problem. But other aspects of 
the situation in April, 1950 were less encouraging. Of the 
issues prominent when the coimission began operation, the 
question of an interim administration had for the moment 
ceased to be of vital importance, and the general problem of
56^2 flfficlai Records. 5th Year, 467th Meeting, p. 15.
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demllitarlzatlon had been fractured into technical disagree­
ments on the disposition of the Azad forces, phasing of the 
withdrawal of regular Indian and Pakistani forces, and 
stewardship of Kashmir’s northern districts during the pre­
plebiscite period. Although these differences were primarily 
procedural In nature, Jthe intransigent attitudes of both 
governments had inflated them out of all relation to their 
true importance. Withdrawal, hinging upon varying interpre­
tations of "synchronization" and "balance of forces," indi­
cated the extent to which the broad principle of a plebiscite 
could become mired in technicalities.
The major development during the period was the open 
operation of regular jpakistani forces in Kashmir, a clear 
contravention of Pakistan’s original representations to the 
Council and of obligations accepted in the initial resolu­
tions. Concomitantly, the tribesmen, instigators of the 
dispute, ceased to be a significant factor.
The genesis of future issues could be observed in 
Council and commission actions. Arbitration of differences, 
tentatively advanced by the commission, rejected by India and 
accepted with reservations by Pakistan, received the approval 
of the Council and was implied in both the McNaughton pro­
posals and the four-power resolution. And it was difficult 
to believe that demilitarization, which had been of flaming 
importance when proposed in two phases, would be less of an 
issue in one phase.
The positions of both governments on the issues of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
r -127-
this period flowed from their basic approaches to the entire 
problem. The cardinal featurê :of the Indian stand was that 
India was in Kashmir by right and that Pakistan could not 
aspire to equal footing in the contest. From the fact of ac­
cession resulted India’s responsibility for the security of 
Kashmir; hence, demilitarization must leave in the state 
sufficient Indian and state forces to safeguard that security. 
A plebiscite would be for the purpose of confirming accession, 
which was, in all respects, already complete. India’s claims 
regarding the northern areas were also based on its fundamen­
tal argument. Refusal to discuss with Pakistan the details 
of Indian withdrawal was not only in line with that portion 
of the truce proposals providing for the prior withdrawal of 
Pakistani troops, but followed upon India’s insistence that 
Pakistan had no legal rights in Kashmir. The position on the 
Azad forces was, again, linked with Kashmir’s security.
The Pakistani approach was diametrically opposed to 
the Indian. Pakistan attempted to avoid deserved condemna­
tion resulting from operation of its troops in Kashmir through 
arguments on Indian aggression, illegality of the Indian 
presence in Kashmir, and economic and strategic considerations 
making possession of Kashmir a necessity for Pakistan. Paki­
stan considered itself as having equal status with India and 
entitled to equal rights. This claim influenced its position 
on implementation of the truce, which should establish a 
balance of forces between the parties. Thus Pakistan asked 
to be apprised of Indian plans before signing a truce
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agreement, Pakistan regarded the Azad forces as local and 
not covered by the truce terms. On the question of the 
northern areas, Pakistan denied India’s claim to assume de­
fense of the territories as a result of the established re­
lations between India and Kashmir.
Positions of Council members were noteworthy for an 
almost uniform neutrality. Indications of favoritism, which 
had emerged in June, 1948, had disappeared. Elections to the 
Council had removed Pakistan’s adherents, Argentina and Syria, 
from the scene and their successors were consistently im­
partial, Tsiang, at one time sympathetic toward India, had 
returned to the neutral fold. The Council attitude toward 
the McNaughton proposals and the four-power resolution, de­
signed to "balance the scales" between the parties, bore out 
this impression of impartiality. Abstentions from the ballot 
on the four-power draft were in no sense contradictory, India 
abstained as a party to thb dispute, and Yugoslavia, not op­
posed to the aims and provisions of the resolution, did not 
believe that it gave sufficient consideration to the basic 
problem, the welfare of the people of Kashmir,5?
Pakistan could find more cause for satisfaction with 
the results of commission activity than could India. The 
shadow which darkened the Pakistani position following armed 
entry into Kashmir had been dispelled in succeeding months, 
for the Council appeared willing to regard the development as
Official Records. 5th Year, 470th Meeting, p. 4.
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a fait accompli and to proceed from the actualities of the 
situation. This worked to the disadvantage of India, whose 
position had been but slightly modified since January, 1948.
As a result of New Delhi's unchanging approach and 
Council acceptance of the existing situation, the McNaughton 
proposals and the four-power resolution appeared more favor­
able to Pakistan than to India. Although Pakistan was not 
granted an undue advantage, Karachi would accept any formula 
recognizing its position as a legal party to the dispute. But 
New Delhi would inot assent to any departure from its original 
position, which barred any solution at all acceptable to 
Pakistan.
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CHAPTER VI 
THIRD PHASE 
I
Since April, 1950, a single United Nations repre­
sentative has sought success where the Security Council and a 
five-member commission found defeat. Successive representatives, 
like the Council and commission before them, have discovered 
that technicalities, grown to matters of substance, continue 
to impede final settlement. And while agents have negotiated 
with the governments, reported to the Council, then returned 
to negotiations in an apparently unending cycle, Kashmir has 
quieted under the heavy hand of stalemate. Two armies, no 
longer engaged in active hostilities, sit out the monotonous 
months across a cease-fire line intended as a temporary 
demarcation between battle forces but which has assumed the 
character of a political boundary. Denunciation and recrimi­
nation no longer flash between New Delhi and Karachi, and the 
eyes of the world public have turned to other, more recent 
conflicts and crises. Kashmir, once a blazing issue claiming 
full attention from world statesmen, has become a repetitious 
disagreement occasionally ruffling the surface of Indo-Paki­
stani relations, another bit of unfinished business regularly
-130-
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reappearlng on the Security Council agenda.
Political activity within Kashmir did not come to a 
halt with invasion. Amid persistent rumors that Jhe is actu­
ally imposing a police regime upon the state. Sheikh Abdullah 
has consolidated his position. A program of land reform and 
reduction of farmers* debts has given the Kashmiri peasant, 
for the first time in recent history, an economic position a 
jot or two above the wretched.^ This, and other reforms, has 
resulted in considerable popularity for the Sheikh*s adminis­
tration, and there is reason to believe that in a plebiscite, 
many Moslems under Sheikh Abdullah's jurisdiction would vote
for his candidate, India, to show appreciation forlthe politi-
. ?
cal stability and relative economic prosperity that he has
obrought to Kashmir.
But certain of Sheikh Abdullah's achievements have not 
been viewed so favorably by the international forum. A con­
stituent assembly was called on October 27, 1950 to determine 
"the future shape and affiliations of the State,Despite 
repeated Indian assurances that the assembly is intended only 
to frame a state constitution and has no power to decide the 
question of accession,^ Pakistan and the Security Council have
Msm ïgrk limfijs.. February 3, 1952,
2Alice Thorner, "India-Pakistan Tensions Focus on Kash­
mir," Fflxslaa £fllA.gy XXLX (March 17, 1950), p. 3,
Qfiiciai Egg,0XdS, 5th Year, Supp. for Dec., 1950,
pp. 126-27.
4"The question has been asked whether the Constituent 
Assembly of Kashmir can decide the question of accession. The
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remalned suspicious of Sheikh Abdullah’s intentions. That 
they have reason has been indicated in recent months. In 
April, 1952, Sheikh Abdullah claiEœd full sovereignty for 
Kashmir, stating that "no Parliament, be it that of India or 
any other country, has any authorization here" and that Kash­
mir, as an "autonomous republic within the Indian Union," 
would not accept full integration with India as long as re­
ligious prejudice against Moslems existed in India.^ He 
acted upon this principle in June, 1952 by asking the con­
stituent assembly, commencing to act like a legislative as­
sembly, to dethrone the maharaja and to establish an elective 
office of chief of state,^
In response to such actions, and to indications dat­
ing from the instigation of the dispute that many Kashmiris 
preferred independence to accession to either India or Paki­
stan, India, in July, 1952, granted to Kashmir "a large 
measure of self-government within the Indian union."? Yet 
India’s view of the political relationship between Srinagar 
and New Delhi remained the same: "Kashmir's accession to the
Indian government is complete in law and fact— it is a part
answer is NO. The Assembly may express its views on the 
subject but it has not power to decide the question. The 
Government of India has made this clear more than once." 
Some Questions a M  ÛÛ KastuaLc., Government of India,
p. 8,
NêH ïimSÆ. April 12, 1952.
&Ibid.. June 11, 1952.
Tjbid.. July 25, 1952.
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of India."8
While such events took place in Kashmir, the Security 
Council and its agett, the United Nations representative, 
continued the search for a solution. From April, 1950 to 
June, 1952, the Council received four reports from the repre­
sentatives, accepted Sir Owen Dixon*s resignation and appointed 
his successor, adopted two resolutions concerning Kashmir, 
and consistently recommended continuation of the representa­
tive’s activities.
The two-year period covered additional changes in 
Council membership. Throughout 1950, members were Cuba,
Ecuador, Egypt, India, Norway, and Jugoslavia in addition to
\
the five permanent members. In January, 1951, Brazil, the 
Netherlands, and Turkey replaced Cuba, Norway, and Egypt, One 
year later, Chile, Greece, and Pakistan succeeded Ecuador, 
Yugoslavia, and India. Thus, during 1952, the membership has 
been Brazil, Chile, Greece, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Turkey, 
and the states permanently represented.
Sir Owen Dixon, in submitting his first report to the 
Council on September 15, 1950, requested that it be his last, 
that it be regarded as the final step in the discharge of his 
functions. He believed himself unable to contribute further 
toward a settlement. Dixon had arrived in the sub-continent 
ten v̂ eeks after the Council had requested the governments to 
take immediate steps toward drafting a demilitarization
^1^. £ll.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-134-
agreement:
The situation. . . presented strange features.
The parties had agreed that the fate of the 
State as a whole should be settled by a general 
plebiscite, but over a considerable period of 
time they had failed to agree on. . . prelim­
inary measures. , , necessary. . . before it 
was possible to set up an organization to take 
a plebiscite. . . The cease-fire line itself 
v;as held in strength and thus two considerable 
armies stood opposedlto one another,9
Indian-occupied territory was administered by Sheikh 
Abdullah*s government and was garrisoned by Indian troops and 
state forces. On Pakistan*s side, the Azad government held 
authority in the western areas, but political agents directly 
responsible to the Pakistani government controlled the North­
ern regions, Dixon first sought to negotiate on the measures 
necessary for commencement of the plebiscite administrator’s 
duties:
Only if and when I was satisfied that no such 
agreement could be brought about and that all 
real chance of it had ended, ought I to turn 
to some ]form of settlement other than a pleb­
iscite of the whole State.10
He began his task v/ith assurances to India that, 
although unable to indict Pakistan as an aggressor, he would 
accept the contention that the crossing of the Kashmiri 
border by hostile elements had been contrary to international 
law and that "when. . . units of the regular Pakistani forces 
moved into, . . the State, that too was inconsistent with
, ------- Esssxiis., 5th Year, Supp. for .Sept.,1950, S/1791, p. 26. ' ^
î Xizisl., p. 27.
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International law."^^
With that understanding, Dixon proposed a demilitariza­
tion program, the first step of which would be withdrawal of 
Pakistani forces, to be followed by troop reductions in 
Indian-held territory, India and Pakistan would concurrently 
undertake disarmament of state forces and of Azad troops» 
Operations would be divided into phases, detailed plans for 
which would be prepared by the chiefs of staff, and the number 
of troops remaining in Kashmir would be as small as possible. 
Administration of evacuated areas would be by existing author­
ities, under United Nations surveillance, and according to 
custom or law prevailing prior to invasion;
I proposed that it should be expressly provided 
that neither 1that provision nor any other pro­
vision, . . should. . . import any recognition 
of, , , legal authority in such territory other 
than one depending upon and derived from the law 
of the State or to imply any derogation from or 
prejudice to the sovereignty of the State.12
Administration of the northern districts would be by United
Nations officials whose powers would be dependent upon the
custom or law of the areas as of August 1, 1947 and who might
exercise their authority through existing local channels.
The cease-fire line was to continue as a boundary but
it would be preferable if a single government exercised power
throughout the state during the plebiscite period. To achieve
this, Dixon suggested three alternatives: (1) a simple
lllfeid., p. 29.
12li2iUi., p. 33.
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coalition government; (2) interim administration by individ­
uals outside state politics, half Hindu and half Moslem; or 
(3) administration conducted entirely by United Nations 
agents.
Reactions were not favorable. New Delhi rejected the 
withdrawal proposal on grounds of state security and objected 
to plans for the evacuated areas since many of the local mag­
istrates, appointed following invasion, were unacceptable to 
India. To curb the authority or to alter the composition of 
the state government would interfere with Kashmir's sovereign­
ty. Pakistan would not accept provisions which took control 
of northern districts out of Azad or Pakistani hands, Dixon 
concluded that agreement on essentials of a plebiscite for 
the entire state was virtually impossiblei
X became convinced that India's agreement would 
never be obtained to demilitarization in any such 
form, or to provisions governing the period of the 
plebiscite of any such character, as would. , . 
permit of Jthe plebiscite being conducted in con­
ditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation 
and other forms of influence, . . by which the, . , 
fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled,13
He then asked the governments if they would agree to 
a plebiscite restricted to certain disputed districts, spe­
cifically the Vale of Kashmir. Remaining areas would be 
awarded automatically to whichever dominion the inhabitant 
clearly favored, or as a result of local référendums. Paki­
stan vehemently protested such an arrangement,charging that 
it constituded a breach bf India's original plebiscite
, p. 36. .
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promise. India would consider the proposal on condition that 
areas in which there was no doubt as to the preference of the 
population would be awarded to India or Pakistan without pleb­
iscites, and that boundary demarcation would have due regard 
to geography and the requirements of an international b o r d e r ,14 
Although Pakistan refused to consider such a scheme, 
it would accept a simple partition without a plebiscites
. . .  a solution having the advantages of being 
immediate in its operation and self-executing;
Pakistan would consider the matter, provided 
that it took the Kashmir Valley, I had little 
doubt however that India would not concede the 
Valley of Kashmir in an over-all partition,
India did not concede.
Finally, Dixon proposed himself to prepare a plan of
pattition and partial plebiscite, subject to modification,
\
including a provision that the plebiscite area was to be ad­
ministered by the United Nations through the plebiscite 
administrator. Pakistan agreed, but India returned an "em­
phatic refusal," The state government would be superseded 
and to permit Pakistan any role in a plebiscite would be sufj* 
render to aggression, "There can be no equality of any right 
between India and Pakistan in this or other relevant
 ̂New Delhi suggested a plebiscite in the Vale and 
parts of Muzaffarabad. India would receive all of Jammu 
east of the cease-fire line and most of Ladakh, Pakistan 
would acquire Gilglt, Gilgit Agency, Gilgit Wazarat, the 
Tribal Territory, and Baltistan (all northern districts), 
and Jammu west of the cease-fire line.
Official Records. 5th Year, Supp. for Sept 1950, S/1791, p. 39. # $
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respects.*16
Dixon admitted failure, for he was convinced that, 
given the docility and gentleness of the Kashmiris, impartial 
administration of the plebiscite areas was an absolute neces­
sity for a fair plebiscite. He had given up hope of recon­
ciling Indian demands with a formula for partition and partial 
plebiscite that would be acceptable to Pakistan. If there 
remained a possibility of settlement by agreement, it lay in 
partition with some Method of determining possession of the 
Vale other than by an over-all plebiscite. But the Jdîfficulty 
in partition was determination of an acceptable boundary;
I doubt whether it may not be better to leave the 
parties to themselves in negotiating terras for 
the settlement of the problem of how to dispose 
of Jammu and Kashmir, . . So far the attitude of 
both parties has been to throw the whole respons­
ibility upon the Security Council or its repre­
sentatives of settling the dispute, notwithstanding, 
except by agreement betv̂ een them, there was no 
means of settling it.i?
Council consideration of Dixon’s report and the 
additional factor of the constituent assembly resulted in 
adoption on March 30, 1951 of a resolution sponsored by the 
United Kingdom and the United States, The Council viewed the 
assembly as possibly prejudicial to a plebiscite in:
l&Ibld.. p. 42. Regarding "surrender to aggression," 
Nehru said on November 25, 1947: "The issue in Kashmir is 
whether violence and naked force ishauld decide the future. . . 
The raiders encouraged by Pakistan have sought to enforce by 
the sword accession to Pakistan against the obvious Iwishes 
of large numbers of the people. , , We cannot permit the suc­
cess of this method to achieve political ends," Nehru, p. 65.
Qffifilai Bg.£PJdj5> 5th Year, Supp. for Sept..
1950, S/1791, p. 46.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-139-
Remlndlna the Governments. . . of the prin­
ciple embodied in the Security Council, . . and 
the United Nations Commission for India and Paki­
stan resolutions. . . that the final disposition 
of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made 
. . . through the democratic method of a free., . 
plebiscite. . . under the auspices of the United 
Nations;
Affirming that the convening of a Constit­
uent Assembly, . , and any action that Assembly 
might, . . take to determine the future shape and 
affiliation of the. . . State or any part. . . 
would not constitute a disposition of the State 
in accordance with the above principles. . .18
Dixon's resignation was accepted. A successor would consult
with the governments to effect demilitarization on the basis
of the commission resolutions of August 13,1943 and January
5, 1949. And the Council:
upon the parties, in the event their 
discussions with the, . . Representative failing 
in his opinion to result in full agreement, to 
accept arbitration upon all outstanding points 
of difference reported by the. . . Representa­
tive, . .19
The cease-fire would continue, and the governments were re­
quested to refritin from action prejudicial to a peaceful 
settlement. Although India immediately rejected the resolu­
tion, it was adopted with eight voting in favor (Brazil, China, 
Ecuador, France, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States); none opposed; and three abstentions 
(India, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugo­
slavia).
Activating the resolution, the Council, on p̂oril 30,
13se Official Records (S/2375), S/2017/kev. 1, p. 38.
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1951, named Dr, Frank P. Graham^O the United States as 
Dixon's successor, Graham's first report was submitted on 
October 15, 1951 and covered his activities from June 30 to 
September 15. He had found a complex situation in the sub­
continent. The cease-fire was being Maintained, there had 
been some decrease in armed forces in Kashmir, and there was 
a general desire to settle the problem as soon as possible. 
Disturbing elements were alleged cease-fire violations on 
both sides, war-mongering propaganda, and continued activity 
of the constituent assembly.
Ù1 September 7, Graham drafted a twelve-point demili­
tarization program designed to meet the situation:
ol mi fakiaiaa1. . . . specifically pledge themselves that 
they will not commit aggression or make war, . , 
with regard to the question of. . , Kashmirj
2. Agree that each Government, . . will in­
struct its official spokesmen and will urge all 
its citizens. . . bot to make. « . statements 
calculated to incite the people of either nation 
to make war against the other. , ;
3. Reaffirm their will to observe the 
cease-fire. . ;
4. Reaffirm, . . the principle that the ques­
tion of the accession of. , • Kashmir. , . will 
be decided through, , , a free. . , plebiscite 
under the auspices of the United Nations;
ZOprank Porter Graham, 1886- , former United States
senator and president of the University of North Carolina, 
is one of five American citizens on the United Nations Panel 
for Inquiry and Conciliation. During the war he served on a 
number of war boards. Graham was the American representative 
on the Good Offices Committee on the Indonesian Question, 
1947-48, and was subsequently special adviser to the secre­
tary of state on Indonesian affairs. He was defense man­
power administrator in the Department of Labor when named to 
the Kashmir post.
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5. Agree that. , . the demilitarization of
. . . Kashmir. . . v.dll be effected in a single, 
continous process;
6. Agree that. , . demilitarization shall be 
completed during a period of 20 days, unless an­
other period is decided upon by the. . . Govern­
ments. . ;
7. Agree that. . . at the lend of the period 
. . . the situation will be:
A. Qa ££kl£JLüÛ Ql 11m:(i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals 
. . . will have been withdrawn;
(ii) the Pakistan troops will have been 
withdrawn from the State, and 
(iii) large-scale. . . disarmament of the
Azad. . . forces will have taken place.
B. Qn ^  Indian slds. ol ths. linn:(i) the bulk of Indian forces in the State 
will have been withdrawn;
(ii) further withdrawals or reductions. . . 
of the Indian and State, . . forces 
remaining after completion of the 
operation referred to in B(i) above 
will have been carried out; 
so that. . . there will remain on the. . . Pakistan
side of the. . , line a force of ____* Civil Armed
Forces, and on the Indian side. • . a force of 
- - -8. Agree that the dorilitarization shall in­
volve no threat to the cease-fire agreement. • ;
9. Agree that representatives of the. . .
Governments. . . will. . , draw up a programme 
of demilitarization. .;
10. Agree that. . . demilitarization will be 
without prejudice to the. . . responsibilities of 
the. . , Representative and Plebiscite Administra­
tor with regard to the final disposal of forces. , ;
11. Agree that differences regarding the pro­
gramme of demilitarization, . . will be referred 
to the Military Adviser of the. . . Representative, 
and if disagreement continues, to the, . . Repre­
sentative, whose decision shall be final.
(*It is requested that the. . , spaces be filled in by your Government).21
Both governments accepted the first four paragraphs. 
But for India, withdrawal of Indian troops and disarmament of 
the Azad forces affected Kashmir’s security and could not be
Officiai s/2375, pp. 41-43.
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consldered separately. India would withdraw the bulk of its 
forces and some of the remainder provided there was complete 
demilitarization on the Pakistani side of the line except for 
a civil force of 4,000, half Azad followers and half not, 
commanded by United Nations officers or "locals" and not 
Pakistanis. Pakistan would accept disarmament of Azad forces 
provided the balance of the Indian forces were withdrawn and 
there were reductions in the state forces.
India thought it premature to appoint the administra­
tor before completion of demilitarization, while Pakistan 
favored appointment as far in advance of the final day as 
possible. India termed the 90-day period insufficient and 
Pakistan accepted it* In essence, India would agree to with­
drawal only when Pakistani troops, tribesmen, and Azad forces 
no longer could be considered a menace to security. The 
exact period and phasing of withdrawal and the size of forces 
to remain could not yet be determined. Pakistan assented to 
Lhe provisions as they stood but continued to insist upon a 
"military balance" on either side of the cease-fire line, 
Graham recommended that the Council call upon the governments 
to avoid increases in their military forces in Kashmir and to 
renew efforts at agreement on demilitarization.
The Council, in a United Kingdom-United States spon­
sored resolution adopted on November 10, 1951, approved the 
demilitarization proposals and:
2. Instructs the, . . Representative to con­
tinue his efforts to obtain. , . demilitariza­
tion. • i
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4. Instructs the. . , Representative to report 
to the Security Council on his efforts. . . not 
later than six weeks after this resolution comes 
into effect.22
Graham reported again on December 18, 1951. His pro­
gram during renewed negotiations had been: (1) to exhaust
possibilities of agreement on previous proposals for demili­
tarization and (2) in case there was no agreement, to obtain 
detailed plans from both parties in order to establish points 
of difference. From the outset he had concentrated on narrow­
ing disagreement on the size of forces to remain after demili­
tarization and on appointment of the administrator, but dif­
ferences had remained essentially the same. However, he was 
able to report agreement on four additional paragraphs, 8, 9, 
11, and 12— covering, respectively, the cease-fire agreement, 
drafting of demilitarization details, responsibilities of the 
representative and administrator, and arbitration. India 
accepted the last on condition that it concerned technical 
details in implementation of the agreed program, not differ­
ences arising in the process of drafting.
But as agreement had not been reached on the remaining 
four, most basic, paragraphs covering continuous demilitari­
zation, the 90-day period, phasing of withdrawal, and appoint­
ment of the administrator, Graham recommended substitution of 
an absolute deadline of July 15, 1952 and addition of the 
following phrase to the withdrawal-period paragraph:
. . .  so that on the date referred to. . . there
QUi&iol E&carda (s /2 4 48 ), s/2392, p. 2.
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will remain on each side of the cease-fire line 
the lowest possible number of armed forces based 
in proportion on the number of, , , forces exist­
ing on each side of the. . . line on 1 January 1949.23
Concerning the other paragraphs, the governments were
asked their opinions on reduction of forces and employment of
United Nations troops to maintain security. Pakistan replied
that it would be willing to reduce its forces to any level
provided there existed a "balance" betweenr.Indian and Azad
forces and that it would accept outside forces. India refused
to consider United Nations troops and noted that further troop
reductions would be dependent upon conditions:
Demilitarization concerns only the Indian and 
State forces; the State Militia which is a police 
force, clearly does not fall within either cate­gory.24
Graham found that there had been no substantial change 
in positions. Demilitarization presented insurmountable ob­
stacles unless agreement were reached on a definite period 
for demilitarization, the scope of the program and the number 
of troops to remain in Kashmir, and appointment of the admin­
istrator, which was the keystone of the entire program; "the 
clearest symbol both of, . , ultimate demilitarization and 
the promised plebiscite, would be, . . a definite day for in­
duction into office of the, . • Administrator."25
The Council, without formal vote, approved continua-
23sc CffltWL Records. S/2448, p. 13.
^ ^ î h iâ . .  p . 47.
23s£ Official Records. 7th Year, 570th Meeting, p. 9,
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tlon of Graham's activities, and on April 22, 1952 his third 
report was submitted. He was of the opinion that of the 
three parts of the commission's truce proposals, upon which 
all demilitarization attempts had been based, the cease-fire 
was largely implemented, and to all practical purposes the 
truce was in operation without formal agreement. The Council 
and the representative should henceforth devote their efforts 
to the third phase, the plebiscite itself.
But there had been little change in the positions of 
Karachi and New Delhi, India was adamant on the question of 
withdrawal, although willing at the conclusion of demilitari­
zation to consult with the administrator and the representa­
tive on further reductions in its forces. The remaining 
issues could be settled easily once the scope of demilitariza­
tion and the size of forces to remain had been decided.
Pakistan accepted the date of July 15, 1952 and agreed 
that demilitarization should embrace all armed forces in Kash­
mir without exception:
There is no justification whatsoever for the 
contention that the State Militia is a police 
force and so not liable to disbandment,
The militia was organized along lines of the Indian infantry
and was officered by Indians, India had not objected when the
McNaughton and Dixon proposals referred to the militia in
connection with the state army and the Azad forces. But
arbitration of "technical differences" was not sufficient;
Official Records, S/2448, p. 33.
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there should be a provision, similar to that of the March 14, 
1950 Council resolution, authorizing the representative to 
"interpret" agreements reached on demilitarization. "The 
experience of the last three years underlines the necessity 
for such a provision. Without it, there would be no means of 
resolving deadlocks that might arise."2?
II
Seven issues summoned the Indian and Pakistani 
champions into battle during the most recent phase of the 
Kashmir dispute. The controversy over the constituent as­
sembly was the first to arise. In Pakistan’s view, convening 
of the body nullified the "international agreement" resulting 
from acceptance of the commission resolutions of August 13, 
1948 and January 5, 1949 and was a challenge to the authority 
of the Security Council.
Rau fell back on the legal basis of India’s federal
structure. Kashmir was a unit of the Indian federation,
largely autonomous and entitled to frame its own constitution.
The main purpose of the assembly was to provide for an elected
legislature with a responsible executive:
So far as the Government of India is concerned, 
the Constituent Assembly is not intended to pre­
judice the issues before the Security Council,or to come in its way.28
The assembly might express an opinion on accession, but it
p. 36.
Official Records- 6th Year, 533rd Meeting, p. 6.
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could make ho decisions.
Zafrullah Khan saw the shadow of conspiracy. The 
assembly, a result of a long-considered scheme, was a clear 
indication that India had never intended to proceed with a 
plebiscite. If a referendum at an early date were to deter­
mine accession, there was no need for an assembly to frame 
Kashmir’s constitution:
The proposed consituent assembly is. . • an 
attempt on India’s part to contrive yet another 
pseudo-legalistic subterfuge to cover its occu­
pation of Kashmir. • . against the will of the 
people, , . We are not convinced that the. , , 
assembly is not an attempt to confuse the issues, 
poison the atmosphere and obstruct a just and 
peaceful solution. And. . . we are not convinced 
that, . . India can be absolved of its full re­
sponsibility in this matter by any attempt on its 
part theoretically to separateithe so-called 
autonomous sphere of the Maharaja’s Government 
from India’s own sphere of authority.29
The second point to assume importance touched many of 
the differences and agreements comprising the liistory of the 
dispute. Both parties accused the other of failure to fulfil 
obligations. Rau heatedly denied the charge. On analysis, 
India’s "so-called intransigence" would be found to be nothing 
more than reliance upon "pledges already given to India," 
Actually, said Rau, India had more than met its obligations. 
Without awaiting a truce and demilitarization agreement, India 
had reduced its forces despite previous understandings which 
called for prior Pakistani action. On the other hand, Paki­
stani troops remained in Kashmir although they had accomplished
Official Records, 6th Year, 548th Meeting, p. 9.
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their supposed goal— forestalling of an Indian offensive and
prevention of a fait accompli. And India had not forgotten
its promise of a plebiscite;
Unfortunately, the soil of Kashmir has not yet 
been cleared of the invader— the Pakistan Army 
which joined the invader is still there— and so 
the fulfillment of the wish of the Government 
of India has been delayed by Pakistan’s own act.30
Zafrullah Khan turned to the issue of the Azad forces 
for his reply. Pakistan had never repudiated its obligation 
to withdraw its forces, but Indian insistence upon Azad dis­
bandment without prejudice to state forces had proved a real 
obstacle. And Indian refusal to consider employment of neu­
tral forces blocked a possible solution to the impasse. No 
matter what India offered in the way of justification for this 
attitude, Pakistan could not consider withdrawal until definite 
procedures were agreed upon and fulfilled by India.
The Dixon report introduced several issues. Regarding
Council abandonment of responsibility for the dispute, Rau
thought worse programs might be adopted than allowing the
initiative to pass back to India and Pakistan. Zafrullah
Khan was far from agreement, for he believed the situation
required vigorous and immediate action. The result of Coun-
cil renunciation of jurisdiction might not be pleasant:
It would enable India to consolidate its hold on 
Kashmir and to continue systematically to alter 
the composition of the population by forcing or 
driving out more and more Muslims as refugees
Official Records. 6th Year, 538th Meeting, p. 2.
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into Pakistan, and settling non“Muslims in their place.31
On the possibility of a partition-plebiscite arrange­
ment providing a solution, Rau repeated to the Council India's 
view as expressed to Dixon, New Delhi was prepared to con­
sider the proposal providing a major share of disputed terri­
tory were arbitrarily awarded to India, Pakistan, unwilling 
to accept a combination, would agree to simple partition if 
the Vale were to be part of its share.
On the possible employment of foreign troops during
the plebiscite period, Pakistan was in agreement. In fact,
Zafrullah Khan pointed out, as long ago as January, 1943 he
had acquiesced in the use of Commonwealth or United Nations
troops.32 Rau again took refuge in Kashmir's "sovereignty"
and "integrity." Foreign troops were "unthinkable," for they
would amount to interference with the functions of Kashmir's
lawful government;
We are wholly unable to accept any entry of for­
eign troops in the State or in any other part of
India{ . . .  in view of the provision made by 
the resolutions of August 1943 and January 1949, 
there is no occasion for the use of foreign troops 
or of special local levies recruited by an out­side agency.33
The unchanging attitude of the Council members toward
3J-SC QfiifilgJL B££Q£âs.» 6th Year, 535th Meeting, p. 7.
32see page 45,
33^ Official Records. 6th Year, 536th Meeting, p. 4. 
The provision referred to covers employment, in consultation 
with the commission, of Indian troops to maintain order and 
security.
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arbitratlon may possibly have influenced India’s capitulation 
on this issue during the Graham negotiations* But in the 
debates on the Dixon report, Rau was unyielding, stubbornly 
viewing all suggestions as proposals to reopen questions 
settled by resolution or agreement.
Zafrullah Khan delighted in this opportunity to casti­
gate the Indian approach to international cooperation. How 
any nation which thought its cause just could refuse impartial 
adjudication was beyond his comprehension. He struck at 
Indian sensitivity on the resurrection of past controversies:
It was not suggested that the accession of. . .
Kashmir. . . should be submitted to arbitration.
The suggestion is: as there is an international 
agreement embodied in the two resolutions of
13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, and as the
implementation of these resolutions has come to 
a standstill, the issues arising therefrom 
should be submitted to arbitration so that the 
arbitrators can determine what is to be d o n e .34
The final issue, Graham’s proposals on demilitariza­
tion, the withdrawal period, and the administrator’s appoint­
ment, was only fleetingly touched, for positions had been 
made clear to the representative and negotiations were then 
in progress. Yet there were hints of incipient agreement, 
for India’s Setalvad saw little difficulty in settling the 
withdrawal period and the administrator’s appointment provided 
agreements were first reached on the scope of demilitarization
and the size of residue forces. As a gesture toward a solu­
tion, Setalvad produced a nev/ Indian offer, 6,000 men below
34U2Ü,. p. 9.
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le original figure, on condition an additional 6,000-man 
.lltla be regarded as an Internal police force, not a mlll- 
iry reserve* Azad territory would be garrisoned by a 4,000- 
in force, only half of which should consist of Azad adherents,
Zafrullah Khan was not as yet amenable to any scheme
) far removed from a "military balance* and continued to
ress for early induction Into office of the administrator:
Pakistan is, . , ready to carry out, . . demili­
tarization In two stages. . . or a. . . programme 
in one single continuous process, , , But Paki­
stan could not possibly be expected to agree to 
any one-sided, • . arrangement. For us, demili­
tarization is not an end in itself; it is an 
essential preliminary to, , . a free. , . pleb­iscite,35
The only real differences among the majority of Coun- 
L1 members during this final period lay in the zeal with 
ilch they pressed for a settlement. All but the Soviet 
lion approved both the Dixon and Graham reports. All were 
rltlcal of the constituent assembly and of India’s refusal 
) compromise on demilitarization terms. The lone conflict 
rose when Jacob Malik3b of the Soviet Union criticized the 
sthod of Graham’s appointment and his procedures, but not 
Is conclusions or recommendations,
Francis Lacoste^^ of France believed a plebiscite,
35SC Official 7th Year, 571st Meeting,p. 6.
36Jacob A. Malik, 1906- , entered diplomatic work in
hie, press section of the Soviet foreign office. He attended 
lie Five-Power conference in 1945, was political adviser to 
he Soviet representative on the Allied Control Council in 
?46, and has been permanent representative to the United 
ations since 1948,
3^Francis Lacoste, 1905- , has served the^Quai
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essential to settlement, required fulfilment of one condition 
— plebiscite territory must be free of influences "such as 
that inevitably involved in the presence of occupation troops 
, . . belonging to one, , , of the parties concerned."38 De­
militarization was thus a prerequisite:
States like India and Pakistan owe it to the 
international community, and to themselves, to 
demonstrate their policital maturity. , . The 
draft resolution. . . does not ask the parties 
to sacrifice principles, ideas or even interests.
It does no more than ask them to apply. . . 
classical methods. . . recommended for three 
years by the Council as the best means— if not, 
in the absence of direct agreement, the only 
means— of escaping from what seems. . . to be 
assuming. . , the appearance of a dangerous im­passe.39
Malik broke four years of Soviet near-silence only to 
ignore the dispute in order to criticize United Kingdom and 
United States activities. He thought it strange that only 
one candidate to succeed Dixon was presented, and this candi­
date an American, In the more than four years since the 
dispute had been introduced, the western powerb had been par­
ticularly active. Resolutions had been adopted, commissions 
established, and representatives appointed, but no real 
progress toward a settlement had resulted. Malik suspected 
plans of an "annexationist, imperialist" nature:
They are not based on an effort to achieve a real
d*Orsay in Paris, Belgrade, Peking, and Washington, With the 
Free French Forces of the Interior in 1944, he has been a 
delegate to the United Nations since 1948.
Official 6th Year, 539th Meeting, p. 5.
39lbisi., p. 6.
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settlement, . . They pursue different aims, 
different— directly contrary— objectives. The 
purpose, , , is interference. , . in the Inter­
nal affairs of Kashmir, the prolongation of the 
dispute. . , and the conversion of Kashmir into 
a protectorate of the United States and the 
United Kingdom. , . Finally, the purpose, . . is 
to secure the introduction of Anglo-American 
troops. . . and convert Kashmir into. . , a mili­
tary and strategic base.40
In addition, the American representative had pressed the
governments to accept foreign troops, although the Council
had not authorized him to do so.
Sir Gladwyn J e b b 4 l  of the United Kingdom informed
Malik that if the Council were ever to accomplish anything, it
must rise above the "low-lying poisonous mists of suspicion"
that had so often defeated it. Further, Malik’s charges were
ridiculous and thoroughly unbelievable:
No doubt there are people who can be persuaded 
to believe this, just as there are people who 
could believe that. • . a mission to Antartica 
to study the habits of penguins could only be an 
indirect slander on totalitarianism or on Marx­
ist society. It is possible to believe that; 
and people. . • can always be found who will
Official B££flxd.S.t 7th Year, 570th Meeting, 
pp. 13-14. Malik implied Pakistan had attempted to purchase 
western support with bases. Pakistan denied this. A rumor, 
circulated Immediately following partition, had Pakistan 
offering Chittagong, the best port in East Bengal, to the 
United States as a naval base. The New York H eês., October 
13, 1947.
4lsir Gladwyn Jebb, 1900- , was minister of economic
warfare in Britain’s wartime cabinet, 1940-42, He attended 
the Quebec, Cairo, and Teheran conferences and was acting 
secretary general of the United Nations in 1946. Jebb helped 
draft peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, 
and Finland. He has been permanent representative to the 
United Nations since 1949.
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believe anything.42
On Kashmir itself, the United Kingdom position was
comfortably in line with that of the majority of the Council.
Jebb termed India’s reception of demilitarization proposals
"a little less than fair" and thought arbitration was the key
to this issue, which in itself was the key to a plebiscite.
The United Kingdom felt "very strongly" that the time was past
for mediation and persuasion:
The dispute is not one which time will, . , solve 
• , • I hope that the Council will accept. . . 
arbitration. . . as the most effective way of 
moving forward towards a settlement*43
Jebb expressed grave doubts as to the wisdom of calling the 
constituent assembly, attaching "great importance" to assur­
ances that it was not competent to decide accession or to 
"prejudice the position" of the Council.
Gross of the United States also saw arbitration as 
the key and similarly questioned the intentions of the assem­
bly, particularly as relating to India’s interpretation of 
the plebiscite provision in the accession agreement:
That commitment is not. . , "to give the people 
the right to decide whether they would remain 
in India or not." To phrase the plebiscite 
question in this form would be to disregard the 
binding agreement accepted by both parties. The 
Security Council has from the beginning held 
that the issue of accession is one which is to 
be settled by a fair, . . plebiscite under United 
Nations auspices, and both parties, in the lan­
guage of their own commitments, have accepted
42sq Offjçial 7th Year, 570th Meeting, p. 19.
43SC Dfficlai Records. 6th Year, 566th Meeting, p. 3.
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this view,44
III
The commission's faith in the "flexibility" of an 
approach to the problem by a single United Nations representa­
tive has been substantiated to a great extent by the accom­
plishments of the Security Council's two representatives. As 
a result of their activities, and of time, the issues divid­
ing India and Pakistan are no longer so numerous or so vital.
A cease-fire in Kashmir has been maintained for some time, 
and a truce, the second part of the commission's comprehensive 
settlement proposal, for all practical purposes has been 
implemented. Sir Owen Dixon's acceptance of the Indian con­
tentions regarding the invasion as a violation of international 
law, while not acted upon, have partially mollified India on 
this issue. Dr. Frank Graham's twelve-point truce program 
has all but found acceptance. The introduction of the prin­
ciple of proportional residue forces in Kashmir has pointed 
a way to a solution of a portion of the withdrawal question. 
And, most important, limited acceptance of arbitration has 
removed many of the difficulties surrounding demilitarization.
Yet Issues remain. The scope of and size of forces 
to remain after withdrawal are still in contention. And to 
"military balance" and “synchronization" as factors in this 
problem, has been added the status of the Kashmiri militia.
The exact period during which withdrawal is to be completed
44sg Official Records. 6th Year, 537th Meeting p. 10.
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is still undecided as is the date of official appointment of 
the plebiscite administrator. The parties continue to be 
divided on employment of outside forces during the plebiscite 
period, and the existence of the constituent assembly is a 
festering sore. The question of an interim administration 
has again arisen. And on the most promising formula for a 
final settlement, partition and a partial plebiscite, the 
demands of both parties are unacceptable to the other.
But once these problems are recognized as the techni­
calities that they are, the present Kashmiri picture appears 
brighter than at any time during the history of the dispute. 
As the United Nations representative continues his slow but 
increasingly successful progress toward bringing India and 
Pakistan together on the remaining details of the demilitar­
ization prograip, there is reason for hope that a settlement 
may yet be achieved on the twin pillars of his twelve-point 
program and acceptance of some plan of partial plebiscite 
and partition.
Rhetorically, Indian and Pakistani arguments appear 
to have changed but slightly since the Inception of the dis­
pute, To India, it was and is a question of international 
law, the violation of international obligations; to Pakistan, 
a question of unlawful occupation of Kashmir and of thwarting 
the desire of Ithe people to express their political prefer­
ence, But beneath the surface, and in many instances quite 
cleatly, both governments tend increasingly to adopt a 
realistic approach and to accept the situation as it exists.
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not as theory outlines It* Thus India, although continuing 
to place the greatest stress upon the inviolability of Kashmir 
sovereignty, has, for all practical purposes, abandoned hope 
or intention of occupying all of Kashmir during the plebiscite 
period. And Pakistan is amenable to a preponderance of Indian 
forces in the state, though not yet so great as India demands. 
Both parties, in action if not in words, have come far desert­
ing an absolute approach for compromise and practicality.
The Council voting record has followed the pattern 
firmly established in previous periods. Attitudes rarely show 
partiality; the desire is to settle the question in almost any 
fashion capable of winning approval from both governments.
Where Pakistan had been universally reproved for its action 
in moving troops into Kashmir, India was similarly reprimanded 
on the issue of the constituent assembly and on its picayunish 
approach to demilitarization. And the United Kingdom and the 
United States continue to lead the Council in quest of an 
answer to the problem of Kashmir.
The detached Council attitude precludes a distinct ad­
vantage for either party. Pakistan's great success came 
earlier in being accepted as a legitimate party to the dis­
pute. Indications that the various settlement proposals favor­
ed Pakistan were only apparent, for Pakistan may better afford 
to accept any proposal which does not grant India a decided 
advantage. India yet finds it difficult to accept certain 
essential provisions without abandoning completely the 
original basis of its case.
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CHAPTER VII 
SIGNIFICANCE 
I
For the observer who cuts beneath a surface of repe­
titive arguments and intransigent positions, the problem of 
Kashmir presents several questions concerning its signifi­
cance, for India and Pakistan and for the Security Council. 
Logical answers are possible only through an understanding of 
the dispute itself. Kashmir did not spring full-grown upon 
the world scene. Its slow generation lies in history, deep 
in the turbulent past of India^ and in the chaotic history of 
the modern international coiranunity.
Of vital importance is the character of modern India, 
the result of centuries of change and conflict in the sub­
continent. An apparently irresistible attraction for conquer* 
ers throughout recorded history has precluded development of 
an homogeneous character. Invasions have piled successive 
layers of culture upon the land until it has become a welter 
of people and races, religions and sects, philosophies of 
government and ways of life. The British, and the Moguls 
before them, imposed a surface political unity upon the
lln this case, "India" refers to both the Indian 
Union and Pakistan.
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sub-contlnent. But always there remained many Indias. Two 
facets of pre-independence India— its religious cleavage and 
its political anatomy— resulting from the confused past con­
tributed directly to the dispute that is Kashmir,
India in political flux at the conclusion of the 
Second World war was scarred by conflict between two great 
faiths. Three hundred million Hindus and one hundred million 
Moslems had radically different ideas as to the structure of 
an independent state, A solution was sought through the 
establishment of two nations, Pakistan as a Moslem homeland 
and the Indian Union as a secular state. Though perhaps a 
political solution, partition did not result in reconciliation 
of religious antagonism, which continued to corrupt relations 
between the new govèrnments.
As repeated invasions aided in generating Indians 
religious difficulties, so they created a complex political 
configuration which had few equals. Under the British, long 
masters at construction and administration of complicated 
governmental systems, the intermingling of sovereign states 
and British provinces was not a barrier but an actual aid to 
domination. But when Great Britain relinquished power in 
India, the exact status of the principalities could no longer 
be considered of importance in theory alone. Two successor 
states, imbued with modern nationalism, were not inclined to 
permit continuation of a ritualistic political hierarchy 
challenging their own authority over the millions of the sub­
continent, The problem became Immediate with partition and
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Independence and found rough solution in the rush of events. 
Yet in cases where religious animosities merged with politi­
cal complexities, serious complications were inevitable.
Granted a background composed of unique religious 
and political elements, the problem of the states might have 
been solved without serious difficulty had there been suf­
ficient time to seek a solution through negotiation and com­
promise, But precipitate British withdrawal precluded 
leisurely consideration of the issue; the question of the 
future of the states was thrown into the arena, to be answer­
ed by circumstances rather than reason.
The character of the governments involved has had 
much influence in prolongation of a dispute thus engendered. 
Independence day on August 15, 1947 saw two new commonwealths 
rise from the defunct Indian Empire. Pakistan is a nation 
frankly based upon theology. Thersense of religious singular­
ity is coupled with the pride of a new nation and the fear 
of domination by the remaining great bulk of the sub-continent# 
All combine to give the Pakistani government a character 
fanatic, nationalistic, and sensitive to any apparent chal­
lenge of its rights.
The creators of the Indian Union, on the other hand, 
are determined that it will be a secular state. They have 
lost the battle of communalism and partition in India as a 
whole but are dedicated to the proposition that the territory 
remaining to them will not be marked as an exclusively Hindi 
polity# Already possessing a large Moslem minority popula-
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tlon» India is able to view the acquisition of more Moslems 
in Kashmir, particularly if the people voluntarily reject 
communalism and indicate preference for a secular though 
Hindu-majority state, as furthering this program. In addi­
tion, India's leaders are almost without exception rarified 
intellectuals, usuilly educated in law, immersed in the tech­
nicalities of abstract theory, and idealistic. The result is 
a government which, in a case such as Kashmir, may be depended 
upon to stress the letter of international law, which is sus­
picious, of the motives of a government that has destroyed the 
dream of alunified secular sub-continent, and which will take 
umbrage at the slightest impugning of its own motives.
II
From this situation issues the Kashmir dispute, a 
disturbance initiated by tribal invasion but which soon in­
volved both dominions. Although neither government desired 
open conflict, public excitement, nurtured on bitterness re­
sulting from partition and recent communal bloodshed, was 
capable of producing a situation in which, reason overwhelmed 
by emotion, India and Pakistan would plunge Into war.
Initial Indian and Pakistani attitudes were dogmatic. 
India viewed the tribal incursion and alleged aid furnished by 
Pakistan as violations of international law which would have 
to be punished, whatever the other aspects of the situation. 
Accession v/as legal and India's actions were legitimate and 
understandable. Nehru defended the Indian record one week 
following accession:
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I want to say at once that every step that we 
have taken in regard to Kashmir has been taken 
after the fullest thought and consideration of 
the consequences and I am convinced that what 
we have done was the right thing. Not to have 
taken those steps would have been a betrayal of 
a trust and cowardly submission to the law of 
the sword with its accompaniment of arson, rape and slaughter.2
But Pakistan saw in India's acceptance of Kashmir's 
accession a violation of the meaning of partition and an at­
tack upon the security of Moslems and of Pakistan. Denying 
all charges of complicity in the invasion, Pakistan refused 
to recognize either accession or the legality of Indian mili­
tary operations in Kashmir,
Equally important in influencing the later course of
the dispute is the character of the Security Council itself.
Two years following its establishment, it was already clear
that the Council was not alunified body able to cope efficierfc-
ly with major international disturbances:
The Council's particular job is to listen to 
any nation, whether a member or not, which thinks 
it is being imposed upon enought by another nation 
to threaten the peace. The Council has the further 
job of deciding what action to take in such argu­
ments.^
The Council is capable of fulfilling its first func­
tion as a forum for debate. But on the second, internal 
division prevents resolute action. The Council is uncertain 
as to the exact line between suggestion of action and imposi­
tion of its will, which it is unable to back with force. It
^Nehru, p. 55.
Ssigrid Arne, à UniiM lÜ-tApjjia Primer (New York; 
Ehinehart and Company, 1943), p. 216.
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is clear that the Council cannot function as an international
board of adjudication, returning decisions based solely on
law and fact:
The Security Council has in no case any authority 
to settle a dispute with binding force. Hence 
it can never exercise any activities having the 
character of. . . arbitration, but at most make 
non-binding recommendations, i.e. mediate.*
The Council must attempt to bring the parties together on a
compromise program which will ensure cooperation in effecting
a settlement* Without voluntary participation of the states
involved, a proposal would be valueless.
An approach such as this inevitably led to frequent 
abandonment of legal light. Rather than treating the Indian 
complaint as a legal charge, the Council indicated its inten­
tion to consider the practical aspects of the situation and t) 
seek a compromise solution. This could be accomplished 
through two methods; "The Security Council may either recom­
mend procedures or methods of adjustment or recommend directly 
the terms, . . . the basis of a settlement,"^ Both procedures 
were followed, the first in authorization of conversations be-
I
tween the parties with the Council president as rapporteur and 
in the later suggestion of arbitration of demilitarization dif­
ferences; the second in adoption of a cease-fire, demilitariza­
tion, and a plebiscite as the principles upon Miich a settle­
ment should be based.
^Aif Ross, gfiMiliuiaa ih& UbU sû Maiisaa: Apaiyaia of structure and Function (New York: Rhinehart, 1950), p. 156.
^Alexandre Parodi, "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes," 
International Conciliation. CDXI.V (November, 1948), p. 622.
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The task of the United Nations Commission for India 
and Pakistan was to develop details for implementations of the 
agreed-upon principles. Commission activities resulted in a 
cease-fire and acceptance of general demilitarization plans.
But differing interpretations of certain details of the formula 
blocked further progress by the commission and led to its dis­
solution and replacement by a single United Nations representa­
tive, Two successive representatives have maneuvered India and 
Pakistan closer to a settlement. Although no agreement has 
been signed, long months of quiet have so cooled initial pas­
sions that a iig. facto truce exists. And only three technical 
differences obstruct agreement on plebiscite prerequisites on 
the basis of Graham’s twelve-point program. In the process 
of negotiations, India and Pakistan gradually have abandoned 
their initial dogmatic positions; they are inclined to accept 
conditions which would have been repugnant in the first months 
of the dispute. With increasingly serious consideration of a 
settlement proposal based upon both partition and a plebiscite, 
the Council may yet find a formula which will satisfy both 
parties to the dispute. It would appear that Francis Lacoste, 
the Council representative of France, was overly pessimistic 
in his opinion expressed to the Council on March 30, 1951;
Year by year the eloquence and skill of the rep­
resentatives of India and Pakistan seem to raise 
new aspects of the subject. However, a calm 
study of their speeches and of the practical re­
sults they have each year achieved, leads to the 
dual conclusion that, in the realm of ideas, the 
Council has had no occasion to change its posi­
tion, . . and that, so far as the facts are con­
cerned, there has unfortunately been no real
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-1 6 5 -
progress towards a settlement of the dispute,&
Although the final form and date of a solution remain
uncertain, a number of possible settlements may be examined.
Least likely, nearly five years after violation of a mountain
border threatened conflict in Asia, is war. As The New York
lime^ remarked editorially:
The Security Council has been at this problem 
for more than four years, during which time 
there has been only one positive achievement—  
the establishment of a cease-fire line, , ,
However, there has been a negative achieve­
ment that far surpasses any other feature of 
this case— war between India and Pakistan over 
Kashmir has been avoided.'
An only slightly less remote possibility is an inde­
pendent Kashmir, friendly to both dominions but controlled by 
neither, While it is undoubtedly true that many Kashmiris, 
even members of Sheikh Abdullah’s government, nurture hope of 
complete independence,® it is highly unlikely that either New 
Delhi or Karachi would give it serious consideration.
The dispute may yet be settled according to the 
original formula, an all-inclusive plebiscite. But consider­
ing the impasse on plebiscite conditions and recent favorable 
attitudes toward total or partial partition, this possibility 
appears to be rapidly losing its appeal.
The possibility of total stalemate cannot be over­
looked, If the Council were to adopt Sir Owen Dixon’s
Official Records. 6th Year. 539th Meeting, p. 4. 
?The Now York Times. Jpril 23, 1952,
, February 3, 1952,
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suggestion that the initiative be returned to India and Paki­
stan, such could very likely be the result, for the govern­
ments displayed no ability to negotiate a solution when they 
possessed the initiative before the introduction of the dis­
pute into the Security Council.
A simple partition of Kashmir between India and 
Pakistan along the present cease-fire line, now beginning to 
assume the characteristics of a political boundary, may be 
regarded as a practical, if not an entirely satisfactory, solu­
tion. But controversy over possession of the Vale of Kashmir 
effectively blocks agreement along this line.
Lastly, a solution may result from the proposal to 
partition most of Kashmir according to the obvious wishes of
the inhabitants with plebiscites to be conducted in doubtful
areas. Although Zafrullah Khan Informed the commission in 
1948 that "under no circumstances" would Pakistan consider any9form of partition and Nehru rejected arbitrary division on 
religious or any other principle in 1947,10 in June, 1952 
plebiscite and partition appeared to be the most likely answer 
to the problem. Within recent months, both parties have ex­
pressed willingness to consider partition— provided they were 
awaided the Vale of Kashmir— and India has assented to a combi­
nation of plebiscite and partition, although advancing demands
Official 3rd Year, Supp. for Nov., 1948,
p. 93.
lOVera M. Dean, "Impact of the 1947 Partition Darkens 
India's Outlook," fflxgigo Policy Bulletin. XXX (November 17, 
1950), p. 2.
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as yet unacceptable to either the Council or Pakistan. But 
If New Delhi and Karachi are able to agree upon which areas 
are to be favored by a plebiscite, not an impossibility, a 
solution according to this formula may be achieved.
Ill
There is more significance, for India, Pakistan, and 
the Security Council, in the Kashmir question than is usually 
the case in a territorial dispute. India and Pakistan clearly 
have shown increased stature in their approaches to the prob­
lem during five years of negotiations. Although both parties 
continue to pay verbal homage to their original positions, in 
practice they have adopted a more realistic attitude than was 
apparent in the early days of wildly inflammatory accusations. 
They appear to have realized that compromise on position or 
principle does not necessarily involve abandonment.
The. ĵIey; York Times is much too harsh in noting:
So far as the attitudes of India and Pakistan are 
concerned, impartial outsiders have been given 
no reason to change the opinion that has been 
held ever since the United Nations started its 
efforts at mediation. India must be condemned.
Pakistan has at all times showed a willingness 
to accept United Nations proposals and India has 
with equal consistency either rejected them or 
made unreasonable conditions,Ü
The Times overlooks India's acceptance of the joint plebiscite
and partition formula, rejected by Pakistan. And Pakistan
has been in a better position to assent to other proposals,
for each tacitly or openly recognized the legitimacy of Paki-
Jpril 28, 1952.
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stani participation in Kashmir's affairs. In most instances, 
Pakistan has everything to gain by acceptance.
For India, Council, commission, and representative 
suggestions involved nullification of a portion of the legal 
framework upon which the Indian case rests. This process is 
certain to be slow and painful. That India eventually did 
accede to most major proposals is an indication of how great 
a change time has produced in the Indiana approach to the dis­
pute.
With cynicism toward international cooperation in 
control of the public mind after six years of half-peace, half­
war in world affairs, it Is popular to depreciate the Council 
on all counts, in all cases. Such an attitude is not just to 
the Council record on Kashmir. Four years of patient listen­
ing and proposals have carried India and Pakistan close to 
agreement. Even supposing progress were the result of time 
and exhaustion, the Council has contributed nevertheless in 
continuing negotiations and in forestalling war in the ini­
tial stages of the controversy. The Council, or its agents, 
brought agreement from India and Pakistan on a plebiscite as 
the solution to the dispute, on a cease-fire, and on general 
demilitarization provisions.
Study of the internal workings of the Security Council 
during consideration of the Kashmir question discloses several 
interesting points. The members acted with almost total im-r 
partiality toward India and Pakistan, Although in the early 
stages of discussion Argentina and Syria appeared more
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receptive to Pakistani arguments and at one point the Chinese 
delegate spoke out in defense of India, there has been no 
forthright championing of one party or the other, and touches 
of favoritism but imperceptibly have affected Council action, 
as revealed in resolutions. The majority has been resolutely 
neutral throughout; deviations clearly have been the result 
of personal opinion rather than alignments of opposing forces 
within the Council,
Even the East-West split, which has insinuated itself 
into almost every situation to fall under Council scrutiny, 
has been a negligible factor in consideration of the Kashmir 
dispute,12 At no point has the veto power come into opera­
tion, Soviet abstention from resolution votes indicates lack 
of interest rather than opposition to majority policies. Al­
though United Kingdom and United States diplomatic activity 
outside the Security Council drew fire from both the Soviet 
Union and Pakistan and indications of it appeared in several 
resolutions, efforts appear to have been in furtherance of 
Council policy rather than attempts to circumvent the inter­
national agency.
Coupled with this evidence that the Council is capable 
of functioning as an impartial mediator, a settlement, not 
too long delayed, may yet contribute toward recouping some 
of the Council’s prestige, diminished by slight success in
12Although the USSR publicly announced support of 
India in late 1951, the move has had no apparent influence 
upon Council attitudes and actions during consideration of 
the dispute in 1952.
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other disputes. A satisfactory solution could demonstrate
that the Council, although as now constituted incapable of
fulfilling the high hopes once held for it, can function
effectively as a conciliatory agency in the 'type of dispute
for which it was intended, a situation not complicated by
the unprovided for great-power rivalry. Graham noted this
possibility in his third reporti
The intellectual, political, and spiritual 
leaders of India and Pakistan have the most 
strategic opportunity through the settlement 
of a complex and stubborn dispute to give to 
the United Nations and to the peoples of the 
world a desperately needed example of interna-., 
tional cooperation for freedom, , , and peace.
Activities and achievements in the Kashmir question 
add no new facet to the known character of the Council. De­
spite over-enthusiastic expectations in certain quarters, the 
Security Council does not pretend to be the resolver of all 
international difficulties, the bearer of the millenium in 
international affairs. Without clear authority of its own 
and sufficient force to buttress that power, it is unable to 
function as an international arbiter. The Council was con­
ceived as more of a mediating agency to which international 
difficulties may be carried for discussion and settlement.
But even this interpretation of the Council's role 
rests on the hope that the great powers can cooperate, avoid­
ing alignment in rival factions. Any organization acceptable 
to the nations whose membership is essential can never pre-
Official Records. 5th Year, 564th Meeting,pp. 23—25.
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vail in the face of determined opposition of any great power
or reconcile a serious dispute among great powers. It is
obvious that the Council, following the failure of this hope, 
cannot function effectively while split into contending fac­
tions. But, as T, F, Tsiang noted, it can yet perform a 
service;
What, then, can the United Nations contribute
towards the maintenance of peace? It has no
force of its ov/n. It has no financial resources 
of its own. Some of the important problems of 
the world are not within the scope of its activ­
ities. . . In the face of all these limitations 
and difficulties there is one sphere where we can 
be useful and strong. That is the sphere of world 
public opinion. It is by mobilization of the 
moral forces of the world that the United Nations 
today can make a real contribution. I am firmly 
convinced that if we should be courageous enough 
to deploy all the moral forces of the world, we 
could yet maintain the peace of the world.14
Although Tsiang’8 view is perhaps overly idealistic, 
the Security Council does provide a forum by means of which 
states may release tensions which threaten hostilities. The 
Kashmir question is an example. "Dr, Graham obviously feels 
that if he and .the disputants. . . keep on talking, nothing 
drastic will happen, and perhaps time. . , will bring. . . a
solution.*15
The Security Council, as the United Nations organ 
primarily responsible for world peace and security, may yet 
contribute to some degree of international stability. Graham 
is of this opinion;
Official 5th Year, 471st Meeting, p. 14.
15%h& b m  /ipril 23, 1952.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-172-
The United Nations, with all its growing pains 
and frustrations, is the only international 
body for the settlement of the most difficult 
international disputes. The failure of peace­
ful settlement of such deep disputes has in­
volved the w/orld in tragedies too terrible to 
risk again. The United Nations, with all its 
defects, is nevertheless, with its multilateral 
procedures for the peaceful settlement of com­
plex disputes, still the best hope of the 
peoples for peace.16
Official Esfiajds, 6th Year, 564th Meeting,
pp. 23-25.
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Without the Security Council proceedings, 
containing verbatim -transcripts of debates on and 
resolutions concerning Kashmir, this study could 
not have been centered upon the Security Council 
itself. Although incomplete for several periods, 
the Records furnished most of the material for the 
chapters covering the activities of the Council, 
the commission, and the two representatives in the 
Kashmir question. The Records often are poorly 
printed and are dotted with typographical errors, 
but the information is there. For information on 
Council activities during the periods for which 
the Records have not been published, particularly
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from February 5 to March 31, 1948, additional 
sources were employed.
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Government of India, Tha Kashmir l&silÊ.. Ministry of Informa­
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Official publications .of the Indian and 
Pakistani governments supplemented information 
derived from the Council Records  ̂in particular 
furnishing a broader base for analysis of Indian 
and Pakistani positions. The Pakistani docu­
ments, blatantly propagandistic, state Pakistan's 
case and attack India on a number of issues rather 
than upon Kashmir alone. The Indian publications 
are more restrained, consistently stressing the 
legal approach to the question. The White Paper 
aa Indian States was of great aid as a source of 
information 6n the changing policy of the Indian 
government toward states which have acceded to 
the Indian Union,
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Several of these volumes contributed directly 
to the body of the thesis; others were primarily 
useful as background on Indian history, politics, 
and religious problems and on the United Nations. 
Ambedkar*s work is a violently anti-Moslem attack 
upon the concept of partition, although not fol­
lowing the official Congress line for he favors the 
two-nation plan as a means of ridding the Indian 
state of dissident elements. Subject India by 
Brailsford is a brief, anti-Congress study of Indian 
politics immediately prior to independence. De 
Montmorency offers a concise and competent study 
of the development and pre-independence pattern of 
the state system and of the meaning of paramountcy.
Most of the material for the discussion of the po­
sition of the states in Chapter I was drawn from 
this volume. Indian Crisis traces the historical 
development of the nationalist movement. Hoyland
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is highly critical of Congress, less so of the 
League, Lovett*s study of Indian nationalism, 
while turgidly written, is undeniably compre­
hensive for he traces in great detail origins of 
and influences upon the movement from inception 
of British rule to the conclusion of the First 
world war, SDd AfiPX» a collection
of speeches and papers by Jawaharlal Nehru, pro­
vides insight into the character and thought of 
the individual who motivates Indian policy. The 
legalistic, idealistic Indiansapproach to practi­
cal situations is clearly apparent in Nehru*s public 
pronouncements.
As a reference on the international law in­
volved in the Kashmir question, the Oppenheim- 
Lauterpacht omnibus is invaluable. Examining law 
among nations from both the-theoretic and the case 
study approaches, Oppenheim touches almost every 
point raised during the dispute. Brierly’s The 
L m  fil Nations, while a more readable work, is es­
sentially an essay on international legal theory 
rather than a documented investigation of is prac­
tical operation, Jessup follows a similar pattern 
with tendencies toward extreme idealism.
Sigrid Arne*s study of the United Nations is 
largely an essay on its genesis and development 
but also deals with its procedures and capabilities. 
The Ross study of the United Nations' constitutional 
basis was of more practical value to the thesis for 
Ross thoroughly dissects the significant provisions 
of the Charter to demonstrate what they mean in 
practice as well as in wording. Everyman*s United 
Nations, a handbook published by the Secretariat, 
is a useful source for Security Council facts, 
figures, procedures, and activities. The Yearbook 
serves a similar purpose. It was particularly use­
ful in charting progress of the Kashmir question 
in the Security Council,
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A great deal of information on Kashmir im­
mediately prior to invasion and during the course 
of hostilities as well as on contemporary Indian 
and Pakistani economic problems, politics, and 
foreign policy has been derived from periodicals. 
Of particular value were pieces by Alice and Dan­
iel Thorner, "Issues in Kashmir" is the most 
succinct account of developments in Kashmir be­
tween August, 1947 and January, 1948 encountered 
during research for this study. "India-Pakistan: 
Demography of Partition" by Kingsley Davis and 
"Partition of India and Prospects of Pakistan" by 
Dr. Spate contributed more to an understanding of 
issues raised in Council debates than they did to 
the body of the thesis. Phillips Talbot, in "In­
dependence of India," provides a thorough analysis 
of the history and precepts of the Congress party 
and the Moslem League. "Pakistan and the Tribes" 
is an informative, and highly sympathetic, survey 
of present Pakistani relations with the Fathans.
It was of considerable value in supplementing 
references to this subject in the Council debates.
Bias was obvious in several of the selections, 
notably those authored by Sir William Barton and 
Sir Percival Griffiths, both violently pro-Paki­
stan. In general, articles appearing in British 
publications were inclined to favor Pakistani 
arguments in the Kashmir question.
C. NEWSPAPERS 
Ib£. Hsw lack IXms.» August, 1947-July, 1952.
The Times proved invaluable for supplementary 
background material and for information not avail­
able in the Council Records. Coverage of the per­
iods February 5 to March 31, 1948 and May 1 to 
June 30, 1952 was particularly important to the 
thesis for the official Security Council proceed­
ings for these dates are not available. Articles 
covering the early days of ithe invasion of Kashmir 
were also of great value.
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